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Abstract
Essays on Inequality and Macroeconomic Stability
by
Thomas William Francis Hauner
Adviser: Professor Wim Vijverberg
This dissertation consists of three chapters. . .
Chapter 1: Aggregate Wealth and Its Distribution as Determinants of Finan-
cial Crises: Panel Evidence This essay investigates the relationship between wealth
inequality and financial crises across a panel of nine advanced economies over the past 100
years. While substantiation of a role for income inequality is ambiguous in the literature,
evidence is presented suggesting a unique capacity for the accumulation of assets to increase
the likelihood of a future financial crisis episode. Testing long-run panel data with a reduced
form, two-way fixed effects model, estimates suggest that increasing wealth inequality, in an
economy with high levels of aggregate wealth as measured by the wealth-income ratio, has a
significantly positive and increasing marginal effect on the likelihood of future financial crises,
particularly stock market crashes. Predicted probabilities from country-specific fixed effect
logit models closely track the incidence of financial crises in the United States and United
Kingdom over the last century. It is argued that these results reveal an important role for
the distribution of accumulated assets in the macro-financial stability of rich countries. The
distribution of stocks may capture structural vulnerabilities that the distribution of flows
cannot expose, and hence more unequal countries in wealth face greater financial instability.
An economic network hypothesis, elaborated in Chapter 2, is proposed for interpreting these
results.
v
Chapter 2: Network Defect: Wealth Inequality, Network Topology, and Financial
Crisis If two, otherwise identical, economies were distinguished only by their distributions
of wealth, are they equally stable in response to a random shock? This essay proposes a
theoretical financial network model to understand the relationship between wealth inequality
and financial crises. In a financial network, financial assets link individual asset and liability
holders to form a web of economic connections. The total connectivity of an individual is de-
scribed by their degree, and the overall distribution of connections in the network is imposed
through a degree distribution—equivalent to the wealth distribution as incoming connections
represent assets and outgoing connections liabilities. A network’s topology varies with the
level of wealth inequality and total wealth and together, simulations show, they determine
network contagion in the event of a random negative income shock to some individual. Ran-
dom network simulations, whereby each financial connection is randomly placed, reveal that
increasing wealth inequality makes a wealthy network less stable—as measured by the share
of individuals failing financially or the decline in financial asset values. These results intro-
duce the idea for a unique topological role for accumulated assets and their distribution in
macro-financial stability.
Chapter 3: Instability, Credit, and Inequality in the Twentieth Century The final
essay studies the long-run relationship between financial instability, wealth inequality and
aggregate wealth, and household debt. Specifically, it examines whether wealth inequality
and aggregate wealth are contributing forces to the level of financial instability in the United
States over the 20th century, or whether debt is a more crucial lever. A more traditional role
for income inequality is also investigated and compared, in which its long-run increases may
add to household debt and, from there, to a financial crisis. Applying a vector autoregression
model, which assumes the endogeneity of the variables, and studying any cointegrating
relations provides statistical validity to these relationships through rigorous specification
vi
and hypothesis testing. Results show that wealth inequality, acting in concert with the
large accumulation of aggregate financial wealth, contributes significantly and positively to
financial instability. A second long-run relationship is found between household debt and
wealth inequality, whereby increases in financial instability are the main adjusting force
back to stationary levels. Less robust evidence is found strongly linking household debt to
financial instability, though income inequality does significantly contribute to debt long-term.
Together, these results emphasize the important role for the distribution of accumulated
wealth in the stability of the US economy.
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Chapter 1
Aggregate Wealth and Its
Distribution as Determinants of
Financial Crises: Panel Evidence
1.1 Introduction
Familiar plots from Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez reveal the share of income held
by top percentiles in the United States provocatively peaking before both the Great Crash
and the more recent global financial crisis. (For example, see Piketty and Saez (2003),
Alvaredo et al. (2013), and Piketty and Saez (2014).) This correlation has generated a host
of discussions and research into the relationship between income inequality and financial
crisis. (See Milanovic (2009), Krugman (2010), and Acemoglu (2011), among others.)
There exist two primary mechanisms in the literature to explain the apparent association
between inequality and financial crisis. The first, and less-cited, is the institutional narrative,
favored by Acemoglu and also Moss (2009), whereby deregulatory shifts unleashed market
forces that increased risk, leverage, and economic fallout in the event of a crash.
1
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The second proposed mechanism is a household debt story. One variation emphasizes the
demand from non-rich households, such that income inequality pushed households to borrow
while holding consumption and savings constant (Cynamon and Fazzari (2014), Carvalho and
Di Guilmi (2014)). Another variation places the emphasis on the supply side—not unlike
the institutional story. Government agencies loosened the reigns for household lending and
homeownership (Rajan (2011)) or the federal reserve held interest rates down (Stiglitz (2012))
in an effort to stimulate aggregate demand. Yet another variation points to wealthy high-net-
worth individuals who sought safe, high-yielding investments in a world of declining interest
rates. The mass of collateralized debt obligations and asset-backed securities was a response
to the insatiable investing appetites of hedge funds and other institutional investors abroad
(Lysandrou (2011), Stockhammer (2012), Stockhammer (2015)). Still others (Kumhof and
Ranciere (2010) argued that the precise causal force of growing debt was less concerning
since many forces contributed (e.g. weakened labor bargaining positions, stunted income
growth, and the search for yield amongst wealthy households). What mattered was the
equilibrium level of household debt, which contributed to instability. Lucchino and Morelli
(2012) provide an initial summary of the existing theories, highlighting which parts of the
income distribution each emphasizes.
The household debt mechanism is not entirely convincing, however. Two underlying is-
sues give pause. First, Mason and Jayadev (2014) demonstrate that “Fisher dynamics,” their
terminology for interest rate changes, inflation, and income growth, account for most, if not
all, of the increases in US household leverage since 1980. Leverage grew not because of indi-
vidual household choices or institutional policy shifts (with the exception of interest rates)
but due to these broader “Fisher” macroeconomic dynamics. Second, debt may disguise
the true structural forces driving economic stability. In a summary of the inequality-crisis
literature, Jayadev (2013) concludes, “wealth/net worth may be the more critical variable,
especially when financial crises are driven by asset bubbles.” Indeed, Morelli and Atkinson
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(2015) survey 84 crises across 21 countries over the past century, examining both the levels
of and changes in income inequality preceding a crisis episode, and conclude that the impact
of either on financial crises is ambiguous. Because one individual’s liability is another’s asset,
the empirical focus of this paper turns to the latter half of the balance sheet. It is argued
that wealth inequality, rather than income inequality, is the more influential determinant of
financial crises.
Presenting empirical evidence of the relationship between wealth inequality, aggregate
wealth, and financial crises, this paper argues that wealth inequality, in an economy with
high levels of aggregate wealth, has a positive, significant, and robust marginal effect on
the likelihood of a future financial crisis, particularly a stock market crash—or both a stock
market crash and banking crisis. Relying on an unbalanced panel data set of nine Western
European and Anglo-Saxon countries over the past century, results are drawn from a set
of reduced-formed, two-way fixed effects linear probability models. The results hold when
accounting for financial sector development, private sector credit, top marginal tax rates,
average rates of return on capital, and GDP growth. Furthermore, no significant relationships
are found when income inequality replaces wealth inequality in the model. This is evidence
of the belief that wealth inequality captures certain structural attributes of the economy that
income inequality cannot. And some structural arrangements are more stable than others.
Why should the distribution of assets (a stock) be a more relevant factor in financial
instability than the distribution of income (a flow)? Asset accumulations serve as a proxy for
the underlying structural relationships of an economic network. Axel Leijonhufvud described
an economy as a “web of contracts and understandings” between agents. In such an economic
web, financial assets and liabilities link parties. They connect households and individuals
who are codependent on the future cash flows such assets represent. In a network model, the
total number of assets or connections represents an individual’s degree and the distribution
of those assets can be described through a degree distribution—a useful summary statistic in
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graph theory that characterizes large networks. Much like the financial network contagion
literature (see Allen and Gale (2000), Battiston et al. (2012), and Elliott et al. (2014a),
among others) it is argued that the topology of the network—as chiefly determined by the
degree distribution—characterizes its level of stability, or the severity of contagion in the
event of a shock.
In Chapter two, using a simple static network model of interpersonal wealth, it is shown
that wealth inequality can directly contribute to the stability of the network structure in the
event of a shock. Stability is defined as the number of individuals in the network economy
whose net worth drops below some threshold. When assets are distributed evenly, a single
shock to one individual’s wealth is quickly absorbed by connected individuals who all have
similar financial wealth. But when assets are unequally distributed, a shock is less likely to be
absorbed by the network. Instead, contagion spreads as failure costs, previously absorbed in a
more equal network, wipe out collateral wealth—the underlying value of all network assets—
from one connected individual to the next. Across model simulations, network contagion is
jointly determined by (1) the level of wealth inequality, and (2) total wealth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 outlines the reduced-form
econometric model and its marginal effects; Section 1.3 presents the data and Section 1.4 the
estimation results; in Section 1.5 some robustness checks are shared, bolstering the initial
findings, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Methodology
A reduced-form empirical model is derived in this section based on insights from the theoret-
ical framework in the following Chapter as well as the broader financial contagion literature.
From the former, the finding—demonstrated in simulations—that aggregate wealth and its
distribution jointly determine the stability of a financial network is incorporated. That
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is, wealth inequality only positively contributes to instability in sufficiently rich economies.
Total national wealth, individually, has a nonlinear effect on economic network stability,
as argued by Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Elliott et al. (2014a), initially leading to more
instability but then becoming more stabilizing.
Wealth inequality is empirically measured as the top 1%’s share of aggregate net worth
top1nw and aggregate wealth is measured relative to national income W/Y . These explana-
tory variables are interacted to capture their jointly deterministic role in network instability.
The linear probability model thus takes the following form, including country and year fixed
effects:






+ γ′Xit−2 + εit. (1.1)
Dependent variable crisiskit is a binary indicator of a financial crisis of type k for a given
country i and year t, top1nw represents the net worth held by the top 1% of households,
and W/Y is the aggregate wealth-income ratio for a given country. The vector X contains
a set of control variables including financial sector size, estimated averages rates of return
on capital, and average GDP per capita growth rates. Lag-length, included to clarify the
direction of the proposed relationship, is selected by information criteria.1
In order to test the nonlinear relationship between aggregate wealth and instability sug-
gested in the literature (and echoed by the simulations in the next Chapter) a quadratic
term for aggregate wealth is added to the model.
1The income inequality-crisis literature has used both contemporaneous and lagged specifications with
mixed results.
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+ γ′Xit−2 + εit.
(1.2)
Of course the linear probability model (LPM) is not an applied researcher’s first choice to
estimate a binary dependent variable regression equation. Aside from predicted probabilities
that land outside the unit interval (and often below zero), the LPM implies E[ε] = 0 and
therefore that the estimated coefficient must equal the true parameter value. It is cautiously
used, however, because emphasis is placed on the positive or negative marginal effects of
wealth inequality on the likelihood of a financial crisis. Also, because of the interaction term
these effects behave nonlinearly, making any clear interpretation of marginal effects in a logit
model difficult. There also exist significant gaps in the time series data, leading to irregularly-
spaced observations that may or may not be clustered around a crisis episode (see Figure
1.A.1). Thus it becomes important to control for both time and country fixed effects as
allowed by the LPM. Country and year fixed effects also help account for between-country
crisis correlations—an imperfect remedy. Other measures such as averaging observations
across half-decade intervals, or redefining a binary outcome, are also taken.
The model is not primarily intended as a predictive tool, to forecast by what percent
the probability of crisis changes based on changing wealth distributions, but rather as an
analytical measure of historical significance. Any significant results merely prop up the
financial network framework for relating macroeconomic stability to wealth distributions.
Still, as a robustness exercise, country-specific predicted probabilities from a logit model are
shared in Section 3.7. As another robustness check, fixed effect logit models are estimated
for many of the same relationships, though they can only control for country fixed effects.
A two-way fixed effects logit estimator, as elegantly laid out by Charbonneau (2014), is not
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readily feasible for applied work.
1.2.1 Marginal effects
The marginal effects of wealth inequality top1nw on the likelihood of a financial crisis of
type k implies, from Equation (1.1), that
∂crisiskit
∂top1nwit−2




Coefficient β1 is now difficult to interpret. For example, if β1 is to be economically significant
then W/Y must equal zero, an impossible outcome. (An analogous scenario would afflict β2 if
considering the marginal effects of aggregate wealth.) Hence the sign and significance of the
overall marginal effect is emphasized, evaluated at the mean as well as the 25th percentile
of the wealth-income ratio distribution. Also presented is the average marginal effect of
wealth inequality, whose standard errors are estimated using the Delta method. Plots of the
individual marginal effects will provide a visual description of which sample observations are
positive or negative.
Rejecting the null hypothesis H1 : β3 = 0, in favor of a positive alternative where β3 > 0,
implies wealth inequality and aggregate wealth both contribute to financial instability so
long as the expression in equation (1.3) remains greater than zero. It would support the
structural interpretation, argued here, for why the distribution of stocks rather than flows
contributes to the financial stability of an economy.
From Equation (1.2) the nonmonotonic effects of aggregate wealth on instability are




= β2 + 2β4
W
Y it−2
+ β3top1nwit−2 S 0. (1.4)
Under this model, rejecting the null hypothesis H2 : β2 = 0 = β4 in favor of an alternative,
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in which β2 > 0 and β4 < 0 and generate a negatively sloped marginal effects curve, would
suggest aggregate wealth displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with financial instability.
A marginal effects curve that is positively sloped would contradict this claim.
While it may be tempting to summarize any marginal effect from wealth inequality on
financial crises with a single statistic, such as an average marginal effect, doing so would




The net worth held by the top 1% of households measures wealth inequality.2 A survey
by Roine and Waldenström (2015) collects ten national time series of wealth concentration.3
Data for Italy (Brandolini et al. (2006)) and Spain (Alvaredo and Saez (2009)) are also in-
cluded. Each country’s time series is dependent on sampling methods and weighting, tax
evasion, mortality rate calculations, and the basic unit of measurement. Despite heteroge-
neous methodology, but also given the lack of a consistent historical survey across countries,
the data are employed conscious of these shortcomings. Data begin with a single observation
in 1740 for the UK and continue through 2012. Many series are sporadic with large gaps
between observations. There is, however, a distinct overall trend. Each country’s top wealth
shares peak near the turn of the twentieth century, decline, and then begin increasing at
various points between the 1950s and 1960s. Australia, Sweden, and the UK show strong
increases over the last 40 years, while others are more mild, such as France, the Netherlands,
and the US (Figure 1.1).
2Surveys from France, the UK, and US are based on individual data. Roine and Waldenström (2015)
also cite studies comparing household versus individual surveys which find “no important differences.”
3Available online at http://www.uueconomics.se/danielw/Handbook.htm. A complete list of their data
sources for historical wealth inequality can be found in table A1 of Roine and Waldenström (2015)
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It should be noted that US data are from the Kopczuk and Saez (2004) series rather
than the more recent, and higher frequency, Saez and Zucman (2014) study. The latter’s
capitalization method, whereby top wealth shares are estimated using a multiplier that
inflates reported capital incomes to national income and product account aggregates, is
inconsistent with other countries in the panel. Later, when predicting probabilities at the
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(b) 1915–2012
Figure 1.1: Top 1% Share of Net Worth
Sources: Roine and Waldenström (2015), Brandolini et al. (2006),
and Alvaredo and Saez (2009).
Aggregate Wealth
Piketty and Zucman (2014) estimate a country’s national wealth, calling it the capital-
income ratio, by summing all marketable capital assets at their current price levels. This is
equivalent to the aggregate wealth-income ratio. Assets tabulated include productive capital
such as land and factories, financial capital like pensions and life insurance, and also capital
assets like art, but exclude durable goods, an important source of wealth and collateral for
low-income households, claims on future government spending and transfers, and human
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capital—a key determinant of contemporary incomes.
The Piketty and Zucman (2014) data cover a panel of seven countries from 1845 through
2012.4 It is supplemented with national wealth data estimates for Sweden (from Waldenström
(2015)) and Denmark (from Abildgren (2015)).5 Both series adhere to the methodological
approach of Piketty and Zucman (2014). Some general trends emerge in the aggregate wealth
data: all countries experience increases over the last 40 years, with some, such as the US and
UK, beginning around 60 years ago; all countries, except Sweden and the US, had very high
aggregate wealth in the nineteenth century; and the UK and France are notably approaching















1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
Figure 1.2: Aggregate Wealth-Income Ratios
Sources: Alvaredo et al. (2017), Waldenström (2015), and Abildgren
(2015)
The two central explanatory variables (wealth inequality and aggregate wealth) are avail-
able for nine countries: Australia, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
4The World Wealth and Income Database (WWID), formerly known as the World Top Incomes Database
(WTID), is partially derived from contributions like Piketty and Zucman (2014). Data are available online
at http://wid.world.data/.
5See Waldenström (2014) for the creation of the Swedish National Wealth Database (SNWD).
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the UK, and the US. Depending on model specification and estimation method, the panel
contains up to 273 observations. However, it is quite unbalanced. There exist 105 unique
years and one fifth contain only a single country.
Financial Crises
Binary crisis indicators invite scrutiny since they are largely determined through profes-
sional consensus, established through precedent and acceptance in the relevant literature.
Indicator data come from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), one such accepted source, and specify
the country, year and crisis type. The authors define financial crises granularly, distinguishing
between six crisis types.6 The focus here is on two: banking crises and stock market crashes.
(The others, it can be argued, are predominantly politically rather than economically de-
termined.) A banking crisis is defined as either a series of bank runs that culminate in the
public takeover of at least one institution, or the closure, merging, takeover, or government
assistance of one important institution. A stock market crash is defined more objectively.
When multi-year real returns are at least −25 percent, a crash is deemed to have occurred.
Crisis episodes, in the nine country panel, are summarized in the timeline in Figure 1.A.1
relative to the availability of explanatory variable observations. Existing continuous mea-
sures of financial stress are not considered because they only begin in the 1990s. Chapter
three, which only studies the US, will examine a continuous measure.
Controls
Myriad other factors, either at individual or aggregate levels, could account for any
apparent relationship between wealth inequality in rich countries and a financial crisis. To
account for a country’s level of financial market development, such that increases in wealth-
income ratios or top wealth shares are not simply reflecting the size of a country’s financial
markets, data on the overall share of value added to GDP by the financial sector over time
are included. Data, from Philippon and Reshef (2013), begin as early as 1850 for some
6Currency, inflation, stock market crashes, domestic and external sovereign debt, and banking crises.
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Table 1.1: Number of Crisis Episodes: 1870–2010, Subsample 1
Banking Crisis Stock Market Crash Both
Australia 0 4 0
Denmark 0 2 0
France 0 5 0
Italy 3 1 1
Netherlands 0 1 0
Spain 4 5 1
Sweden 1 6 1
United Kingdom 6 10 1
United States 13 24 7




Notes: Subsample is restricted to country-year observations with top1%
wealth shares, aggregate wealth-income ratios, and finance’s share of
total income. Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
countries and continue through 2007.
From Roine et al. (2009), a measure of financial development (the sum of bank deposits
and stock market capitalization) is included to estimate a proxy for the rate of return on
capital, discussed in greater detail below. From the same study a measure of total private
sector credit—as a share of GDP—accounts for borrowing by households and firms, the
most cited determinant of financial crises in the literature. Data begin in 1900 and continue
through 2006.7 Top marginal tax rates are also included since they directly determine indi-
vidual savings, which accumulate into wealth and can also represent a form of redistribution.
Efforts at redistribution is cited as one destabilizing force of the US subprime mortgage crisis
(Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Rajan (2011)).
Asset price bubbles, and the business cycles which generate them, are the prevailing
economic theory of financial crises. To support the argument that it is the distribution
of assets that contributes to financial instability, an attempt is made to control for these
7See Table 1 in Roine et al. (2009) for detailed documentation of the original sources of each series.
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factors by including proxies for the rate of return on capital as well as GDP growth. Piketty
(2014) presents r > g as a simple theoretical relation between rates of return on capital and
overall growth to explain long-run increases in wealth inequality, and Fuest et al. (2015)
corroborate it empirically. Including both r and g helps to ensure that any apparent effect
of wealth inequality on instability is not simply being driven by cyclical determinants of
wealth inequality or asset price bubbles. Differencing over changes in financial development
yields the proxy for r and g is approximated by the percent change in income per capita
using Maddison-Project (2013) data. With the full set of control variables the panel data set
becomes just 134 observations for 6 countries (Australia, Spain, France, Sweden, the UK,
and US). (See Tables 1.1, 1.A.1–1.A.2 for summary statistics of dependent, explanatory, and
control variables.)
1.4 Results
Ordinary least squares results are briefly discussed for various specifications of the reduced
form linear probability model in equation (1.1). Of primary concern, however, is the marginal
effect of wealth inequality on crises (Equations (1.3)). Inferring fitted probabilities is not
practicable since in many instances values may be negative—and technically uninterpretable.
Results from estimating the likelihood of banking crises are presented in Table 1.2 and
the likelihood of stock market crashes in Table 1.3. In the Panel A estimates of both crisis
types, coefficients for the term interacting wealth inequality with aggregate wealth-income
ratios are significant for the model specification only controlling for financial sector size
(Columns 1). After careful consideration, balancing parsimony with sample size, but also by
information criteria, this is the preferred specification. The preferred model explains over
57 percent of the variation in banking crises and 82 percent of the variation in stock market
crashes. The estimated parameter for the interacted term retains significance, and increases
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slightly in magnitude, in the fully specified model (Columns 3).
The parameter estimate for the interaction term between inequality and the wealth-
income ratio in the stock market crash model (Table 1.3, Panel A) is notably more significant
(at 1%) across all three specifications than the banking crisis models. One reason may be
that the occurrence of a banking crisis is defined by government intervention, an inherently
political and discretionary decision. Regulators and researchers may have varied definitions
of a systemically important institution (which required the federal aid). Given imprecise
definitions, observations with positive banking crises may lack enough within-group variation
to demonstrate any consistent relationship. Financial contagion that prompts government
intervention and bailouts in one circumstance may not seem sufficiently dire to officials in an
alternate scenario and thus similar circumstances may have opposing outcomes. In contrast,
stock market crashes are defined by predetermined empirical changes in stock market indices
and not ad hoc political interventions, perhaps one reason that stronger inference exists in
those models. The simplest explanation may just be that the frequency of stock market
crashes is more than twice the frequency of banking crises (Table 1.1).
1.4.1 Marginal effects of wealth inequality
Independently, wealth inequality has a negative and significant (at 5%) coefficient concern-
ing banking crises (Table 1.2, Column 1). Aggregate wealth has a similarly negative but
insignificant coefficient. The marginal effect of wealth inequality on banking crises becomes
∂crisisbit
∂top1nwit−2
= −3.542 + 1.759W
Y it−2
, (1.5)
and this expression is positive and increasing for all levels of the aggregate wealth-income
ratio above the 0.02 percentile—that is, all observations in the full data series excluding
three (Germany in 1948 and the UK in 1948–1949) and all observations in the subsample.
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Table 1.2: Likelihood of Banking Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -3.542
∗ -0.699 -1.807
(1.757) (2.536) (2.388)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.169 -0.110 -0.227
(0.185) (0.217) (0.233)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 1.759∗∗ 1.350 2.031∗
(0.565) (1.024) (0.901)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 -6.077 -8.543 -8.463
(6.440) (5.382) (5.435)
r̃ t−2 -0.038 0.045
(0.256) (0.295)
ĝ t−2 1.148 -0.108
(1.027) (1.224)
Private Sector Credit t−2 0.065
(0.104)




Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 3.837∗∗∗ 4.865∗ 6.374∗
(1.097) (2.177) (2.503)





AIC -18.6 -3.6 -10.3
R2 0.571 0.528 0.565
Countries 9 9 6
Obs 213 156 134
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of banking crisis in a given country and year. Linear
probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year. A proxy
for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all
bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy for growth,
is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and
the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis
type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth as well as the average marginal
effect.
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Table 1.3: Likelihood of Stock Market Crash
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -6.964
∗∗∗ -8.638∗∗∗ -9.465∗∗∗
(0.668) (1.448) (2.173)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.602
∗∗∗ -0.622∗∗∗ -0.772∗∗
(0.066) (0.124) (0.219)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 2.459∗∗∗ 2.733∗∗∗ 2.892∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.599) (0.696)






ĝ t−2 -0.012 -0.703
(1.346) (1.615)
Private Sector Credit t−2 0.063
(0.143)
Top Marginal Tax Rate t−2 -0.003
(0.007)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 3.353∗∗∗ 2.624∗ 2.184∗∗
(0.454) (1.205) (0.677)





AIC -101.6 -53.1 -65.4
R2 0.825 0.772 0.794
Countries 9 9 6
Obs 213 156 134
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of stock market crash in a given country and year. Linear
probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year. A proxy
for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all
bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy for growth,
is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and
the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis
type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth as well as the average marginal
effect.
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The marginal effect of wealth inequality on banking crises is evaluated at two different points
along the wealth-income ratio distribution, its mean and 25th percentile. Additionally, the
average of all individual marginal effects are also calculated. These results are summarized
in Panel B of Table 1.2. A visual summary of the individual marginal effects is presented
in Figure 1.3a, where the magnitude of the marginal effect is plotted against aggregate
wealth levels, comparing observations across the entire sample of data with the specific
subsample the preferred model (Column 1) was estimated on. The distribution of aggregate
wealth observations is shown by the kernel density plot, where dashed vertical lines indicate
medians. (Figure 1.3b summarizes the corresponding marginal effects of wealth inequality
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(b) Stock Market Crash
Figure 1.3: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood of Crisis: LPM
Importantly, the marginal effect of wealth inequality on the likelihood of a banking crisis
is very positive, and significant at 1%, when evaluated at the average aggregate wealth value
or when averaging the individual effects. In fact, the effect is positive and significant (at 5%)
when evaluated all the way down at the 10th percentile of the aggregate wealth distribution.
In the fully specified model (Table 1.2, Column 3), which, while adjusting for relative rates
of return, private credit, and marginal tax rates, reduces the sample size to 134 observations,
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the marginal effect of wealth inequality is even more positive, and remains significant at 5%
when averaging across individual effects.
Turning to stock market crashes, the marginal effect of wealth inequality in the pre-
ferred model (Table 1.3, Column 1) is similarly positive in magnitude, increasing, and also
significant at the 1% level. The explicit formulation becomes
∂crisissit
∂top1nwit−2
= −6.964 + 2.459W
Y it−2
. (1.6)
It remains positive when wealth-income ratios are above the 8th percentile of ratios among
the model’s full data series as well as its subsample (see Figure 1.3b), thus the marginal effect
is positive at the mean and 25th percentile of wealth-income ratios and significant to 1%.
The same is true of the average marginal effect of wealth inequality on stock market crashes.
While the fully specified model’s estimates (Table 1.3, Column 3) are equally statistically
significant, the marginal effect of wealth inequality on stock market crashes is positive only
at and above the 15th percentile of aggregate wealth in the subsample and the 20th percentile
of the full series. The marginal effects, after adjusting for credit, rates of growth, and tax
rates, remain significant and significant at 1%.
Overall, the first null hypothesis (H1 : β3 = 0) must be rejected. The alternative (β3 > 0)
is compatible with the network hypothesis: that wealth inequality positively contributes to
financial instability in rich economies by arranging financial connections between individuals
in an increasingly vulnerable structure. The LPM results indicate that wealth inequality has
a positive and significant marginal effect on the likelihood of both of banking crises and stock
market crashes. The positive slopes observed in Figure 1.3 support the contention that the
marginal effect of wealth inequality on instability is increasing as economies become richer.
While wealth inequality’s marginal effect is positive on both crisis types, it is unsurprising
that the stock market crash model’s parameter estimates are more significant and consistent
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given their more objective definition and greater prevalence in the data. However, average
marginal effects are similarly positive and significant between crisis types. These results sup-
port the argument that the distribution of wealth is an important component in determining
the likelihood of some future financial crisis in a wealthy economy. The network framework
implies that a rising maldistribution directly weakens the underlying interconnectedness of
the economy such that a negative shock has a higher probability of inflicting contagion within
a sufficiently rich network.
1.4.2 Additional crisis specifications
One concern with the above results is that they may be influenced by the seemingly random
availability of historic wealth inequality observations. French wealth inequality data, for ex-
ample, are available only every 10 years beginning in 1870. (See Figure 1.A.1 in the appendix,
which indicates crisis years and data observations in the largest subsample.) Another, more
intractable, problem is that crises are correlated across countries. Considering these possi-
bilities, more long-run relationships are examined by averaging observations across five-year
horizons.8 The dependent variable now takes a value of 1 if the crisis type ever occurs over
the half-decade interval, and a 0 otherwise. International correlations of crises may now be
absorbed by the wider time window, and the wealth inequality-crisis relationship is framed
in more of a long-run context. Lags are omitted from the averaged model.
Estimation results of the reduced form, two-way fixed effects models averaged across
five-year intervals show consistently positive estimates for the interaction parameter (Tables
1.B.1–1.B.2 in the appendix). The fully specified model’s estimates are most significant
when describing the relationship to banking crises (Column 3), while the model adjusting
for financial sector size, rates of return, and growth, and the fully specified model are most
8The data are so unbalanced that a Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional dependence can not be esti-
mated.
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significant when describing the relationship to stock market crashes (Column 2–3).
For consistent comparisons to previous results, the preferred LPM model specification
(Columns 1) is used to examine the marginal effects from wealth inequality (Figure 1.B.1 in
the appendix). Wealth inequality demonstrates a strongly positive and increasing marginal
effect on stock market crashes over five-year periods—and remains so for 98 percent of
wealth-income ratios observations. Specific marginal effects are summarized in Panel B of
Table 1.B.2. It shows that for each model specification, the average marginal effect of wealth
inequality on stock market crashes is very positive and significant at at least 5%.
The marginal effect of wealth inequality is also positive on banking crises, though in-
significant for the preferred model (see Panel B of Table 1.B.1). It remains positive, but
becomes significant (at 1%) in the fully specified model for all levels of aggregate wealth
above the 25th percentile in the subsample. The average effect of wealth inequality on stock
market crashes is also positive and significant at 1% in the full model.
To further test the constancy of the wealth inequality-financial crisis relationship, the
crisis indicator is redefined. A large crisis occurs when both crisis types occur within the
same year for a given country (i.e. the intersection of banking crises and stock market
crashes). Not only does such an indicator occur with much less frequency (only five percent
of the largest subsample’s observations), but it also reflects another popular crisis indicator
developed by Schularick and Taylor (2012)—derived through peer-reviewed consensus as well
as consultation with economic historians—an indicator of systemic financial crises.
Regression results (presented in Table 1.B.3) indicate wealth inequality interacted with
national wealth is significantly and positively related to large crises in the preferred spec-
ification, Column 1. Significance suffers attrition as controls are added and observations
decline—though it remains significant at 10% in the full specification. Wealth inequality is
found to have a positive and increasing marginal effect on the likelihood of large crises when
aggregate wealth is anywhere above the 10th percentile of the distribution in both the full
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sample and subsample of observations (see Figure 1.B.2). If all of the individual effects are
averaged, the average marginal effect of wealth inequality on large crises is strongly positive
and significant (at 1%) for each of the model specifications (Panel B, Table 1.B.3).
The averaging of observations over five year intervals is repeated for the large crisis
indicator. Estimation results are shown in Table 1.B.4 and are significant (at 1%) only in
the fully specified model (Column 3). The overwhelming majority of observations yield a
positive and increasing marginal effect of wealth inequality on the likelihood of a large crisis
occurring for a given country in the preferred specification (see Figure 1.B.3), however the
small sample size of 72 observations limits inference.
Together, these results support a strong positive relationship from rising wealth inequality
to future financial instability, conditional on the aggregate wealth of the economy in question.
Moreover, they are compatible with the contention that the distribution of accumulated
assets imparts structural information about the economy which has direct implications for
its macroeconomic stability. Unequally distributed assets imply an economic structure that
is more vulnerable to contagion in rich economies.
1.4.3 Aggregate wealth and instability
The theoretical framework in Chapter two, in addition to linking wealth inequality to an
increased likelihood of financial crisis, predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between
rising aggregate wealth and financial instability—echoing nonlinearities described in the fi-
nancial network contagion literature. That is, as the network becomes wealthier instability
increases but eventually decreases because a sufficiently high number of financial links be-
tween individuals absorb any negative shock and contagion threat. Least squares estimates
of Equation (1.2) are presented in Table 1.B.5 of the appendix, all based on the preferred
model specification that adjusts for financial sector size.
Though explaining between 50 and 80 percent of the variation, and again showing very
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significant results for the interacted term between wealth inequality and aggregate wealth,
no coefficients of wealth-income ratio terms suggest a plausible inverted-U relationship. The
only coefficients that actually lead to an inverted-U graph are from the stock market crash
model, but it is increasing for extremely negative values of wealth—an impossible situation—
and decreasing for all nonnegative values. Also, the marginal effects of aggregate wealth on
crises (Equation (1.4) and Figure 1.B.4) are positive and increasing—exactly the opposite of
the anticipated outcome.
While we still reject our second hypothesis (H2 : β2 = 0 = β4), we cannot reject it
an favor of an alternative that indicates a negative quadratic relationship between network
wealth and instability as suggested by our model. One possibility is that the economies in
our sample have all attained sufficiently high levels of aggregate wealth by the 20th century
that they are all on the downward sloping portion of the inverted-U curve. However, there is
a large enough percentage of observations that show a significantly negative marginal effect
of aggregate wealth on stock market crashes to leave the question unsettled.
1.5 Robustness Checks
This section presents findings on and discusses four robustness checks of the empirical re-
sults. First, the empirical relationship in Equation (1.1) is estimated with first differences
rather than fixed effects. Second, a fixed effects logit model is estimated. Third, income
is substituted for wealth as the inequality measure to test if the distribution of stocks does
in fact have more explanatory power than the distribution of flows. Lastly, within-sample
predicted probabilities from logit models are compared, on a country-by-country basis, with
actual large crisis episodes.
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1.5.1 First difference estimator
A well-known econometric result is that in panel data with T = 2, first difference and
fixed effect methods lead to the same estimator. However, as T grows relative to N , and
if the panel is unbalanced, then differences can result. It could be that the first difference
estimator, which also accounts for time invariant characteristics of the model, may yield
more information than the two-way fixed effects estimator that soaks up any idiosyncratic
variation between countries.
The estimated model in first differences, and ignoring fixed effects, becomes









Estimating the linear probability model with first differences and clustering standard
errors by country finds significance for the interaction term between wealth inequality and
aggregate wealth for stock market crashes and large crises (see Tables 1.C.1–1.C.3 in the
appendix). Though the preferred model varies in comparison to the two-way fixed effects
estimator, the sign and significance on stock market crashes and large crises demonstrate
constancy. Furthermore, positive average marginal effects of wealth inequality on future stock
market crashes and large crises are found to be significant—and at 1 percent for large crises.
(Graphs of the marginal effects of wealth inequality are not shown.) That positive, and
significant, average marginal effects from wealth inequality for the first differenced estimator
echo the results from the two-way fixed effects estimator lends validity to the initial results.
Rising wealth inequality, in rich countries, appears to increase the likelihood of a future large
financial crisis.
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1.5.2 Fixed effect logit model
The fixed effect logit model is estimated to confirm the above findings from the linear prob-
ability model with two-way fixed effects. The following equation, with country-level fixed
effects, is estimated using maximum likelihood
Pr(crisiskit = 1) = Λ
(










where Λ(·) represents the cdf of the logistic distribution.
Results estimating the likelihood of banking crises, stock market crashes, and large crises
are shown in Tables 1.D.1–1.D.3 of the appendix. In the preferred models (Column 1),
estimates are not significant—though the interacted term between inequality and wealth
remains positive. The fully specified models become significant and extremely positive in
the interacted term, however extremely large standard errors suggest the specification is
overdetermined. (The fully specified large crisis model is, in fact, perfectly determined.)
Estimating the marginal effects of wealth inequality on both crisis types yields the plots
in Figures 1.D.1–1.D.2, both based on the specification in Columns 1. Marginal effects from
wealth inequality are overwhelming negative, though increasing, on banking crises. The
effects on stock market crashes and large crises, however, are overwhelmingly positive. The
average of the individual marginal effects is positive and significant at 1% in the second and
third specifications of the stock market crash model and second specification of the large
crisis model.
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1.5.3 Income inequality model
Is the emphasis on wealth inequality rather than income inequality warranted? Or, does
income inequality also relate to future unstable financial markets? The same reduced form
linear probability model with two-way fixed effects in Equation (1.1) is estimated by simply
substituting top income shares data for top wealth shares data. Income inequality data are
more common, so the panel expands to 10 countries with a maximum of 538 observations.
Estimation results are presented in the appendix, Tables 1.E.1– 1.E.3 of the appendix.
The impact of income inequality on financial instability is ambiguous and insignificant. Pa-
rameter estimates of income inequality and income inequality interacted with the aggregate
wealth-income ratio demonstrate a large variance in both sign and magnitude when predict-
ing both crisis types.
Though insignificant, the marginal effects of income inequality are also analyzed. As
a comparison to Figure 1.3 above, individual effects are estimated for all observations in
the full sample of wealth-income ratios and the subsample the preferred wealth-inequality
specification was estimated on (Column 1). See Figure 1.4. The effect is generally positive
and increasing for banking crises, and the average effect is positive and significant to 5%.
However, the average marginal effect of income inequality on banking crises in the fully
specified model, while insignificant, is negative and of comparable magnitude.
The income inequality model of the likelihood of stock market crashes is entirely insignifi-
cant, and its marginal effects are entirely negative. While the marginal effects are increasing,
they are decidedly negative, both individually and on average. When using large crises as the
dependent variable (Table 1.E.3), income inequality still has no significant marginal effect—
though it is slightly positive in the model specifications excluding private sector credit and
top marginal tax rates.
A Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) J-test of model specification confirms the lack of
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Figure 1.4: Marginal Effect of Income Inequality on Likelihood of
Financial Crisis: LPM
explanatory power for income inequality in either financial crisis model.9 These results
further support the hypothesis, and preliminary statistical evidence presented above, that
the unequal distribution of financial assets (a stock) rather than incomes (a flow) positively
influences a wealthy economy’s likelihood of future financial crisis.
1.5.4 Predicted probabilities of large crises
While the sign and significance of marginal effects have been stressed, the relationship
between aggregate wealth and its distribution should correspond to actual financial crisis
episodes in keeping with the hypothetical network relationship. That is, the models’ within-
sample predicted probabilities should correspond to actual crises for a given country. To
generate these forecasts a logit model is used so that predicted values are constrained to
the unit interval and have clear interpretations. Estimating equations country-by-country
necessarily eliminates country fixed effects. (Including year fixed effects only yields perfectly
9Though problems exist in the estimation which increase the likelihood of overrejection (i.e. a finite
sample and a model under test that doesn’t fit well), one still fails to reject that the predicted income
inequality model regressor is statistically different from zero.
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determined outcomes.)
The limitations of the aggregate wealth and wealth inequality data imply that it is
possible to estimate predictions for only four countries: the United States, United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Sweden. In order to extend the time series from 2000 through 2012 for the
United States, wealth inequality data from Saez and Zucman (2014) are used—estimated
with the capitalization method—rather than the previously used Kopczuk and Saez (2004)
data—estimated with the estate tax method.
The preferred model specification is used whenever possible:
Pr(crisiskt = 1) = Λ
(






+ β4finsht−2 + εt
)
(1.9)
To judge the accuracy of the above model, predicted probabilities are compared against
the lagged real-changes-in-credit model of Schularick and Taylor (2012), henceforth S&T, an
oft-cited model in the literature:10





βk∆ ln rcreditit−k + εit
)
. (1.10)
Two crisis indicator variables are compared. The first is the large crisis indicator, wherein
both a banking crisis and stock market crash occur within the same year in a given country.
This double financial trauma best encapsulates the intuitive notion of a financial crisis when
absorbed by the real economy. The second crisis indicator comes from S&T and omits some
large crises but also includes additional ones, thus differing from the exact Reinhart & Rogoff
dates.
Results are presented graphically in Figure 1.5 below. Plotting each individual predicted
probability helps to illustrate the relative sparsity of some country-level data. Vertical gray
10For example, Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) use it to estimate the level of endogenous financial instability
created through inequality and leverage.














































































Figure 1.5: Predicted Probabilities of Large Crisis
bars represent a relevant crisis year. In the case of Sweden, the preferred model (Equation
(1.9)) can not be estimated since financial sector share values greater than 0.062 predict the
outcome perfectly—thus the finsh term is dropped. And in the case of Denmark, no crises
occur in the subsample of observations for which financial sector share data are available—so
again, the finsh term is dropped.
The preferred model clearly outperforms the S&T model in the case of large crises in
the United States (Figure 1.5, left panel). It appropriately peaks during the Great Crash,
recedes during the postwar period, and then slowly increase beginning in the late 1980s with
spikes in 1990 and the late 1990s and mid 2000s. Equation (1.9) is particularly nuanced
in tracing economic instability in anticipation of the dot-com bubble, itself not categorized
as a large crisis, and again near 2006, to presage the eventual subprime mortgage crisis.
The preferred model performs equally well to predict instability as defined by S&T crises
(see Figure 1.F.1), climbing dramatically in 2000 and 2001, declining somewhat, and then
peaking before the recent global financial crisis. An earlier peak coincides with the Great
Crash, an S&T coded crisis. By comparison the S&T model is too volatile, equally for the
crises the model was designed for and the large crises as defined in this paper. Its relative
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changes in probability reflect business cycles more than any genuine financial stability risk,
and peaks in predicted probabilities all occur away from any crisis episode. In other words,
the S&T model cries wolf. One simple reason for the success of the preferred model for the
US is that there exist a large number of observations (98 and 95) from which to estimate.
The United Kingdom case also lends credibility to the preferred model, again in both
large crises (Figure 1.5) as well as S&T defined crises (Figure 1.F.1 in the appendix), despite
having only 60 or 64 observations from which to estimate. Predicted probabilities increase
steadily, with a relative peak, near the 1973 oil embargo crisis. They also increase before the
S&T defined crises of 1984 and 1991 and then increase again in anticipation of the global
financial crisis in 2007. The S&T model still exhibits tremendous volatility, again crying
wolf during eras of relative financial market tranquility.
The Danish and Swedish models predicting large crises (Figure 1.F.2 of the appendix)
perform poorly by comparison, which is understandable given the irregular and infrequent
data—only 38 and 31 observations, respectively. The peaks at the beginning of the predicted
series appear to correspond to crisis episodes, however, the models completely miss on the
recent global financial crisis, lacking any foresight. Of course the paucity of Danish data
since 1980 are one important factor. The Swedish predictions do correlate with the real
estate crisis in the early 1990s, however the relative increase in probability is recent and
obfuscated by probabilities of similar magnitude estimated throughout the late 1950s and
1960s. Given more observations in real credit data, the S&T model performs relatively well,
with the highest peaks in probability generally corresponding to actual crisis episodes, except
for some conspicuous misses.
Overall, the empirical results are consistent enough to lend support to the hypothesis that
wealth inequality, in sufficiently wealthy economies, plays a unique role in macroeconomic
stability, one that income inequality does not, and cannot, capture. However, more data are
needed if this conclusion is to be defensible beyond the Anglo-Saxon paradigm.
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1.6 Conclusion
The economic theory pinning down the paper’s empirical approach—outlined in Chapter
two—is a radically simplified interpretation of a financial network economy, one that re-
moves the veil of intermediaries and instead relies on the latent financial pathways that link
individual asset and liability holders.11 The distribution of wealth therefore acts as a suf-
ficient statistic to describe the arrangement of linkages in a networked financial economy.
Aggregate wealth describes the total number of links. Together, the total wealth and its
distribution are key determinants of the network economy’s robustness in the event of a
shock. More unequal distributions in rich economies create a structure of interconnectedness
that is more likely to result in a financial crisis if shocked. Contagion will be greater, simu-
lations show. This theory echoes much of the intuition from the banking network contagion
literature.
This paper tests this theory empirically with a reduced-form linear probability model in-
cluding two-way fixed effects on panel data from nine countries (Australia, Denmark, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US) with historic data beginning in
1870. The marginal effect of wealth inequality on the likelihood of financial crises, particu-
larly stock market crashes or both banking crises and stock market crashes, is statistically
significant, positive, and increasing. The finding is robust to the frequency of observations
and estimation methods. The predictive performance of the logit models, particularly the
US and UK cases, gives further support to the importance of wealth inequality and aggregate
wealth on macro-financial stability. While motivated by the US case over last forty years,
the positive marginal effect of wealth inequality on instability appears not only across time
in the US but also across other financially advanced and wealthy economies (i.e. Australia,
France, and the UK).
11See Chapter two.
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These empirical results strongly suggest that the two parameters, wealth inequality and
aggregate wealth, are mutually important in determining economic stability. One implica-
tion is that future increases in wealth inequality (as predicted by Piketty) in the US and
other financially advanced economies may increase macroeconomic instability. The conse-
quences for moral hazard, systemic risk, and too-big-to-fail, among other regulatory concerns,
could be great. Another broader implication is the incitement to reduce inequality for co-
gent economic—not simply moral—reasons. Rising inequality will always have wide welfare
effects, but macroeconomic health may also be at stake.
This chapter has said little, however, about what type of idiosyncrasies within each coun-
try might be generating the variation in wealth inequality that is picked up by the positive
association with future financial crises. Can the structural argument be causal, or might
unobservable and omitted variables (which are intended to be absorbed by the fixed effects)
be lingering? Given the opacity of top wealth share portfolios, it is unlikely that idiosyn-
cratic variations in asset types, their allocations, and their flows did not contribute over time.
Recently, Alstadsaeter et al. (2017) find that the top 0.01% of Scandinavian wealth holders
evade approximately 30 percent of their personal income and wealth taxes. This suggests
that substantial variation in top wealth shares may arise simply from the natural fluctua-
tions in tax enforcement itself, which goes beyond the changes in financialization and capital
returns accounted for in the model. At the same time, Diamond et al. (2017) have argued
cycles of liquidity promoted leverage, and thus instability. However, the inclusion of country
and year fixed effects—which mollify such unobservable variables—and the constancy with
first difference estimators, still supports the structural and causal interpretation of wealth
inequality’s impact on the macro-financial economy.
Several statistical limitations motivate continued study. First and foremost is the overall
paucity of wealth inequality data. While annual top wealth share estimates exist for the
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United States under numerous methodologies,12 comparably robust, annual data are lacking
for most other developed economies let alone developing ones. Second, is the potential
estimation bias from crisis correlation between countries. And third is the inability to harness
a two-way fixed effect logistic model for applied work.
As the Morelli and Atkinson (2015) survey concludes, context is key to any relationship
between inequality and crisis in a given country. “It might not be an iron law,” they warn.
It may even be that global wealth inequality, given the interconnectedness of all financial
markets, may be the most relevant for contemporary financial crises—another area for future
study.
12See Kopczuk (2015) for a summary.
Appendices
1.A Data
Table 1.A.1: Summary Statistics: Full Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs Countries
Top 1% Shr Net Worth 0.275 0.126 0.063 0.690 401 13
Wealth-Income ratio 4.59 1.421 1.805 8.855 1,174 12
Finance Shr of Income 0.036 0.02 0.001 0.124 1,402 15
r̃ 0.001 0.117 -1.415 0.799 731 15
ĝ 0.018 0.052 -0.509 0.659 2,702 15
Private Sector Credit 0.724 0.404 0.114 2.022 813 15
Top Marginal Tax Rate 58.366 20.704 2 97.5 714 10
Notes: The full sample includes all observations on all available coun-
tries for a given variable, thus exceeding the number of countries in
each of our sub-samples.
Table 1.A.2: Summary Statistics: Subsample 1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs Countries
Top 1% Shr Net Worth 0.246 0.12 0.063 0.690 213 9
Wealth-Income ratio 4.195 0.985 2.258 8.855 213 9
Finance Shr of Income 0.047 0.011 0.011 0.079 213 9
Notes: Subsample is restricted to country-year observations with top
1% wealth shares, aggregate wealth-income ratios, and finance’s share
of total income.
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Figure 1.A.1: Crisis and Observations Timeline
Notes: Observations restricted to subsample of country-year observa-
tions with top1% wealth shares, aggregate wealth-income ratios, and
finance’s share of total income. Crisis dates from Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009).
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1.B Additional Results
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Note: Full sample, n = 243; Subsample, n = 72
(b) Stock Market Crash
Figure 1.B.1: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood
of Financial Crisis: LPM Five Year Averages
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Table 1.B.1: Five Year Averages: Likelihood of Banking Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth -3.452 -8.960 -20.488∗
(4.674) (7.531) (8.040)
Wealth-Income ratio -0.020 -0.623 -1.837
(0.424) (0.648) (0.973)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio 0.987 3.882 8.186∗∗
(1.539) (2.824) (2.351)






Private Sector Credit -0.026
(0.495)
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.009
(0.009)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 0.699 7.129 11.613∗∗∗
(2.183) (4.315) (1.598)





AIC 47.5 30.9 11.5
R2 0.506 0.582 0.683
Countries 9 9 6
Obs 72 59 45
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All variables are averaged over five year intervals. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if crisis
type occurs in given country over five years. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects
(2FE), controlling for country and half-decade. Financial development is the sum of all bank deposits and
stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and a proxy for the rate of return on capital, r. A
second proxy, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial development. The variable ĝ, a proxy for
growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of
GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality
on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
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Table 1.B.2: Five Year Averages: Likelihood of Stock Market Crash
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth -6.732 -9.218∗∗ -5.906∗
(4.275) (3.491) (2.734)
Wealth-Income ratio -0.720∗ -0.996∗∗∗ -0.417
(0.368) (0.296) (0.275)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio 2.805∗ 4.011∗∗ 3.245∗∗
(1.470) (1.274) (1.026)






Private Sector Credit -0.563
(0.587)
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.023∗∗
(0.009)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 5.074∗ 7.406∗∗∗ 6.819∗∗
(2.250) (2.118) (1.743)





AIC 30.4 31.3 8.8
R2 0.638 0.615 0.698
Countries 9 9 6
Obs 72 59 45
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All variables are averaged over five year intervals. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if crisis type
occurs in given country over five years. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects
(2FE), controlling for country and half-decade. Financial development is the sum of all bank deposits and
stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and a proxy for the rate of return on capital, r. A
second proxy, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial development. The variable ĝ, a proxy for
growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of
GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality
on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
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Figure 1.B.2: Marginal Effect of Wealth In-
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Figure 1.B.3: Marginal Effect of Wealth In-
equality on Likelihood of Large Crisis: LPM
Five Year Averages
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Table 1.B.3: Likelihood of Large Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -6.847
∗∗∗ -3.872∗ -3.831
(1.071) (1.964) (2.361)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.517
∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗ -0.369
(0.096) (0.154) (0.196)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 2.343∗∗∗ 1.769∗∗ 1.935∗
(0.386) (0.743) (0.904)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 3.846 2.607 6.643
∗
(2.267) (2.733) (2.856)
r̃ t−2 -0.117 -0.264
(0.271) (0.416)
ĝ t−2 -0.698 -1.666
(1.550) (2.073)
Private Sector Credit t−2 -0.168
∗
(0.083)




Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 2.981∗∗∗ 3.418∗∗ 3.965∗∗
(0.709) (1.275) (1.355)





AIC -187.2 -146.2 -131.4
R2 0.511 0.406 0.406
Countries 9 9 6
Obs 213 156 134
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of both a banking crisis and a stock market crash in a given
country and year. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for
country and year. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial
development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The
variable ĝ, a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is
measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects
of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth
as well as the average marginal effect.
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Table 1.B.4: Five Year Averages: Likelihood of Large Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth -4.844 -7.292 -13.221∗∗
(3.616) (5.866) (4.871)
Wealth-Income ratio -0.391 -0.791 -1.320∗
(0.338) (0.538) (0.621)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio 1.604 3.326 5.831∗∗∗
(1.272) (2.278) (1.230)






Private Sector Credit -0.290
(0.436)
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.007
(0.007)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 1.908 6.493 9.644∗∗∗
(2.122) (3.912) (1.585)





AIC 24.4 16.4 -2.2
R2 0.464 0.466 0.598
Countries 9 9 6
Obs 72 59 45
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All variables are averaged over five year intervals. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if both crisis
types occur in given country over five years. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects
(2FE), controlling for country and half-decade. Financial development is the sum of all bank deposits and
stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and a proxy for the rate of return on capital, r. A
second proxy, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial development. The variable ĝ, a proxy for
growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of
GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality
on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
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1.B.3 Aggregate Wealth and Instability
Table 1.B.5: Test of Nonlinear Aggregate Wealth Effect on Likelihood of Financial Crisis
Banking Stock Market Large
Crisis Crash Crisis
Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -5.137
∗∗ -6.680∗∗∗ -7.568∗∗∗
(1.969) (1.031) (1.261)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.631
∗ -0.520∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗
(0.299) (0.197) (0.176)
Wealth-Income ratio squared t−2 0.033
∗ -0.006 0.015
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 2.060∗∗∗ 2.406∗∗∗ 2.479∗∗∗
(0.583) (0.253) (0.421)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 -8.466 9.461
∗∗ 2.766
(6.373) (3.477) (2.328)
AIC -24.2 -101.8 -189.7
R2 0.582 0.825 0.517
Countries 9 9 9
Obs 213 213 213
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator if a type of financial crisis occurs for a given country and
year. Linear probability model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and
year.
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Figure 1.B.4: Marginal Effects of Nonlinear Aggregate Wealth on
Likelihood of Financial Crisis
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1.C First Difference Estimator
Table 1.C.1: First Difference Estimator: Likelihood of Banking Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
∆Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -0.371 -5.005 -2.461
(0.909) (2.596) (4.900)
∆Wealth-Income ratio t−2 0.077 0.200 0.505
(0.293) (0.448) (0.662)
∆Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 0.688 1.303 0.556
(0.641) (0.844) (1.704)
∆Finance Shr of Income t−2 -10.966
∗ -6.362 -6.980
(5.636) (3.904) (6.471)





∆Private Sector Credit t−2 0.116
(0.397)
∆Top Marginal Tax Rate t−2 -0.000
(0.002)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 2.514 0.366 −0.223
(1.818) (1.037) (2.043)





AIC 48.4 42.9 42.5
R2 0.075 0.122 0.154
Countries 7 7 5
Obs 162 114 103
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Estimated with first differences and no fixed effects. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is
the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market
capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change
in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a
percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the
mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
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Table 1.C.2: First Difference Estimator: Likelihood of Stock Market Crash
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
∆Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 4.832
∗ -8.923∗∗∗ -10.887∗∗∗
(2.165) (1.217) (1.968)
∆Wealth-Income ratio t−2 0.130 -0.531
∗∗ -0.758∗
(0.148) (0.148) (0.276)
∆Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.320 3.447∗∗∗ 3.844∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.493) (0.666)
∆Finance Shr of Income t−2 2.899 1.108 0.116
(5.331) (3.041) (4.222)
∆r̃ t−2 0.108 0.225
(0.130) (0.172)
∆ĝ t−2 -1.786 -2.572
∗
(1.310) (1.189)
∆Private Sector Credit t−2 0.044
(0.678)




Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 3.488∗∗ 5.282∗∗∗ 4.597∗∗
(1.392) (1.122) (1.043)





AIC 208.7 124.3 102.9
R2 0.020 0.056 0.108
Countries 7 7 5
Obs 162 114 103
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Estimated with first differences and no fixed effects. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is
the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market
capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change
in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a
percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the
mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
CHAPTER 1. WEALTH INEQUALITY AND CRISES: PANEL STUDY 45
Table 1.C.3: First Difference Estimator: Likelihood of Large Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
∆Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -1.079 -4.645
∗ -6.215
(0.652) (2.101) (3.752)
∆Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.216
∗∗ -0.278 -0.430
(0.087) (0.165) (0.317)
∆Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 1.142∗∗∗ 1.984∗ 2.507
(0.302) (0.937) (1.487)
∆Finance Shr of Income t−2 0.214 -1.317
∗∗ -2.911∗∗
(5.301) (0.423) (0.888)
∆r̃ t−2 0.120 0.146
∗∗
(0.080) (0.050)
∆ĝ t−2 0.124 -0.128
(0.802) (0.923)
∆Private Sector Credit t−2 0.134
(0.157)
∆Top Marginal Tax Rate t−2 -0.007
(0.008)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 3.713∗∗∗ 3.529∗ 3.883
(0.763) (1.787) (2.255)





AIC -58.5 -58.5 -49.6
R2 0.111 0.101 0.138
Countries 7 7 5
Obs 162 114 103
Clustered standard errors in parentheses of Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Estimated with first differences and no fixed effects. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is
the difference in first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market
capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change
in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a
percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the
mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
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Figure 1.D.1: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood
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Figure 1.D.2: Marginal Effect of Wealth Inequality on Likelihood
of Large Crisis: FE Logit Model
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Table 1.D.1: Fixed Effect Logit: Likelihood of Banking Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -6.966 -42.786 -75.463
∗
(8.851) (32.020) (43.574)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 0.126 -2.827 -5.696
∗∗
(0.495) (2.052) (2.884)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 1.111 10.772 22.956∗
(1.626) (9.182) (12.134)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 34.281 22.723 -1.471
(20.941) (28.316) (42.871)
r̃ t−2 -1.104 -0.861
(2.735) (2.823)
ĝ t−2 -12.478 -13.896
(13.092) (13.916)
Private Sector Credit t−2 -1.788
(1.554)




Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio -0.322 4.8e-5 0.022
(0.947) (3.9e-4) (0.015)





AIC 140.5 102.3 94.3
Pseudo-R2 0.072 0.055 0.116
Countries 7 6 5
Obs 201 141 130
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a crisis occurs for a country in a given
year. Fixed effect logit model is estimated with country fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are reported. A
proxy for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the
sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy
for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share
of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality
on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
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Table 1.D.2: Fixed Effect Logit: Likelihood of Stock Market Crash
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 -0.403 -154.572
∗∗∗ -118.591∗∗
(6.036) (50.103) (53.712)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.246 -9.227
∗∗∗ -6.990∗∗
(0.501) (2.751) (2.939)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 1.505 46.240∗∗∗ 36.959∗∗∗
(1.495) (13.410) (14.330)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 21.232 36.716 33.731
(16.587) (26.872) (38.773)
r̃ t−2 -2.379 -1.370
(2.226) (2.341)
ĝ t−2 12.543 8.275
(12.778) (13.401)
Private Sector Credit t−2 -0.199
(1.784)
Top Marginal Tax Rate t−2 -0.005
(0.025)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 0.929 0.030∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(1.129) (0.011) (0.015)





AIC 212.0 118.6 112.2
Pseudo-R2 0.054 0.197 0.166
Countries 9 9 6
Obs 213 156 134
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a crisis occurs for a country in a given
year. Fixed effect logit model is estimated with country fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are reported. A
proxy for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is the difference in first-differences of financial development (the
sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy
for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share
of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage. Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality
on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25th percentile of aggregate wealth.
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Table 1.D.3: Fixed Effect Logit: Likelihood of Large Crisis
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth t−2 2.264 -236.830
∗ -6011.834
(11.211) (127.471) (2210388.052)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.830 -23.836
∗∗ -1092.064
(1.090) (11.444) (405450.635)
Top 1% Shr Net Worth × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 1.793 90.916∗∗ 4933.949
(2.106) (44.482) (1844686.373)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 76.136
∗∗ 184.791∗∗ 3469.885
(34.972) (93.213) (4730344.580)
r̃ t−2 -12.249 -930.945
(8.442) (351738.545)
ĝ t−2 17.678 -137.834
(43.241) (358416.950)
Private Sector Credit t−2 -30.853
(143921.207)
Top Marginal Tax Rate t−2 -9.999
(4362.300)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Net Worth
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 0.487 0.164∗∗
(1.997) (0.075)





AIC 61.9 29.1 16.0
Pseudo-R2 0.126 0.486 1.000
Countries 5 4 3
Obs 155 98 90
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a both a stock market crash and a
banking crisis occur in a country in a given year. Fixed effect logit model is estimated with country fixed
effects. Coefficient estimates are reported. A proxy for the rate of return on capital, r̃ is the difference in
first-differences of financial development (the sum of all bank deposits and stock market capitalization as
a percentage of GDP). The variable ĝ, a proxy for growth, is the annual percentage change in GDP per
capita. Private sector credit is measured as a share of GDP and the top marginal tax rate is a percentage.
Panel B depicts marginal effects of wealth inequality on the crisis type when evaluated at the mean and 25th
percentile of aggregate wealth.
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1.E Income Inequality
Table 1.E.1: Likelihood of Banking Crisis with Income Inequality
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Income t−2 -5.288 1.623 2.492
(7.879) (6.373) (10.819)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 -0.040 0.084 0.143
(0.123) (0.089) (0.222)
Top 1% Shr Income × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 1.940 0.233 -1.273
(1.623) (1.394) (2.482)






ĝ t−2 -2.070 -2.793
(2.122) (1.646)
Private Sector Credit t−2 0.571
∗∗
(0.221)




Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Income
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio 2.895∗ 2.585 -2.653
(1.449) (1.485) (2.402)





AIC 115.8 105.1 57.1
R2 0.346 0.260 0.320
Countries 10 10 8
Obs 393 335 271
Clustered standard errors in parentheses in Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of crisis type for given country and year. Linear probability
model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year.
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Table 1.E.2: Likelihood of Stock Market Crash with Income Inequality
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Income t−2 -0.951 -4.728 -7.596
(4.074) (5.942) (9.811)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 0.023 0.000 -0.004
(0.057) (0.089) (0.175)
Top 1% Shr Income × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 0.053 0.812 1.654
(0.900) (1.297) (2.009)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 -1.464 -1.995 -6.405
(3.039) (3.751) (7.277)
r̃ t−2 -0.070 -0.207
(0.195) (0.278)
ĝ t−2 1.279 0.598
(1.402) (1.672)
Private Sector Credit t−2 -0.023
(0.219)
Top Marginal Tax Rate t−2 -0.002
(0.005)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Income
at Mean of Wealth-Income ratio -0.729 -1.376 -0.910
(2.111) (2.527) (3.689)





AIC 166.2 185.8 155.9
R2 0.531 0.438 0.396
Countries 10 10 8
Obs 393 335 271
Clustered standard errors in parentheses in Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of crisis type for given country and year. Linear probability
model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year.
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Table 1.E.3: Likelihood of Large Crisis with Income Inequality
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1% Shr Income t−2 −1.693 1.147 −3.074
(4.601) (4.135) (5.695)
Wealth-Income ratio t−2 −0.024 0.044 −0.004
(0.087) (0.077) (0.096)
Top 1% Shr Income × Wealth-Income ratio t−2 0.560 −0.139 0.563
(0.970) (0.837) (1.207)
Finance Shr of Income t−2 −3.074 −1.948 −1.696
(2.515) (2.137) (5.043)
r̃ t−2 −0.154 −0.305∗
(0.111) (0.143)
ĝ t−2 −1.668 −2.321∗
(1.397) (1.207)
Private Sector Credit t−2 0.109
(0.074)
Top Marginal Tax Rate t−2 −0.005∗
(0.003)
Panel B
Marginal Effects of Top 1% Shr Income
at P50 of Wealth-Income ratio 0.670 0.574 −0.798
(1.295) (1.240) (1.687)





AIC −152.7 −132.0 −99.6
R2 0.349 0.229 0.241
Countries 10 10 8
Obs 393 335 271
Clustered standard errors in parentheses in Panel A
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of crisis type for given country and year. Linear probability
model is estimated with two-way fixed effects (2FE), controlling for country and year.
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Figure 1.F.2: Predicted Probabilities of Large Crisis
Chapter 2
Network Defect: Wealth Inequality,
Network Topology, and Financial
Crisis
2.1 Introduction
The share of wealth held by top percentiles in the US provocatively peaks before both the
Great Crash in 1929 and the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.1 Is economic inequal-
ity a destabilizing economic force? Or is the pronounced correlation a symptom of deeper
economic perturbations? The objective of this paper is to conceptualize the relationship be-
tween wealth inequality and macroeconomic instability as manifested through the financial
sector. One goal is to demonstrate how the wealth distribution can alter the configuration
of the financial economy into more or less stable arrangements. The approach can be sum-
marized thusly: consider two identical economies that are observed at a point in time and
distinguished only by their distributions of wealth. Which is more unstable in the event of a
1See Kopczuk and Saez (2004). Piketty and Saez (2014), Saez and Zucman (2014), and Kopczuk (2015).
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negative income shock? To answer, an interpersonal financial network model is constructed
using elements of graph theory. The model is then repeatedly simulated, generating predic-
tions about the endogenous role of wealth distributions on financial stability. It suggests one
direct channel from top wealth inequality to the vulnerability of a financial economy in the
event of a shock.
Wealth, as a collection of financial assets and liabilities, by definition creates financial
links between parties. In aggregate, they compose precisely the “web of contracts and under-
standings” once described by Axel Leijonhufvud. The model assumes one type of financial
asset exists, one individual’s claim on some future cash flow that is generated by another
individual’s labor income. The presence of a financial asset naturally links asset owners to
liability holders. The total number of financial assets an individual owns represents their
in-degree and the distribution of assets in the network economy is imposed through an
in-degree distribution—equivalent to the wealth distribution since it is assumed real assets
are homogeneous, and thus labor income is as well. As the distribution of wealth changes
the distribution of links in the network also changes, thereby altering the topology of the
interpersonal financial network. Though the network is static, with no individual optimiza-
tion problems, contagion is a dynamic process. Contagion occurs when a random negative
income shock decreases one individual’s net worth to the point of financial failure, which
prompts failure costs that wipe out collateral wealth. Importantly, an individual’s net worth
is assumed to collateralize their financial liabilities, much like an asset-backed security. The
network structure implies one individual’s net worth is linked to, and dependent on, the net
worth of others. Therefore decreases in net worth spread.
Network simulations, in which the arrangement of financial links is random, show that
the model economy is more unstable in the event of a negative shock when it (a) exhibits
high wealth inequality, and (b) is sufficiently wealthy in aggregate. Additionally, an inverted
U-shaped relationship is found between aggregate network wealth and instability. Financial
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instability, in the model, is determined by the share of individuals whose net worth drops
below a predetermined threshold or the total decline in financial asset values.
Our network model embeds several features of Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability
Hypothesis—and though not an explicit network model, it is a framework that generates
endogenous instability in a financial economy of connected banks and firms rather than
individuals.2 The first is that balance sheets of individuals are interrelated, where one’s
asset is always another’s liability. Second, assets and liabilities represent commitments to
future cash flows, where the flows across network links are what Minsky called a “complex
system of money in/money out transactions”3. Third, a collapse in asset values stifles future
cash flows and catalyzes a crisis, or as Kregel (2014) argues, only a “slight disturbance” in
money flows is necessary to cause instability and “widespread financial distress.” And finally,
a growing financial economy increases the scale of contagion.
Financial network models are frequently used to model financial crises amongst banks.
The model in this paper borrows from the framework of Elliott et al. (2014a), however
network nodes represent individuals rather than banks or countries, and financial links do
not exist outside of the network. Their emphasis is also on the levels of financialization
in the network, at both the intensive and extensive margins, rather than the skewness of
financial asset distributions as in this paper. Allen and Gale (2000) were one of the first
to show in a simple bank network model that the configuration of financial links mattered
for contagion—complete networks were more stable than incomplete ones. More recently,
Acemoglu et al. (2015) stress network structure as the determining factor in contagion,
but they largely look at the magnitude and frequency of negative shocks to the network
in order to analyze its stability, not network topology. And Glasserman and Young (2015)
abandon topology measures altogether in favor of bank-specific sufficient statistics to evaluate
2See Minsky (1975) and Minsky (1986a) for longer expositions, or Minsky (1992) for a brief summary.
3See (Minsky, 1986b, p. 69).
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bank network contagion risks. They conclude that factors beyond pure spillovers, such as
confidence in counterparties and bankruptcy costs (included in our model), are responsible for
substantial economic losses from contagion.4 The only known network models of individual
wealth inequality reside in a small statistical mechanics literature, demonstrating a power
law degree distribution of wealth often results from network formation dynamics.5 None
consider contagion or network instability as this paper does.
While the finance network literature has largely ignored inequality, the income inequality
literature has considered inequality’s relation to financial crises—with mixed results. In a
qualitative survey of 84 crises across 21 countries over the past century, Morelli and Atkinson
(2015) examine both the levels of and changes in income inequality preceding a crisis episode.
They conclude that either’s impact is ambiguous. Rajan (2011) argues increasing US income
inequality was but one cause of the global financial crisis because it prompted policies that
ultimately relaxed credit to unsustainable levels. Testing the Rajan hypothesis, Bordo and
Meissner (2012) regress changes in real credit growth on lagged changes in top income shares.
They find no effect amongst a panel of 14 countries between 1870 and 2010 and thus conclude
no link between inequality and crisis exists.6 A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
by Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) is structured, like this paper’s model, around assets relating
households. In their case the top 5% own assets derived from the borrowing of the bottom
95%—who must do so because of low income growth. The authors calibrate the model
to show that increasing income inequality, rising household debt of the bottom 95%, and
increasing financial assets of the top 5% cause higher leverage and thus a higher probability
of crisis.
4Both Acemoglu et al. (2015) and Glasserman and Young (2015) are derived from Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), a network model of equilibrium clearing payments among banks used to measure contagion.
5See Lee and Kim (2007), Kim et al. (2008), and Coelho et al. (2005)
6Gu and Huang (2014), criticizing the econometric methods of Bordo and Meissner (2012), argue that
income inequality, in Anglo-Saxon countries, does determine credit growth—and therefore leads to financial
crisis.
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In the inequality literature cited above, the most common mechanism linking rising in-
equality to instability is rising household debt. Mason and Jayadev (2014) show, however,
that a set of so-called “Fisher dynamics” (i.e. interest rate change, inflation, and income
growth) account for most, if not all, of the increase in US household leverage since 1980—the
same structural lever modeled by Kumhof and Ranciere (2010). In other words, increasing
household debt-income ratios do not necessarily imply newly issued debt, and new debt is
the critical lever of the inequality-household debt-instability story.
Instead, this paper argues that an economy’s financial network configuration, as deter-
mined by the wealth distribution, is the critical determinant. Of course, the model is a gross
simplification of a financial capitalist economy—assuming a static network, with one type of
financial asset serviced by (uniform) labor income cash flows and individual net worth acting
as collateral. But by abstracting away layers of financial intermediaries, it becomes possible
to expose the latent financial relationships between individual creditors and debtors and to
understand how the interpersonal distribution of wealth in the economy may impact its over-
all stability. Though the setup also ignores network formation dynamics, or consumption
and saving decisions by individuals, it provides a tractable model that can be simulated and
whose results are generalizable.
An intuitive metaphor for understanding how the network attributes wealth inequality
and aggregate wealth work in tandem to determine financial stability is to consider a Jenga
tower, the block-building game. If each block represents a financial asset or link, then a
short tower is relatively stable regardless of the distribution of the blocks. As the Jenga
tower grows, however, the distribution of blocks becomes critical to its stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 derives the theoretical financial
network model, presents its mechanics, and introduces concepts of instability. Financial
network parameter estimates are shared in Section 2.3, to motivate model parameterization.
Section 2.4 describes the method to simulate random static networks and also presents
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results, including the finding that increasing wealth inequality is destabilizing in wealthy
networks. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Financial Network Model
In this section we introduce the wealth inequality network model, using Elliott et al. (2014a)
as a foundation. It notably disregards financial intermediaries and instead relies on the latent
financial links between asset and liability holders to form an interpersonal financial network
economy. This enables a more tractable model between the economy’s wealth distribution,
how it translates to network topology, and overall financial (in)stability. We present an
extended example at the end to help elucidate concepts from the model.
2.2.1 Setup
Consider a static financial network composed of nodes i = 1, . . . , n ∈ N . Each node repre-
sents a wealth owning individual or household. We exclude firms, banks, and other types
of organizations to simplify our model and to argue that variations in the distribution of
wealth between individuals have network consequences.7 Links, or edges, connect two nodes
and represent a financial claim between them. A financial asset is a claim on future cash
flows. All network links, or financial assets, are represented by an n × n adjacency matrix
G, where element Gij = 1 if node i has some financial claim on node j and 0 otherwise.
Claims are directional, implying the orientation of cash flows. Matrix G is thus composed of
creditors (rows) making financial claims on debtors (columns). Though individuals are along
both dimensions of the matrix, financial claims need not be reciprocated—and G need not
be symmetric. The network can be summarized as an unweighted directed graph G(N,G)
7To be sure, many individuals rely on opaque institutions and organizations to hide private wealth. See
Zucman (2014) and Zucman (2015) for a detailed analysis on hidden private wealth.
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whose edges indicate the existence, and paths, of financial flows between individuals.
Assume there exists only one type of financial asset held by individuals and households,
a type of asset-backed security. Each security is a claim on future labor income cash flows
generated by the liability holder, with their net worth serving as collateral.8 A node i owns
di financial assets, where di =
∑
j Gij is the node’s in-degree. It also represents the total
number of individuals i holds claims against (a row sum in G). A financial asset-owning node
may also back the value of an asset themselves, a function of their own valuation. Let doutj
represent the total number of financial liabilities node j is collateralizing, where doutj =
∑
iGij
(a column sum in G) is the out-degree. Financial assets are distributed according to some
probability distribution f(di), the degree distribution.
9 Only some fraction c ∈ (0, 1) of each
individual’s overall net worth is collateralized and can be claimed by, and owed to, asset
holders in the network.
Let matrix C, the cross-holdings matrix, describe the relative ownership claims on each





if doutj > 0
0 else.
∀ i 6= j. (2.1)
The unweighted adjacency matrix G is now a weighted matrix C of financial claims between
nodes. Assume that the total number of asset holders doutj holding assets backed by individ-
ual’s j’s wealth are each entitled to an equal portion of future cash flows. Cash flows not
claimed by other individuals (1 − c) are saved. (Savings do not accumulate as the model
is static.) The savings of each node are summarized in a diagonal matrix Ĉ, with element
Ĉjj = 1 −
∑
iCij. It is possible to rewrite the total sum of claims made on individual j as∑
iCij = 1− Ĉjj.





doutj so that total assets equal total liabilities and the economy’s balance sheet
balances.
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To illustrate, consider the network in Figure 2.1a, where n = 4 and c = 0.5. The
corresponding adjacency and cross-holdings matrices are in Figure 2.1b. Notice, from G’s
bottom row, that node 4 has financial assets which are claims on the cash flows of nodes 1,
2 and 3 (d4 = 3), but has no cash flow obligations itself (d
out
4 = 0). Because c = 0.5, half of




(a) Graph of network
G =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0
, C =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
.5 .5 .5 0

(b) Corresponding adjacency and cross-holdings matrices.
Figure 2.1: Example of a four-node network
2.2.2 Gross value
There also exist k = {1, . . . ,m} ∈ M real, or physical, assets (e.g. productive assets like
land or human capital).10 Let matrix D, analogous to the cross-holdings matrix C, describe
the pattern of real asset claims. Its elements Dik denote individual i’s share of real asset k.
10Consider one possible microfoundation for our network model thus far. Suppose our static network is
an endowment economy, whereby all nodes are endowed with a single type of financial asset—like our asset-
backed security. The endowments are randomly distributed between nodes according to some probability
distribution f(di), where di is the total number of financial assets node i owns. Which nodes then back each
of the di securities node i owns is randomly determined.
A richer form of heterogeneity could allow for variation amongst nodes rather than endowments. Let
ρ represent a symmetrically distributed stochastic discount factor where ρ ∈ {ρl, ρµ, ρh}. (In Krusell and
Smith (1998), a dynamic general equilibrium model using stochastic discount factors generates a Pareto
wealth distribution in the tails that closely fits the empirical estimates of Wolff (1994).) If a node is assigned
the lower discount factor ρl, then the node must borrow to consume single good y as they have a preference
for consumption. In this circumstance dl < d
out
l and the individual is a net debtor. If a node receives the
higher discount factor ρh it is a lender with a preference for accumulating assets. In this event dh > d
out
h
and the individual is a net creditor. Should the node receive the mean discount factor ρµ, then dµ = d
out
µ .
Yet another possibility is to consider an economy of entrepreneurs. Each node is endowed with some
productive asset and an intermediary good, drawn from a distribution. The intermediary good may be
consumed, but nodes prefer to consume a final consumption good that requires the interaction of at least
two intermediary goods. Credit, fixed in aggregate, is extended between entrepreneurs to produce the final
consumption good, which may be used to repay liabilities.
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The gross value of individual i’s total assets Vi is the sum of their real asset claims (each at
their respective prevailing market price pk) and financial asset claims (backed by the liability








or in matrix notation, V = Dp + CV. Solving for the gross value of each individual in the
network yields the vector of gross values V
V = (I−C)−1Dp. (2.3)
Note, however, that the gross value of individual i’s total assets Vi double counts real asset
claims Dik. They appear not only in the first term of (2.2) but also in the second term as a
component of other individuals’ own valuations Vj. Therefore we must derive a measurement
of node net worth in the next section.
To specifically study how the distribution of financial assets f(di) impacts the network’s
overall stability, the model is simplified by assuming there exists one type of real asset, human
capital, with m = n different units. Homogeneous, it also cannot be owned by anyone else,
hence D = In—though others may have claim to the future cash flows generated by it.
11
Human capital prices are homogeneous and also normalized to one, such that pk = 1 ∀ k.
11Allowing D to represent human capital takes into consideration a common critique of Piketty (2014),
best articulated by Blume and Durlauf (2015), that aggregating financial and physical assets at prevailing
market prices crucially ignores the important contemporary role human capital plays in generating cash
flows.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL NETWORK MODEL 63
2.2.3 Net worth
Node net worth is defined as total assets (real and financial) less liabilities.12 In other
words, claims on one’s own wealth (outflows) are subtracted from the sum of real assets and













Note that the first two terms are simply individual i’s gross value. In matrix form:
v = Dp + CV − (I− Ĉ)V = Dp + [C− (I− Ĉ)]V, (2.5)
where I− Ĉ is a diagonal matrix representing weighted total obligations in the network and
C represents weighted total claims. Substituting the gross value from (2.3) for V in (2.5)
and rearranging leads to the following definition of net worth.
v = Dp + [C− (I− Ĉ)]V
= Dp + [C− (I− Ĉ)][(I−C)−1Dp]
= ((I−C) + C− I + Ĉ)(I−C)−1Dp
v = Ĉ(I−C)−1Dp
v = ADp (2.6)
Net worth is derived from the overall claims between all nodes in the network (matrix A)
made on the underlying real assets (matrix D at price p) of the economy. Since each real
12See, for example, Davies and Shorrocks (1999) and Davies et al. (2007). In Elliott et al. (2014a) this is
called a node’s market value, since their model’s nodes represent firms or banks.
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asset represents a node’s human capital, net worth is a function of the cumulative claims on
future output generated by another’s human capital.
The benefit of matrix A = Ĉ(I−C)−1, called the dependency matrix, is that it summa-
rizes the total claims between all nodes, i.e. the sum of direct and indirect dependencies
between individuals in the network.13 It is possible for element Aij to be nonzero even if the
corresponding element in the cross-holdings matrix, Cij, is zero—an indication of indirect
claims by i on j via other nodes in the network but no direct claims. The dependency
matrix A is not unlike Leontief’s input-output matrix, Elliott et al. (2014a) posit, in its
ability to summarize the interconnections of a network economy. It is instructive to examine
the differences between direct holdings (from cross-holdings matrix C) and total direct and
indirect holdings (from dependency matrix A) in the examples in Section 2.2.6.
The dependency matrix A also simplifies the accounting considerably. Claims on individ-
ual real assets, rather than both financial assets and liabilities, become a sufficient statistic
to determine an individual’s overall net worth when calculating the impacts of a shock as
they reverberate through the network. In fact, all wealth is derived from human capital.
2.2.4 Wealth inequality
The wealth distribution of the network can be decomposed into its real and financial com-
ponents. By assuming real assets, in the form of human capital, are fixed, equal for all
individuals, and have the same market price, financial assets entirely determine the wealth
distribution, defined by the degree distribution of financial assets f(di). That is, wealthier
individuals will have more positive financial claims and links to other individuals in the
network than less wealthy individuals. A deterministic degree distribution, for example,
captures perfect equality of financial wealth. Let a Pareto distribution describe the degree
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(a) γ = 2.35 (b) γ = 1.65 (c) γ = 1.025
Figure 2.2: Random network graphs (n = 20)
distribution of an unequal society where the probability of someone having di financial assets
is given by p(di) = ad
−γ
i , with γ > 0.
14
Aggregate financial wealth of the entire network equals the total number of financial
claims
∑
di. Because the network is static and the number of individuals n remains fixed,
increasing the number of assets in the network increases total financial wealth. This is akin
to the economy growing through increased credit, or financialization at the extensive margin.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how a random network’s structure changes with increasing financial
wealth inequality via the Pareto degree distribution. Arrows indicate the direction of cash
flows. With n = 20 and expected in-degree E[di] = 1, each network is generated randomly for
a specified γ. The highest Pareto parameter (γ = 2.35) corresponds to the lowest inequality
among the three graphs. Its financial claims are more evenly spread out compared to the
most unequal random network graph (γ = 1.025).15
Given that we can calculate the net worth of an individual vi using (2.6), why not directly
model the wealth distribution with f(vi)? Using f(vi), rather than f(di), to model wealth
inequality obscures the critical role that interconnectedness plays in the financial network. It
14Our network model simulation results are robust to allowing wealth inequality to be determined by the
out-degree distribution f(douti ) rather than the in-degree distribution f(di).
15Each graph is generated thusly: draw a random Pareto distribution of financial claims di, truncated at
the top to ensure E[di] = 1 across distributions; randomly link financial claims di to other nodes to create
adjacency matrix G; plot directed graph G.
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is precisely the interlocking structure of the network that determines whether or not a shock
leads to contagion and instability. In order to have a tractable link structure in our adjacency
matrix, the random network’s inequality must be derived from the degree distribution f(di).
Finally, the degree distribution of the network characterizes the same magnitude of wealth
inequality given by the distribution of individual net worths, without loss of generality.
2.2.5 Shocks, financial failure, and instability
Though the model is static, contagion is dynamic. Let the time subscript t specify periods
in relation to the initial shock in period t = 0. Recall that initial real asset prices are set to
1 so that p is a vector of ones. A random exogenous income shock at time t = 0 drops one
individual’s real asset price by the amount λ, such that pi = 1 becomes p̃i = λpi = λ ∀ t > 1,
where λ ∈ [0, 1). The decline in individual i’s market price for human capital will negatively
impact their labor income and thus cash outflows. The magnitude of the negative real asset
price shock p̃i is decreasing in λ. No other individuals in the network experience a real asset
price shock, and thus the vector of real asset prices after the initial shock p̃ contains a value
λ in the ith row and 1 everywhere else.16 A uniform risk of shock ( 1
n
) exists, therefore no
risk premia are priced into financial assets.
The negative real asset price shock could represent the loss of a job or earning capacity.
An individual experiences financial failure if, as a result of this income shock, the individual’s
wealth vi,t should fall below some threshold vi. Let the failure threshold vi = θvi > 0, with
θ ∈ (0, 1) remaining constant throughout the dynamic contagion process. Parameter θ
describes individual financial fragility. A high θ implies a more easily breached threshold
and likelier financial failure in the event of a shock, whereas a low value means more robust
personal finances. The threshold vi is positive because financial duress and accompanying
cash flow strains need not imply negative net worth in our model, only some financial setback
16The notation p̃i indicates that individual i experiences the negative real asset price shock.
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such that creditors are not repaid and penalties imposed.17
Individual financial failure triggers bankruptcy costs βi. They are not to be taken literally
(net worth remains positive), but instead as representative of the increased financial burdens
faced when an individual’s net worth is depressed by some relative amount. Such burdens
could include direct costs like attorney and accounting fees as well as indirect costs such as
lost income, increased future borrowing costs, loss of collateral or counterparty confidence.
Let bt−1 represent a vector of failure costs with element bi,t−1 = βi(p̃)Ivi,t−1<vi , where I is an
indicator function taking a value of 1 if vi,t < vi and 0 otherwise. By definition, βi = 0 ∀ i
at t = 1 because no individuals have failed yet. The first iteration of calculating new node
valuations occurs at t = 1, so (2.6) is rewritten to incorporate failure costs.
vt = Ĉ(I−C)−1(Dp̃− bt−1) = A(Dp̃− bt−1) for t = 1, . . . , T (2.7)
The dependency matrix A not only describes the share of an individual’s wealth owed to
claimants, but also the share of failure costs absorbed by some individual’s financial failure.
When an individual fails financially their remaining net worth (collateral) is wiped out due
to failure costs—we assume βi,t = vi,t in our parameterization in Section 2.4.2. This is the
contagion mechanism, where failure costs spread according to the dependency matrix A.
Consider the following example of contagion dynamics (illustrated in Figure 2.3). Suppose
some individual j is the first financial failure as a consequence of a real asset price shock
p̃j = λ at time t = 0, such that vj,1 < vj = θvj (the first re-evaluation at t = 1). This
prompts failure costs βj,1 that deplete j’s collateral wealth and are partially absorbed by,
for example, individual i’s dependency on j as represented by a nonzero value for element
Aij in the dependency matrix. Such codependence implies i’s value decreases by the amount
Aijβj,1 in period t = 2. Should i’s value vi,2 fall below vi, it would incur its own failure cost
17If vi < 0, it would imply individual human capital market price is negative, an unrealistic scenario.
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βi,2 and as a consequence alter the values, in period t = 3, of all individuals i is financially




p̃j = λpj = λ
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Figure 2.3: Timeline of Network Contagion
A static financial network gives way to a dynamic process of cascading failures. Network
instability is defined by the share of the network that fails financially. The instability is
initiated by a decrease in one individual’s earning capacity and wealth, hindering their ability
to service financial debts and thus provide cash flows for the financial claims creditors have
on their output.18 This cessation of cash outflows to creditors decreases each creditor’s
wealth, setting off progressive failures as any decline in a creditor’s wealth below their own
failure threshold would initiate additional failure costs. Any shock to individual net worth
may ignite contagion. The model emphasizes the role of network topology on instability by
shocking one individual rather than the entire network, which could cause instability simply
because of the scope of the shock and not necessarily network structure.
An algorithm to identify the set of failed nodes Zt is outlined in Section 2.A of the
appendix. Each iteration of the algorithm solves for Zt, the subset of nodes who fail as a
direct result of the preceding t−1 group’s failures. Contagion stops when no new individuals
in the network fail, or ZT = ZT−1.
The level of network instability is defined as the share of individuals in the network who
have failed financially S = |ZT |
n
. One possible interpretation of a financial crisis is a sufficient
18This appropriates Minsky’s position on financial instability: “the behavior and particularly the stability
of the economy change as the relation of payment commitments to the funds available for payments changes
and the complexity of financial arrangements evolve.” (Minsky, 1986b, p. 197)
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share of the network failing financially, though we are agnostic about a specific threshold.
Network failure in the model is driven by drops in the value of initially real but then financial
assets.
Congruent with empirical definitions of financial crisis that specify the magnitude asset
values must drop, the share of nodes failing financially in the model S is equivalent to the
percentage decline in total financial asset values of the entire network. In other words, when
10 percent of nodes fail then total network wealth declines by 10 percent.
2.2.6 Example network with three nodes
Consider a simple network with n = 3 nodes and increasing numbers of financial assets. The
example will be illustrative of the network and matrix structures, not contagion effects.19
Throughout, we assume D = I3 and pk = 1 ∀ k.
First, consider an unconnected network—no edges linking any nodes exist (Figure 2.4a).
In a network with no financial claims, each individual keeps all future cash flows and their net
worth depends only on their human capital—which is homogeneous. When a shock occurs,
only the wealth of the individual experiencing the shock declines, but every other node is







(a) Graph of network
C =
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , A = Ĉ(I−C)−1 =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

(b) Corresponding cross-holdings and dependency matrices
Figure 2.4: Three-node network with no financial as-
sets
19Because this is the smallest possible network that can display a variety of link structures, a shock to any
connected node may or may not immediately cause failure for all nodes.
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Next, suppose two financial assets are introduced into the network (Figure 2.5). The
total share of a node’s net worth that may be claimed by other nodes, c, is 0.5. All elements
in the diagonal savings matrix Ĉ will be 1, unless financial claims are made on a node’s
value and it equals 0.5. The two financial assets represent two claims: node 1 has a claim





while d3 = 0 = d
out
1 ). According to (2.1), C12 = 0.5. Node 1, therefore, has claim to
half of node 2’s cashflows while node 2 retains the other half. The same relationship holds
between nodes 2 and 3, where C23 = 0.5. Importantly, nodes 1 and 3 are indirectly connected
through node 2, though no direct link exists (note the dashed edge in Figure 2.5a). Hence
A13 = 0.25 > C13 = 0, because node 2 claims half of node 3’s net worth, and node 1 claims
half of 2’s. Node 1 also has the highest net worth (
∑
A1j = 1.75) of which 0.75 is derived
from the other two nodes. Node 2 has a net worth of 0.75, of which 0.25 is derived from
node 3, and node 3 has no financial assets and thus a net worth of only 0.5 (equal to its own
savings). A shock to node 1 would have no effect on the other nodes since no other nodes
have financial claims on node 1 or are dependent on node 1’s net worth. Only if nodes 2 or 3










(a) Graph of network
C =
 0 .5 00 0 .5
0 0 0
 ,
A = Ĉ(I−C)−1 =
 1 .5 .250 .5 .25
0 0 .5

(b) Corresponding cross-holdings and dependency matrices
Figure 2.5: Three-node network with two financial
assets
Next, we introduce another asset into the network for a total of three financial assets
(Figure 2.6). Node 1 gains an explicit financial claim on node 3. The in-degree of each node










(a) Weighted network graph
C =
 0 .5 .250 0 .25
0 0 0
 , A =
 1 .5 .3750 .5 .125
0 0 .5

(b) Corresponding cross-holdings and dependency matrices
Figure 2.6: Three-node network with three financial
assets
is now d1 = 2, d2 = 1, d3 = 0 . Of the 0.5 share of node 3’s value that is securitized within
the network, half goes to node 2 and the other half to node 1. But node 1 still receives
indirect cash flows from node 3 via node 2. Thus its total cash inflows from node 3 are
greater than its direct cash flows, or A13 = 0.375 > C13 = 0.25. Contagion would depend on
which individual is initially shocked. For example, if λ = 0 and node 1 were shocked (such
that p̃1 = 0), then only node 1 would fail financially. No other nodes depend on its value
so its failure would not disrupt the net worth of others. If, on the other hand, node 3 were
shocked then because its value backs the financial assets held by the other nodes it would











(a) Weighted network graph
C =
 0 .25 .25.25 0 .25
.25 .25 0
 , A =
 .6 .2 .2.2 .6 .2
.2 .2 .6

(b) Corresponding cross-holdings and dependency matrices
Figure 2.7: Three-node network with maximum (n−1) financial
assets
Finally, suppose all nodes are linked such that di = d
out
i = n − 1 ∀ i (Figure 2.7).
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The network has absorbed the maximum possible number of financial assets (n2 − n) and
represents a complete graph—a special case of a regular graph where all nodes just have equal
degree. Each node has equal net worth: 0.6 from oneself and 0.2 from each of the other two
nodes. Since everyone is connected in both directions, any shock will precipitate contagion.
2.3 Empirics on Financial Networks
To motivate the choice of a Pareto distribution to model inequality of financial assets (and
thus financial connections), we summarize some empirical findings from the financial net-
work literature on the connectivity of financial institutions through interbank lending as
well as the distribution of those connections.20 Then we present estimates fitting various
datasets of individual wealth to Pareto (power-law) distributions along with their goodness
of fit and tests against alternative distributions. While omitting financial intermediaries,
our interpersonal financial network framework emphasizes the latent interconnectedness of
parties created by assets in a financial economy. Estimates on existing bank networks, and
the centrality characteristics of asset distributions, are therefore helpful guides for reasonable
parameterizations of financial assets in the interpersonal network model.
2.3.1 Interbanking networks
In a seminal work, Furfine (1999) developed an algorithm to parse transactions from federal
funds market data for bilateral overnight lending.21 Summarizing interbank lending market
concentration during the first quarter of 1998, Furfine finds that the top 1% of financial
20We must rely on existing research as only aggregate lending data are publicly available. Fedwire Funds
Service, a large value transfer service operate by the Federal Reserve—though not unique to federal funds
lending—provides bank-level data of the US federal funds market.
21All subsequent papers cited in this section rely on the Furfine (1999) algorithm, or adaptations of it, to
generate their interbank lending data from the broader Fedwire data. An important caveat of the resulting
Furfine interbank lending data are their dependence on transactions occurring through Federal Reserve
balance sheets, but not the banks’ own lending.
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institutions in the federal funds market account for two thirds of all assets. They also
represent 86 percent of federal funds sold and 97 percent of federal funds bought. These
levels of financial market concentration are within the range of parameter estimates tested
in our simulations in the next section.
Empirical estimates of various financial network structural parameters from Blasques
et al. (2015) are based on data from Dutch interbank markets between 2008 and 2011.22
Amongst the top 50 lending banks, the authors estimate a mean in-/out- degree of 1.04,
with standard deviations of 1.6 and 1.84, respectively. (Banks lend to or borrow from an
average of 1.04 different banks.) At the same time, they find very positively skewed in-/out-
degree distributions, supporting the Pareto distribution imposed on our network.
Bech and Atalay (2010) describe the topology of the federal funds market in the US
between 1997 and 2006—also using Fedwire data and the Furfine (1999) algorithm. In 2006,
banks had an average in-/out- degree of 3.3 ± 0.1 for overnight interbank lending.23 Among
many other parameters describing the topology of the federal funds market, they estimate the
out-degree distribution for banks on a representative day in their sample period, concluding
that a power-law distribution provides the best fit with a parameter estimate of 1.76 ± 0.02.
Their results lend support to our model’s degree distribution parameterization, described in
Section 2.4.2.
The aforementioned papers only consider unsecured overnight interbank lending. Bargigli
et al. (2015) study both secured and unsecured lending for varying maturities, reflecting our
own model more closely—which posits financial assets are secured by an individual borrower’s
22Unlike the Fedwire data in Furfine (1999), the authors use TARGET2 interbank lending data (the
Eurosystem equivalent of Fedwire) which specifies individual borrowing and lending institutions for indicated
bilateral credit payments. The Dutch interbank lending data has also been cross-validated against Italian
and Spanish interbank lending data to minimize type I errors.
23The authors define a directed link as going from lender to borrower. Thus their definition of a bank’s
out-degree corresponds to our own definition of an individual’s in-degree (cash flows directed in towards the
asset holder).
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labor income and hence a longer maturity.24 The authors estimate the the in-/out- degree
distributions of the Italian Interbank Network (IIN) between 2008 and 2012, and for 2012
they report power-law parameters on the interval [1.8, 3.5]. A similar parameterization is
applied in our model’s Pareto degree distribution of individual financial assets. The authors’
expected degrees of networks with long-term maturities are also within our range of mean
degree values.
Empirical evidence from interpersonal financial networks is comparatively scarce. The
development of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending networks through online platforms provides a
glimpse, in particular data from Prosper.com that has been used by some in the literature.
For example, Krumme and Herrero (2009) find that social links on Prosper exhibit strong
“power-like” degree distributions, a finding replicated by Horvát et al. (2015) for individuals
in borrower, lender, or dual roles and Liu et al. (2014) overall. Adamic and Huberman (2002),
summarizing the general tendencies of online and P2P networks more broadly, write that
they follow Zipf or scale-free degree distributions. Such preliminary evidence on individual
borrowers and lenders in P2P financial networks demonstrates the plausibility of the power
law distribution assumed by the model.
2.3.2 Financial distributions
The Pareto distribution, or power law, is typically used to estimate top wealth shares.25
Thus our model more accurately describes a network of top financial asset holders where
we assume financial assets are Pareto distributed. According to the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), between 1989 and 2007 US households in the top 1% of households by net
worth typically owned one third of all wealth, around 29 percent of all assets, and also nearly
24Bargigli et al. (2015) argue that the overnight market is a poor approximation of other interbank lending
and thus an inaccurate barometer of systemic risk.
25See Kennickell (2009) for estimates of the nonparametric wealth distribution in the US using Survey of
Consumer Finances data and Vermeulen (2014) for a detailed discussion on estimating top tails in wealth
distributions.
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one third of all financial assets. The top 10% held nearly two thirds of all wealth and assets,
and over 70 percent of all financial assets. In contrast, the bottom 50% never held more than
3 percent of financial assets or 6.7 percent of all assets (which almost entirely consisted of
real estate). We argue that since top wealth holders describe the majority of financial assets,
their network topology is a sufficient determinant of overall financial network instability.
Given that the power-law relationship p(x) = Pr(X = x) = Cx−γ implies ln p(x) =
constant + γ lnx, its approximate linear relationship on a log-log plot suggests that its
absolute slope is a reasonable estimate of the parameter γ. Since Pareto (1896), power-
law distributions have been traditionally estimated in the following manner: construct a
histogram representing the frequency distribution of the variable x; plot on a log-log scale;
finally, if approximately linear, estimate its slope to find the scaling parameter.26
For numerous reasons outlined in Clauset et al. (2009), the above estimation method is
problematic. Instead, the authors propose a maximum likelihood estimation method whereby
the scaling parameter γ is estimated conditional on a correct estimate of the lower bound
value for power-law behavior xmin—as chosen by Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics. That is,
since the power law describes the tail of the distribution, the starting point of the tail xmin
must be correctly defined. Following the methodology of Clauset et al. (2009) and applying
it to the 1989 and 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, we find a wide range of plausible
power-law fittings for US household data on total net worth, financial assets, and total
debt.27 We repeat the exercise for comparable variables from three international datasets in
the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS): the UK in 2007, and Australia and Italy in 2010.
Results vary by country (Table 2.1). The US data are the least representative of a
Pareto, or power-law, distribution. Though parameter estimates are easily fitted to the
data, hypothesis testing rejects a statistically significant goodness of fit between generated
26In Pareto (1896), γ̂ was approximately 1.5—and conjectured to be fixed.
27Estimation programs are available online at http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/∼aaronc/powerlaws/.
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Table 2.1: Empirical Pareto Estimates
US UK Australia Italy
1989 2010 2007 2010 2010
net worth
γ̂ 1.475 1.450 2.809 2.729 2.904
x̂min 146,468 206,670 940,162 978,558 495,000
Hypothesis testing
PL reject reject fail (98) fail (92) fail (98)
Alt. reject reject reject reject reject
financial assets
γ̂ 2.208 1.493 3.254 2.224 2.382
x̂min 5,102,103 184,330 788,000 495,660 59,777
PL fail (60) reject fail (98) fail (87) fail (98)
Alt. reject reject reject reject reject
liabilities
γ̂ 1.988 2.036 3.086 3.571 3.393
x̂min 158,376 217,700 147,000 554,457 109,900
PL fail (16) fail (6) fail (93) fail (98) fail (94)
Alt. reject reject reject reject reject
Sources: US: Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF); UK, Australia, Italy: Luxembourg
Wealth Study (LWS)
Notes: Australian, Italian, UK and US data are all in local currency units. SCF (US only)
financial asset data are the total market value of financial investments and products, deposit
accounts, cash and other financial assets owned by household members, including pension
assets as well as life insurance. LWS (GBR, AUS, ITA) financial asset data exclude pension
assets and other long-term savings. Net worth data are total assets minus total liabili-
ties, except Italy 2010, where disposable net worth is measured. Hypothesis testing: (PL)
null hypothesis of fitted power-law distribution and generated power-law distribution (using
estimated parameters) being the same, by Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic; and (Alt.) null
hypothesis of fitted alternative distribution and generated alternative distribution (using
estimated parameters) being the same, by Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Alternative dis-
tributions tested are an exponential distribution and log normal distribution, both with and
without cutoff values (x̂min). If we fail to reject a null, the percentage of 2,500 simulated
fittings of generated and fitted data which fail to reject null is reported in parentheses.
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data and fitted data.28 The Pareto distribution fits US financial asset data from 1989 best,
though only 60 percent of comparisons between generated and fitted data fail to reject the
null that they come from the same Pareto distribution. In all other sets of US data we
reject the null the majority of the time. However, we also reject any alternative distributions
(the exponential and lognormal, both with and without cutoff values) as good fits of the US
data.29 Fitted Pareto parameters range from 1.450 (US net worth in 2010), indicating high
inequality, to 2.208 (US financial assets in 1989), indicating much lower inequality. However,
the latter has a very high cutoff value (over 5 million) suggesting a sliver of the top 1%.
Data for the UK, Australia and Italy consistently fit a Pareto distribution, across all
household variables. In at least 87 percent of the comparisons between generated and fitted
Pareto distributions, we cannot reject a difference between the two. Alternative distributions
are also unanimously rejected as possible models. Though the Pareto is a uniformly good
fit of the LWS data, the scaling parameter estimates are much higher than for the US data,
with a minimum of only 2.224 (AUS financial assets in 2010) and a maximum of 3.571 (AUS
liabilities in 2010). One reason why may be that over-sampling of high-earning households
occurs in the SCF survey population, but not the other national surveys. There simply may
not be enough units surveyed at the top of the tail.
Because a Pareto distribution estimates top wealth inequality in the tail of the distribu-
tion, the interpersonal financial network model is representative of top financial asset holders
and their influence on financial stability. Along with the empirical literature on interbank
networks, our estimates of Pareto parameters for 15 different wealth series suggest that our
range of calibrated γ values [1.025, 2.375] for the simulation in the proceeding section are
reasonable.
28Generated data come from 2,500 randomly generated Pareto distributions simulated from our fitted
parameter estimates.
29Using the R package poweRlaw , we also test against alternative poisson distributions for the US data.
Using a Vuong test, also outlined in Clauset et al. (2009), we prefer a Pareto distribution against a poisson
in all cases.
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2.4 Network Simulations
2.4.1 Setup
In a static random network the number of nodes is fixed and links are established following
some probabilistic rule. Let di be drawn independently from the Pareto distribution p(di) =
ad−γi , where γ is the Pareto, or power-law, parameter and a is a normalizing constant. For
example, suppose a random draw from the degree distribution yields an in-degree of 10 for
individual i. Ten financial assets are owned by i, each backed by the net worths of 10 different
individuals. As a creditor, i is represented by a row in the adjacency matrix G. Those 10
financial claims are randomly assigned to debtors, represented along columns in G, where
Gii = 0. In short, the Pareto draw tells us the row sum of Gi, which is randomly allotted to
columns along row i. Also, an increase in total financial assets
∑
di directly increases the
measure of aggregate wealth d = E[di] because the network size is fixed at n = 100
One characteristic of the Pareto distribution is that its scaling parameter γ is decreasing
in the distribution’s skewness. Not only is γ a natural inequality measure, but it is also
directly related to top percentile shares: if a random variable is Pareto distributed, then the




γ . The Gini index
can also be derived from the Pareto shape parameter with GINI = (2γ − 1)−1 when γ > 1
2
.
Each relationship illustrates that wealth inequality is decreasing in γ.
For each simulation, a random network is generated, one individual is randomly shocked,
and then (according to the algorithm in Section 2.A of the appendix) the total percentage of
nodes in the network that have failed financially S is evaluated—our measure of instability.
Each simulation specifies a unique parameterization and is repeated 1,000 times. The share
of failing nodes S reported is the average across iterations. Note that each iteration generates
a unique graph G(N,G) with a network structure that conforms to an exogenously imposed
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financial wealth distribution and level of total wealth.30 The below procedure describes the
process in full.
Step 1 Generate a static, directed random network G with parameter di represented by
a truncated Pareto probability distribution. (The distribution is truncated to isolate
the effect of γ for a given d. At each level of γ a maximum in-degree is set so that d
remains constant.)
Step 2 Derive the cross-holdings matrix C from G using (2.1).
Step 3 Calculate individuals’ starting values vi ∀ i ∈ n, given an initial real asset price of
pk = 1, and determine failure threshold values vi = θvi for some θ ∈ (0, 1).
Step 4 Randomly choose an individual j to experience a negative income shock and de-
crease its real asset price to p̃j = λpj.
Step 5 Assume all other real asset prices remain at 1 and calculate the number of nodes
failing according to the algorithm in Section 2.A of the appendix.
The set of all nodes ZT who have failed financially, calculated at the algorithm’s terminal
step, yields the share of nodes in the network who have failed S. Results are reported
graphically, with S plotted against the wealth inequality parameter γ for varying levels of
aggregate wealth d.
Given the assumptions built into the model (i.e. n = 100, D=I, p=ι) the share of failing
nodes S is also equivalent to the percentage decrease in total financial asset values. The
baseline results in Figure 2.8 can therefore be interpreted as asset value percentage declines,
an alternative measure of financial instability.
30Additional simulations (not reported) consider n = 500 and n = 1, 000 and yield indistinguishable
results. For computational ease, all simulation results are generated with n = 100.
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2.4.2 Calibration
The share of an individual’s net worth that can be securitized c characterizes the percent-
age of future income flows claimed by creditors in the model. An analogous, and available,
macroeconomic variable measuring the burden of liabilities is the debt service ratio (DSR),
the share of an individual’s income used to repay debt. Aggregate estimates from Drehmann
and Juselius (2012) necessitate several assumptions concerning average credit maturity, lend-
ing rates, and total outstanding credit. Across a panel of both advanced and developing
economies, the aggregate debt-service ratio for households ranges from 5.1 percent in Italy
in 2010 to 20.3 percent for Denmark.31
Because nodes in our model represent individuals or households who also produce and
have presumably made financing decisions, we also consider the DSR of private non-financial
firms and corporations. In 2010, Italy has a private non-financial firm aggregate DSR of 12.9
percent and Denmark’s equals 29.5 percent. (For non-financial corporations the rates are
even higher in 2010: 40.6 percent in Italy and 55.5 percent in Denmark.)
The Federal Reserve produces two similar aggregate DSR estimates for the US: household
debt service payments and household financial obligations, both as shares of personal dis-
posable income.32 Financial obligations include rent payments on tenant-occupied property,
auto lease payments, homeowners’ insurance, and property tax payments. Thus its ratio is
larger, peaking at 18.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 while the DSR was only 13.1
percent in the same period. The BIS data for private non-financial firms (corporations) in
the US in 2010 is 15.8 percent (39.4 percent).
Heterogeneity of debt burdens may skew aggregate estimates, thus distributions are ex-
amined. In 1989 and 2010 in the US, for example, top wealth holders have a greater DSR
31Data are available online at http://www.bis.org/statistics/dsr.htm
32Data are available from FRED online.
Household debt service payments series: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TDSP
Household financial obligations series: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FODSP
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than middle portions of the wealth distribution but lower than the household average. (See
Figures 2.B.1 and 2.B.2 in Section 2.B of the appendix.) Generally, BIS household aggre-
gate estimates are lower than averages calculated from household survey data for overlapping
years.33
Setting c ∈ [0.05, 0.5] captures the full range of DSR estimates. In the baseline model
c = 0.3, modeling an economy with reasonable household cash flow obligations. While higher
c values are more akin to firms than individuals, they are also more congruent with the units
of analysis in the network literature (Section 2.3).
In the event of a financial failure, such that vi < vi = θvi, an individual incurs bankruptcy
costs or some increased economic burden as a consequence of their depressed net worth. We
follow Elliott et al. (2014a) and let θ take on a range of values in [0.8, 0.98]. This provides a
wide enough spectrum such that individuals are either very robust to valuation changes or
very sensitive.
Since the advent of the US Bankruptcy Act in 1978, the majority of consumer bankruptcy
cases are filed under Chapter 7 protection, where assets (above some exemption threshold)
are liquidated to pay off creditors of secure debt but the debtor’s future income streams
are untouched. For example, in 2014 approximately two thirds of all consumer bankruptcy
petitions filed in US courts were under Chapter 7.34 The model assumes that, as in Chapter
7, financially failing individuals liquidate their remaining asset position to cover failure costs.
And because failure costs equal the value of the individual’s wealth after failure in period t,
or βi = vi,t, a failed individual’s remaining assets (or collateral wealth) are liquidated and
wealth drops to zero.
Recall that, an income shock lowers an individual’s real asset price, so that p̃i = λpi = λ.
A negative shock may theoretically decrease an individual’s labor-earning capacity by varying
33The distribution of household DSRs is calculated using Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) data for the
US and Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data for France and other countries (not shown).
34Data are available online at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/bapcpa-report-2014.
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amounts, depending on an individual’s level of savings, the number of wage earners in a
household, support systems of friends and family and other financial coping mechanisms.
The human capital price decline could be very large if, for example, it was caused by some
physical injury preventing a wage earner from earning any labor income through their human
capital. In such an instance λ would be small. On the other hand, the income shock may
be very small if earning capacity is not greatly inhibited, and so λ is large. The range of λ
values tested is in [0, 0.9]. So long as λ < θ a failure, and thus contagion, can occur.
Concerning historical US wealth inequality measurements, Wolff (1992) finds the top
1% of individuals own approximately as little as 19 percent of household wealth (excluding
retirement wealth) in 1976 and as much as 38 percent in 1922. These translate to Pareto
parameter values of 1.56 and 1.27, assuming top wealth shares are described by a power
law.35 In 1962, the first iteration of the Federal Reserve’s household survey, the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF)36, found a Gini coefficient of 0.72 in wealth with a corresponding
top 1% wealth share of 32 percent. In its second iteration in 1983, the SCF found a Gini
coefficient for wealth of 0.74 (top 1% wealth share of 31 percent). Using more recent SCF
waves, Kennickell (2009) decomposes the wealth distribution. In 1989 the top 1% owned
28.3 percent of financial assets and in 2007 it owned 31.5 percent. Assuming a power law
describes top wealth shares for the US in those years, the equivalent Pareto parameters are
1.38 in 1989 and 1.33 in 2007.
Values for the Pareto parameter γ are in the interval [1.025, 2.375], which corresponds to
a range of Gini coefficients from 0.952 to 0.267. The corresponding range of top 1% shares
is from 89.4 percent to 6.95 percent. The parameter space is credible and within the range
of empirical estimates of wealth, asset, and liability inequalities estimated in Section 2.3,
35Solve for γ in S(0.01) = 100
1−γ
γ .
36The earliest Federal Reserve Board wealth survey was called the Survey of Financial Characteristics of
Consumers.
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described above, and in the literature.37
Changes in γ also change the mean d = E[di] of the in-degree distribution f(di). Therefore
the Pareto distribution must be truncated in order to hold d constant as γ varies. It becomes
possible to isolate the distribution effect from the aggregate wealth effect. With n = 100,
possible d values are restricted to the interval [1, 2]. For example, suppose γ = 2.375
(minimal inequality). The maximum possible di is 99 (it is not feasible to have di > n).
When max{di} = 99 and γ = 2.375, then d = 2 and represents an upper bound on expected
in-degree values under our Pareto distribution. For each level of γ we adjust the maximum
di accordingly.
The baseline model calibration is the fullowing: c = 0.3, θ = 0.92, βi,t = vi,t, λ = 0, γ =
[1.025, 2.375] and d = [1, 2]. The full range of parameterizations is summarized in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Parameter calibration for static random network simulations
Variable Values Source(s)
c [0.05, 0.5] Author’s estimates (Section 2.B), Drehmann and Juselius
(2012), BIS, FRB St. Louis
θ [0.8, 0.98] Elliott et al. (2014a)
βi vi UScourts.gov (Federal Caseload Statistics)
λ [0, 0.9]
γ [1.025, 2.375] Author’s estimates (Section 2.3.2), Elliott et al. (2014b)
d [1, 2] Blasques et al. (2015), Elliott et al. (2014b)
2.4.3 Results
Two results from the baseline simulation (Figure 2.8) are emphasized. First, wealth inequal-
ity positively increases network instability for moderate to wealthy networks; and second,
37See Vermeulen (2014), Table 8, for Pareto parameter estimates which merge Forbes billionaire data with
national surveys, such as the SCF. Vermeulen’s Pareto parameter estimates range from 1.02 in the US (very
unequal) to 3.55 in the Netherlands. In his broad survey of power laws in economics, Gabaix (2009) finds
1.5 to be the median estimate found for top wealth.
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Figure 2.8: Baseline model
Notes: Aggregate wealth is increasing in expected in-
degree d. Calibrated with c = 0.3, θ = 0.92, and λ = 0.
As γ increases wealth inequality decreases. The domain
of γ = [1.025, 2.375] corresponds to Gini coefficients of
[0.952, 0.267] and top 1% wealth shares of [0.894, 0.070].
Percentage of financial failures is average of 1,000 itera-
tions.
aggregate wealth has an inverted U-shaped relationship with instability—initially increas-
ing, but then decreasing it. As the network becomes more unequal (γ decreases), the share
of individuals in the economy failing financially S increases, but only when the network is
sufficiently wealthy. Wealth inequality, in other words, is destabilizing only when the econ-
omy attains a minimum level of wealth. In our baseline model this approximately occurs
when d = 1.4. At or above this level of financial wealth, increasing wealth inequality causes
greater financial contagion, greater financial asset losses, and therefore a greater likelihood of
financial crisis. The positive contribution of inequality on instability is relatively linear and
is most pronounced when our network’s wealth has an expected in-degree of 1.6, doubling
the amount of instability when going from the most equal to the most unequal network.
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Unlike wealth inequality, the effect of increasing aggregate wealth on stability is notably
nonmonotonic. Initial increases in aggregate wealth (from d = 1.0 to 1.2) increase the share
of financial failures but are immune to any inequality effects. At moderate levels of aggregate
wealth (d = 1.4) instability is higher still, but now inequality begins to have a destabilizing
impact as it goes up (γ decreases). The strongest effect of wealth inequality occurs in a
moderately wealthy network (d = 1.6), when moving from very low wealth inequality to
very high inequality roughly doubles the size of the contagion—from around 25 to over 50
percent of the network failing. Finally, at the highest levels of aggregate wealth (d > 1.8),
inequality remains positively and significantly related to contagion, however the level, or the
share of the network failing financially, is smaller than at moderate levels of wealth—nearly
20 percentage points less at some levels of inequality.
The network economy is therefore most unstable, or vulnerable to negative shocks, when
it is both wealthier (higher d) and unequal (low γ). The interaction between an economy’s
level of wealth inequality and total aggregate wealth reflects the “robust-yet-fragile” non-
monotonicity found in other network models.38
Importantly, instability occurs independent of the shocked node. Figure 2.9 depicts two
scenarios of identically calibrated networks but with nonrandom shocks. In the left panel,
the poorest node in the network receives the negative income shock and in the right the
richest node is shocked. The level of contagion between them, while significant and nearly
identical to our baseline model in both, is noticeably different. When the poorest node
(min{vi}) receives the income shock, a greater share of the network fails for both a given
level of inequality and aggregate wealth than when the richest node (max{vi}) is shocked.
This makes sense because poorer nodes have more liabilities, and thus their failure costs
spread to a greater number of nodes than when the richest node is shocked. The stronger
effect from shocking the poorest node is more muted at lower aggregate wealth levels. When
38Gai and Kapadia (2010), Nier et al. (2007), and Elliott et al. (2014a).
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(a) Poorest node (min{vi}) shocked. (b) Richest node (max{vi}) shocked.
Figure 2.9: Targeted shocks
Notes: Aggregate wealth is increasing in expected in-degree d. Cal-
ibrated with c = 0.3, θ = 0.92, and λ = 0. As γ increases wealth
inequality decreases. The domain of γ = [1.025, 2.375] corresponds
to Gini coefficients of [0.952, 0.267] and top 1% wealth shares of
[0.894, 0.070]. Percentage of financial failures is average of 1,000
simulations.
the richest node is shocked, networks are more robust by over ten percentage points for the
wealthiest networks (d > 1.6) and approximately five percentage points for the least wealthy
networks (d = 1).
Eigenvector centrality is a useful measure for comparing nodes’ relative integration in
the network, but it has little bearing on the network’s overall stability. Simulations in
which nodes with either the highest or lowest values in the eigenvector corresponding to
the principle eigenvalue receive the negative income shock mimic the results in Figure 2.9b.
In other words, very connected nodes are on average very wealthy nodes whose wealth is
sufficiently high in some instances that financial contagion does not spread to the same
levels as in the baseline model if Figure 2.8. At the same time, more isolated nodes are not
producing cash flows for a sufficient number of other nodes, such that when they experience
an income shock financial contagion is less destructive than in the baseline model.
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The overall pattern of our baseline model, observed when a random node is shocked,
however, persists: increasing wealth inequality (decreasing γ) causes a greater share of indi-
viduals to fail in networks of at least moderate wealth while increasing the aggregate wealth
(increasing d) of the network is initially destabilizing but then stabilizing.
Regular graphs
To emphasize the importance of both aggregate wealth and the financial wealth distribution
on network stability, random regular graphs are simulated for comparison. Regular graphs
have equal in-degrees and thus represent perfect financial asset equality in the model. The
only parameters changing are c, the percentage of future cash flows owed by an individual
to other claimants, and d, the in-degree of all individuals. No longer restricted by the degree
distribution parameter γ, d can take on a broader set of values. Results are presented in
Figure 2.10.
As d increases the aggregate wealth of the network increases, though the levels are not
necessarily comparable to the baseline model. When c > 0.15, there exists a stark pattern:
the share of nodes failing increases sharply when aggregate wealth is low (d = 1), but quickly
drops again as aggregate wealth increases beyond some level. (The particular level depends
on c.) At d = 5, instability disappears. Like the models in Figures 2.8 and 2.9, the regular
network displays increasing instability as aggregate wealth increases from low to moderate
levels, but decreasing instability as wealth increases further. Decreasing c, or financialization
at the intensive margin, however, also significantly lowers instability.39
Simulation results for the full range of parameterizations described in Table 2.2 are pre-
sented in the appendix, Section 2.C. The model is particularly sensitive to the c parameter.
This makes intuitive sense because it captures financialization at the intensive margin. The
39The step-function-like behavior of the regular network results are due to the fact that individuals must
have integer values of di = d. A rounding function in the program simply rounds up to the next integer.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL NETWORK MODEL 88
Figure 2.10: Regular (equal) network
Notes: Regular network contains fixed in-degree di for
each node, hence there exists perfect wealth equality.
Aggregate wealth is increasing in expected in-degree d.
Calibrated with θ = 0.92, and λ = 0. Percentage of
financial failures is average of 1,000 iterations.
higher c’s value is, the more dependent asset holders are on incoming cash flows, and the
greater the risk in the event of some financial failure—just as in the regular graph in Figure
2.10. The θ parameter, the measure of an individual’s personal robustness under financial
stress (or the economy’s ability to absorb depleted cash flows on asset claims) is also critical
as it itself determines the failure thresholds. The parameter λ, inversely proportional to the
size of the income shock p̃i = λpi, is nearly indiscriminate in its effect on contagion (Figure
2.C.3). So long as λ < θ, an initial negative income shock will always cause at least one
financial failure which will catalyze contagion within the network.
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2.5 Conclusion
Keynes once described the relationship between debtors and creditors as forming “the ulti-
mate foundation of capitalism.”40 This paper’s central goal was to examine the relationship
between inequality and financial crisis by reducing the financial economy into a network of
creditors and debtors who are linked through financial assets. While the income inequality
literature has posited that inequality’s association with debt may relate to financial crises,
studying the distribution of the asset side of the balance sheet illuminates a possible topo-
graphical relationship between wealth inequality and crises.
The financial network model presented is a radically simplified interpretation of a finan-
cial economy, one that eliminates intermediaries and instead relies on the latent financial
pathways that link individual asset and liability holders. Implicit financial links observed
between individuals are made explicit in a directed network graph. A link indicates the
presence of a financial asset and the direction of cash flows between individuals. It follows
that changing the distribution of financial assets changes the arrangement of links in the
network. This model of wealth inequality and financial instability, building from the frame-
work of Elliott et al. (2014a), suggests that changes to the network topology have two main
effects: first, increasing top wealth inequality, conditional on a network’s overall wealth,
increases instability; and second, aggregate network wealth should have an increasing and
then decreasing effect on instability—measured by the share of nodes in the network that is
determined to have failed financially. The model’s assumptions of homogeneous real assets
and prices allow for another interpretation of financial instability: decreases in total network
financial asset values.
An obvious implication this model is that it predicts increasing financial instability if
wealth inequality continues increasing in the US and Western Europe (as predicted in Piketty
40(Keynes, 1920, p. 236).
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(2014)). While many have argued increasing broader financialization is to blame for the
recent global financial crisis, this model suggests that the distribution of those engineered
assets is equally important for stability—assuming their location and principle owner is
known to begin with. The network model as described also ignores political boundaries,
often the only realistic arena for implementing policies to counteract inequality. Indeed, one
of Piketty and Zucman’s policy proposals is for the International Monetary Fund, or some
international regulator, to monitor asset ownership with the aim of implementing a global
wealth tax. Imagining the economy as a network model leaves the boundaries of the network
open to questioning, much like the practical financial borders in our globalized economy.
Appendices
2.A Failure Algorithm
This algorithm is used the determine the ordering of individuals who fail financially in the
event of an initial income shock. It finds what Elliott et al. (2014a) refer to as the best-case
equilibrium, i.e. there exist the fewest number of failures and highest values vi,t possible.
The initial financial shock occurs at period t = 0, changing real asset price values to p̃.
Let Zt represent the set of financially failed individuals at period t, where Z0 = ∅. Then for
periods t > 1:
Step 1 Let bt−1 be a vector of failure costs with element bi,t−1 = βi if i ∈ Zt−1 and 0
otherwise. By definition, βi = 0 ∀ i at t = 1.
Step 2 Let Zt be the set of all j where vj,t < 0 and:
vt = A(Dp̃− bt−1)− v.
Step 3 Stop iterations if Zt = Zt−1, otherwise return to Step 1.
The resulting set ZT , at terminal period T , is the corresponding set of individuals who
have failed financially. An important feature is that the individuals added each period
(Zt−Zt−1) are those individuals whose financial failures were catalyzed by the preceding set
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of cumulative failures. For example, Z1 is the first group of individuals to fail and Z2 includes
the group of individuals who fail in the second period as a direct result of the individuals
failing during period t = 1.
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Figure 2.B.2: France: 2005
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2.C Additional Parameterizations
2.C.1 Changes in parameter c
The parameter c determines the share of each node’s value that can be securitized and
claimed by other nodes. It measures the share of a node’s cash flows that are sent to creditor
nodes, an approximation of the level of financialization in the network at the intensive margin.
Simulation results of the static random network for values of c = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8},
and θ = 0.92 and λ = 0, are shown in Figure 2.C.1.
When c = 0.1, less than seven percent of the nodes fail under all levels of wealth inequality
and aggregate wealth. Only as the share of individual wealth that can be claimed increases
(c > 0.2) does the positive effect of wealth inequality on S begin to assert itself at moderate
levels of wealth (d ∈ [1.4, 1.6]). As financialization at the intensive margin, c, continues
increasing instability at the highest levels of aggregate wealth keeps increasing until we reach
a maximum amount of contagion at approximately c = 0.6. (See Figure 2.C.1.) Hereafter,
instability declines as c increases. Thus the inverted U-shaped effect of financialization (at
the extensive margin) on instability observed from increasing network wealth (d) appears to
also take shape when financialization at the intensive margin (c) is also increased—though
the downward sloping portion occurs at values of c that are well beyond any reasonably
estimated debt servicing burden, commercial or private. These results broadly echo those of
Drehmann and Juselius (2012) who show debt service burdens positively predict economic
downturns.
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(a) c = 0.1 (b) c = 0.2
(c) c = 0.3 (d) c = 0.4
(e) c = 0.6 (f) c = 0.8
Figure 2.C.1: Changes in parameter c
Notes: Pareto distributed in-degree d. Aggregate wealth is increasing in expected in-degree
d. θ = 0.92 and λ = 0. As γ increases wealth inequality decreases. The domain of γ =
[1.025, 2.375] corresponds to Gini coefficients of [0.952, 0.267] and top 1% wealth shares of
[0.894, 0.070]. Percentage of financial failures is average of 1,000 simulations.
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2.C.2 Changes in parameter θ
The parameter θ determines the financial robustness of an individual node in the event
of an income shock. Since financial failure is predicated on vi < vi and vi = θvi, the
smaller θ is the more financially robust an individual is. An individual’s financial fragility
is increasing in θ. Simulation results of the static random network for values of θ =
{0.8, 0.84, 0.88, 0.92, 0.94, 0.98}, and c = 0.3 and λ = 0, are shown in Figure 2.C.2.
As θ increases an individual is more likely to breach vi in the event that they personally
experience an income shock or absorb failures indirectly through the dependency matrix A
. When θ is smallest (0.8), individuals are especially robust to any shock and the share of
failing nodes is very low (S < 2%). See Figure 2.C.2. When θ increases (0.88) individual
financial vulnerability increases, but contagion is still very low and unaffected by inequality.
When θ is high (> 0.92), only a slight disturbance can tip an individual into financial failure
and contagion spreads easily. The impact of wealth inequality on contagion is also strongly
felt, but, again, is dependent on the network’s aggregate wealth level.
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(a) θ = 0.8 (b) θ = 0.84
(c) θ = 0.88 (d) θ = 0.92
(e) θ = 0.94 (f) θ = 0.98
Figure 2.C.2: Changes in parameter θ
Notes: Pareto distributed in-degree d. Aggregate wealth is increasing in expected in-degree
d. c = 0.3 and λ = 0. As γ increases wealth inequality decreases. The domain of γ =
[1.025, 2.375] corresponds to Gini coefficients of [0.952, 0.267] and top 1% wealth shares of
[0.894, 0.070]. Percentage of financial failures is average of 1,000 simulations.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL NETWORK MODEL 97
2.C.3 Changes in parameter λ
The parameter λ determines the magnitude of the random income shock imposed on a single
node. An income shock decreases the market price of the node’s real asset to p̃k = λpk, where
pk = 1 and λ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore as the magnitude of the income shock is decreasing in λ.
Simulation results of the static random network for values of λ = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9}, and
c = 0.3 and θ = 0.92, are shown in Figure 2.C.3.
Only when λ is very close to θ in value (0.9) is there any significant decrease in contagion.
If λ < θ, no matter the size of the shock the overall pattern of our simulation results holds:
increasing inequality causes an increase in the percentage of nodes failing, conditional on a
certain level of aggregate wealth; and increasing the aggregate wealth of the network, first
increases then decreases network stability.41
41Because contagion is a property of net worth decreasing below some threshold value, positive shocks to
income have no effect on contagion in the model.
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(a) λ = 0 (b) λ = 0.25
(c) λ = 0.5 (d) λ = 0.75
(e) λ = 0.9
Figure 2.C.3: Changes in parameter λ.
Notes: Pareto distributed in-degree d. Aggregate wealth is increasing in expected in-degree
d. c = 0.3 and θ = 0.92. As γ increases wealth inequality decreases. The domain of
γ = [1.025, 2.375] corresponds to Gini coefficients of [0.952, 0.267] and top 1% wealth shares
of [0.894, 0.070]. Percentage of financial failures is average of 1,000 simulations.
Chapter 3
Instability, Credit, and Inequality in
the Twentieth Century
3.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this essay is to investigate whether there exists a relationship between
inequality, financial instability, and credit, and whether instability is a credit or inequality-
driven phenomenon. If the latter relationship can be discerned, does wealth inequality
play a different role than income inequality, as suggested in the first two essays? This
essay specifically explores the long-run relationship between financial instability, household
credit, and inequality over the previous century in the United States. The accumulation of
credit precedes nearly all crises throughout history, and the US experience is no exception.
This causal relationship is well theorized and documented. Inequality’s role in the dynamic
remains obscure yet relevant. It associates strongly with both the Great Crash of 1929 and
the more recent global financial crisis and also has logical theoretical links with the level of
debt in the economy.
Three long-term relationships are presented and studied. The first, designated the Piketty
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hypothesis, explores the role of wealth and wealth inequality on financial instability. A
detailed theoretical financial network mechanism is explored in the previous essay, thus this
paper focuses on the statistical validity of the broader historical relationship for the US case.
The conventional wisdom is that inequality contributes to financial instability thusly:
Higher income inequality is realized through stagnant average income growth, which drives
up consumer borrowing. The resulting increase in debt generates the traditional irregular
growth in credit that is a hallmark of financial crises. The other long-run relationships
investigated in this essay are between (1) income inequality and debt, and (2) debt and
financial instability. This alternative hypothesis is referred to as the two-step hypothesis, or
two-step mechanism, throughout the paper.
Studying one system of variables that includes bank failures (our proxy for instability),
top wealth shares interacted with aggregate wealth, income growth inequality, debt, and a
long-term interest rate, empirical evidence is found in support of the Piketty hypothesis at
the expense of the two-step mechanism hypothesis. That is, wealth inequality is cointegrat-
ing with instability, and the impact from wealth inequality, as well as the interest rate, is
positive and significant. The relationship also moves more strongly from wealth inequality
to instability than in the reverse direction. The long-run relationship is also mean-reverting,
but extremely slowly. This means that changes in wealth inequality levels and interest rates
gradually push the relationship away from its long-run level, only to be pulled back by an
adjusting increase in financial instability. This dynamic corresponds to the observed declines
in wealth inequality and aggregate wealth in the postwar period and also the increase since
the 1970s.
Evidence of the long-run relationship between household debt strongly contributing to
wealth inequality is also found—further supporting the contention of this dissertation that
the accumulation and distribution of assets plays an important role in financial stability that
income inequality does not. When this relationship deviates from long-run values, it is again
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an adjustment in bank failures, or instability, that pulls the relationship back to its stationary
level. Adjustments from decreasing wealth inequality or interest rates are insignificant, and
changes in household debt are primarily influencing the cointegration process around wealth
inequality as an accumulation of shocks.
Two other systems of variables are estimated, investigating the two-step mechanism piece-
by-piece. Evidence in support of the link between income inequality and debt (step one) is
found, however the relationship between household debt and instability (step two) is more
equivocal. The long-term effect of shocks to household debt have no significant impact
on instability. It is also likely that instability (still measured in bank failures) does not
cointegrate with household debt, and thus our results are imposing a theoretically, but not
empirically, identified relationship. Statistical tests strongly indicate financial instability is
actually exogenous to the final system of variables.
A well-defined path from empirical modeling to economic theory depends upon statistical
inference. Typically in macroeconomic modeling, theory-based, non-stochastic models are
applied to empirical data by appending a stochastic disturbance process to the model.1 The
cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) model—the econometric methodology employed
in this paper—takes the opposite approach. It begins with an explicitly stochastic represen-
tation of all the data and then derives a more general statistical model through parameter
testing. It is arguably a more helpful technique for sifting through and evaluating the natu-
ral macroeconomic experiments occurring through passive observation. David Hendry once
remarked in an econometrics seminar hosted by Robert Engle that the basic problem any
forecaster faces is when, not if, a dummy variable will be needed in an econometric time
series. The CVAR method makes the inevitability of stochastic events fundamental to its
1Johnston & Dinardo, in their classic text Econometric Methods, Fourth Edition (1997), describe the
disturbance term as a “stochastic symbol for the econometrician’s residual ignorance” (p.46). They continue:
“just as one often does with God, one ascribes to the inscrutable and unknowable the properties most
convenient for the purpose at hand.”
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framework.
It therefore seems a natural tool for analyzing irregular, long-run events such as financial
crises, and the long time periods involving wealth inequality and aggregate wealth dynamics
invite the use of the cointegrated VAR model to examine the adjustments between stationary,
long-run states. While it may seem peculiar to consider an equilibrium level of financial in-
stability in shorter time frames, the long-term but stochastic movement in bank failures is an
appropriate non-stationary series to study as a cointegrating relation with other endogenous
and non-stationary variables.
This paper, then, is not an in-depth, rigorous analysis of one specific statistical model
and its precise general-to-specific, parsimonious identification. Rather, it is an overview of
three competing, but possibly complementary, narratives describing long-run relationships
between the distribution of economic resources, debt, and the incidence of financial instability
in the US. Each one of the statistical models presented could themselves be worthy of a
dissertation chapter. The goal is to motivate a broader line of thinking and research into
long-run behavior of these interrelated macroeconomic phenomena. One of the advantages
of utilizing the cointegrated VAR framework is the statistical valid framework it creates to
test ex-ante theoretical relationships and cast them in potentially new light, question their
supposed staid insights, or challenge the empirical interpretations of theoretical constructs.
The reminder of this essay is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews some of the
relevant literature. Section 3.3 broadly outlines each of the relationships in the two-step
mechanism and the Piketty hypothesis through a cointegration framework. Section 3.4
introduces the data, the cointegrated VAR model, and hypothesis testing formulations on the
cointegrating vectors. It also presents an alternative moving average (MA) representation
of the econometric model that helps to interpret the model’s stochastic elements. Section
3.5 presents estimation results of the CVAR model for each of the competing hypotheses
and discusses the long-run dynamics of each result and Section 3.6 examines each system
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of variables’ impulse responses. In Section 3.7, some robustness checks on the constancy of
the statistical model’s estimates are reported, and Section 3.8 concludes. A long appendix
details the data used, model specification testing, and other estimation results.
3.2 Relevant Literature
This section summarizes some of the main findings in the literature concerning the relation-
ships in the two-step mechanism and the Piketty hypothesis. The more traditional study of
credit and crisis is the starting point (step two of the two-step mechanism), moving on to the
relationship between inequality and credit, and finally to wealth inequality and instability.
3.2.1 Credit and crisis
The relationship between credit and instability begins with the role of finance. Finance’s
contribution to economic growth has been under consideration by economists since at least
Joseph Schumpeter (The Theory of Economic Development, 1934), who stated, “development
is in principle impossible without credit.” Whether by decreasing information and trans-
portation costs, increasing savings opportunities, facilitating risk through maturity trans-
formation, or aiding capital allocation, to name but a few, there exist numerous potential
mechanisms for the expansion of the financial system to positively impact growth. Levine
(1997) surveys the economic theory and cites over 30 studies demonstrating a relationship
between a country’s financial development and economic growth. For example, the positive
role of credit on growth extends to the industry level (Rajan and Zingales (1998)).
The corollary, of course, is that, as in “Spinning Wheel” and classical mechanics, what
goes up must come down. Charles Kindleberger sums up the causal relation early in his
definitive chronicle of economic booms and busts: “The cycle of manias and panics results
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from the pro-cyclical changes in the supply of credit.”2 He goes on to say that the “causa
remota of any crisis is the expansion of credit and speculation” (p. 104). At the same time,
he argues that the causa proxima, or catalyzing pin prick in the proverbial credit bubble,
varies and “may be trivial.”
Underpinning Kindleberger’s survey is Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis,
itself an alternative financial interpretation of Keynes’s General Theory. In its briefest
summary, the theory proclaims “stability is destabilizing.” What this means demands a
slightly longer summary. The uncertain choices made in a financial economy (what to invest
in and how to finance it) yield three credit profiles: hedge finance, where incoming cash
flows cover interest and principal costs; speculative finance, where interest is paid; and Ponzi
finance, in which neither interest nor principal payments are met and new credit must service
the old. When expanding expectations of prospective earnings create new credit obligations
to fund investment are met by unexpected deterrents, margin calls and other events can
trigger the debt-deleveraging phase of a cycle. That is, in the transition from boom to bust,
the economy shifts from a majority of hedge and speculative borrowers to a majority of
speculative and Ponzi borrowers.3
Schularick and Taylor (2012) test the reduced-form levers of the Minsky model against a
panel of 17 countries between 1870 and 2008 and find that lagged growth in real bank loans
positively contributes to the likelihood of financial crisis. Notably, their own results do not
hold for the subsample of US observations—another motivation for the current paper.4
2Kindleberger & Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (2005), p. 12.
3See Minsky, John Maynard Keynes (1975) of Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (1986) for detailed expo-
sitions.
4The empirical significance of lagged real growth in credit on financial crises fails for the US for the
Schularick & Taylor subsample of crisis episodes. However, as in their model, the second lag is significant
(10%) when using a broader measure of a large financial crisis, derived from Reinhart (2010), and defined
as the occurrence of both a banking crisis and a stock market crash in a given year.
CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 105
3.2.2 Income inequality and debt
The intuitive entry point for studying the potential role of inequality on instability is to
examine income inequality’s effect on credit growth. Not only has income inequality data
been more readily available, but it also naturally relates to existing theories of aggregate
demand, consumer purchasing power, and debt. In response to the great recession, Bordo
and Meissner (2012) analyzed the Schularick & Taylor data directly and, ignoring many
econometric red flags—later corrected by Gu and Huang (2014), with contradictory results—
concluded that lagged changes in income inequality have no role in abnormal credit growth
and hence no relation to financial instability. Examining only the last 40 years of economic
time series and using a battery of estimation methods, Perugini et al. (2016) and Malinen
(2014), both find tentative results suggesting a statistically significant contemporaneous role
for the level of income inequality on private indebtedness. Each of these papers therefore
considers the two-step mechanism in its entirety.
Other research in the literature focuses only on step one, between income inequality
and debt. Belabed (2015) links income inequality in the US before the Great Depression to
increased levels of consumption, because households follow preferences according to a relative
income hypothesis á la Duesenberry, and then to increasing household debt.5 Focusing on the
US since 1980, Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) present a conceptual framework (discussed in
greater detail below) to consider the role of realized capital gains and stagnant income growth
in household balance sheets. It helps to understand the empirical patterns, which mirror the
historical patterns documented in Belabed (2015), that they report: stagnant incomes of the
bottom 95% but steady consumption comoving with higher income inequality and household
debt.
In a comprehensive and rigorous new paper, Coibion et al. (2017) utilize household-level
debt data from 2000 until 2012. Exploiting local variations in income inequality, the authors
5See Duesenberry, Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior (1949)
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find that low-income households in zip-codes with high inequality accumulate less debt as
a share of income than households with similar incomes in low-inequality areas. This, they
conclude, points to a credit supply, rather than credit demand, narrative.
In the broader and in-depth inquiry New Perspectives on Business Cycles: An Analysis
of Inequality and Heterogeneity (1993), Satya P. Das incorporates interpersonal distributions
into a set of theoretical models. Chapter seven considers inequality’s effect on a dynamic
model of a single-asset money market with exogenous income inequality and money-holding
preferences. As expected, increasing inequality leads to a greater demand in real money
because richer households are more patient and prefer to hold more money relative to con-
sumption.6 In chapter eight, he directly explores a model of inequality and banking-sector
instability, utilizing a maturity-transformation type of mechanism. Increasing inequality
causes a savings disparity, the disparity leads to a greater ratio of a bank’s long-run deposits
to short-term deposit, and the increasing share of long-run deposits leads banks to devise
riskier (more illiquid) portfolios—thereby increasing instability.
3.2.3 Wealth inequality and instability
The main argument in Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Centry (2014) is that wealth
inequality and aggregate national wealth are, since the late 19th century, historically high.
The postwar period was an anomaly, created primarily through politics and conflict, and
high wealth inequality and aggregate wealth are returning to historically high levels—their
stationary state, if you will. The primary mechanism is the superior returns enjoyed by
capital relative to labor, or r > g. In direct contrast to the two-step hypothesis, Piketty
writes that “a potentially more important cause of instability is the structural increase of the
capital/income ratio. . . coupled with an enormous increase in aggregate international asset
6Time preferences are the primary mechanism through which Das determines endogenous income and
wealth distributions, as in much of the heterogenous household literature.
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positions” (p. 298). He does not go on, however, to theorize the ways in which aggregate
wealth contributes to financial instability.
A role for the distribution of those aggregate positions was argued in the first two essays of
this dissertation and can be summarized as follows. First, wealth inequality was found to have
a significant and positive marginal effect on the likelihood of future financial crises across a
panel of nine countries across the twentieth century. Second, a theoretical interpretation was
developed, arguing that financial assets inherently link individuals in a network structure,
and it is the topology, or configuration, of the network that largely determines its stability in
the event of some income shock. Both findings crucially depend on the level of total wealth
being sufficiently high, as put forth by Piketty, and thus are not in conflict with Minsky’s
instability hypothesis. Rather, it was argued that the distribution of financial assets (the
reciprocal side of credit) as concentrated amongst top wealth holders is more relevant to
systemic financial crises than individual manias or panics. The proceeding analysis will
consider a continuous measure of financial instability in contrast to the binary, systemic
indicator in the first empirical study in Chapter one.
3.3 Inequality, Debt, and Instability Frameworks
3.3.1 Financial instability and debt
According to Minsky (1975), the driving force of the theoretical relationship between credit,
or debt, and financial instability is the ratio between new investment demand and expected
retained earnings, or I
Q̂
using his notation. Why? New investment demand is the expan-
sionary macroeconomic force, based on the Kalecki profit equation, and retained earnings
are what finance it. The difference between the investment amount and retained earnings
comes from borrowing.
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This ratio is redefined, based on more readily available macroeconomic time series, as D
A
,
where D represents total debt or credit and A represents total assets. Because the expansion
of the money supply M may also fuel credit growth, and therefore instability, we consider
the following function of financial instability: crisist = f(
Dt
At
,Mt), where crisis is some
continuous variable describing the likelihood of a crisis episode or the degree of financial
instability in a given year. Now, assume there is some steady-state relation or long-run value
crisisLR = η. Deviations from it could be measured by
crisist + θ1dt + θ2at + θ3mt = ηt, (3.1)
where lowercase variables indicate a log of either debt, assets, or money. This equation
implies testing whether some hypothetical ηt is a stationary process. If so, deviations should
be equilibrium-correcting whenever ηt 6= 0 and adjust back to the theoretical steady state.
(Empirically, this may be difficult to observe, as new shocks and feedbacks continue to distort





that θ1 < 0 and θ2 > 0—and from f2 =
∂f
∂M
< 0 that θ3 < 0.
3.3.2 Debt and income inequality
The second relationship outlined in the introduction presents income inequality as a key
component of credit growth. It is thought that stagnant incomes at the lower end of the
income distribution pressure households into more borrowing in order to maintain consump-
tion.7 Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) define a steady-state relationship between the aggregate
household debt-to-output ratio as
dt = ȧt + ct + g
r
gap,t, (3.2)
7See, for example, Frank et al. (2005), Iacoviello (2008), and Bertrand and Morse (2013).
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where credit d, change in assets ȧ, and consumption c are all ratios relative to output. The
r superscript indicates a real growth rate ggap, which represents the gap in average income
growth between rich and poor households. Their model shows that increasing inequality via
an increased income-growth gap between the top and bottom ends of the income distribution
leads to increasing debt.
An alternative specification to explore is a simple, direct one:
dt + ζ1ineqt = νt. (3.3)
To test if this proposed long-run relationship holds, νt must be stationary, where nonzero
values indicate movements from disequilibrium of the proposed cointegrating relation. If
income inequality is to have a positive long-run effect on debt then ζ1 < 0.
The previous set of equations outlines the most conventional thinking on how the inter-
personal distribution of income may contribute to financial instability, if at all. Step one,
income inequality must increase debt (as in (3.2) or (3.3)); step two, increasing debt forms
a credit bubble that eventually bursts (as in (3.1)). To distinguish this competing narrative
from the hypothesis we propose below, it will be referred to as the two-step mechanism or
two-step hypothesis.
3.3.3 Wealth inequality and instability
The third relationship implies a direct link between wealth inequality, aggregate wealth,
and instability. Building upon empirical results from the first essay, which demonstrated a
significantly positive marginal effect of wealth inequality on financial crises, the interaction
of wealth inequality with the aggregate wealth-income ratio is tested as a cointegrating
relationship with financial instability. It is posited that if the relationship holds in the US
over the last century, then it may be tested as a cointegrating relation
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crisist + δ1(top1nw ×
W
Y
)t + δ2dt + δ3it = ξt, (3.4)
where top1nw represents the top 1% share of wealth, W/Y the aggregate wealth-income ratio,
d represents debt, and i the long-term interest rate. Again, the right-hand side variable ξt
measures deviations from any long-run value and can be tested for stationarity (and thus
cointegration). This hypothetical relationship not only captures the significance of wealth
inequality’s historically high long-run levels, and how deviations from them may relate to
periods of relative financial calm, but also the significance of aggregate wealth as a whole
as suggested by Piketty. It argues that wealth inequality is insufficient to influence financial
instability by itself. It must be accompanied by generally high levels of financial wealth,
thus supplying a sufficient number of assets to distribute unequally.
This final relationship, dubbed the Piketty hypothesis, is where the analysis begins. But
first, the econometric model and data are introduced, with each unique model specification
described along with the proposed hypothesis testing of the two-step mechanism and Piketty
hypothesis.
3.4 Empirical Approach
One immediate shortcoming of relying on the vector autoregression (VAR) model to study
any dynamic relationship is the limitation on the number of variables. This constraint
necessitates testing competing theories with alternative information sets. While substituting
theoretical and empirical variables opens the possibility for inconsistencies, it also serves as
a strong robustness check for any valid long-run relations. The first empirical model will
therefore attempt to nest each of the subsequent ones, albeit imperfectly.
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3.4.1 Data
Numerous data sources are utilized to construct and compare several vector autoregression
(VAR) models. A list of included variables and their definitions and sources is summarized
in Table 3.1. Corresponding summary statistics and graphs of each variable’s time series in
levels and differences are listed in the data appendix. Given the long time window studied
(some series begin as early as 1864), many aggregate data are spliced together, combining
historical sources such as the Historical Statistics of the United States (HSUS) database
along with more contemporary sources, like the Flow of Funds (FoF) and National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA).
Table 3.1: Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source(s)
lfail





Interaction between top 1% share of net
personal wealth and the aggregate wealth-
income ratio
Saez and Zucman (2014);
Piketty and Zucman (2014)
rgy1090pt
Gap in real average pre-tax income growth
between top 10% and bottom 90%
WWID
dghh
Total household debt, incl. mortgages (ratio
to GDP)
Philippon (2012)
depoghh Household deposits (ratio to GDP) Philippon (2012)
Daghh









gs10 10-year interest rate Shiller (2009)
lmoney Log of broad money (M2 or M3)
1867–1958, HSUS; 1959–
2016, OECD (2017)
The measure of financial instability is defined by the total number of bank failures,
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closures, seizures, or (in later years) assistance transactions from federal regulators. Data
for lfail come from both HSUS (HSUS, 1975, pp. 446–447) and the FDIC (FDIC, 2017,
Table BF02), the latter beginning with its inception in 1934. In overlapping years, 1934–
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Figure 3.1: Large financial crises and bank failures.
Notes: Gray bars indicate a large crisis event, or both a banking crisis
and stock market crash occurring that year. Variable lfail is the log
of total bank failures. See Table 3.1 for definitions and sources.
Any valid measure of financial instability should increase before or during a crisis and
decline thereafter. The variable lfail is compared with the actual incidence of large financial
crises (as defined in Chapter one) in Figure 3.1. An ostensible threshold for bank failures
appears in the data that relates to the likelihood of a large financial crisis. On every oc-
casion that there are at least 80 bank failures (log 80 ≈ 4.4) in a given year, a large crisis
episode takes place within the following decade. This is even more true when examining an
alternative indicator of a systemic financial crisis.
Because crisis indicators are generally determined through consensus among economic
historians, discrepancies and ambiguities exist. A comparable set of systemic financial crisis
CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 113
indicators comes from Schularick and Taylor (2012), and while there are some differences
between the two series, there is overwhelming agreement.8 Figure 3.A.1, in the appendix,
plots bank failures with the Schularick & Taylor systemic indicators.9 Nearly every prominent
19th century peak in bank failures corresponds to a systemic crisis event.
Top wealth shares for the US are estimated in Saez and Zucman (2014) using the capital-
ization method, whereby micro-level capital income data are inflated to match FoF aggregate
measures by a capitalization factor and thus yield a total wealth estimate. The national
wealth-income ratio beta comes from Piketty and Zucman (2014). Differences between av-
erage, pre-tax real income growth rates for the top 10% of households and the bottom 90%
are calculated using the data available at the World Wealth and Income Database (WWID)
(Alvaredo et al. (2017)). The measure rgy1090pt therefore captures the inequality of income
growth rather than simply top income shares.
Total household sector debt dghh includes mortgage debt and comes from Philippon
(2012).10 The variable is measured as a ratio relative to GDP, as are household deposits
depoghh, which come from the same source.
From 1897–1949, data on the change in household assets, as a GDP ratio, equals the
sum of net acquisitions of financial assets by households and the change in tangible assets by
households and nonprofit organizations (both from HSUS, James and Sylla (2006)). However,
the recent series used for Daghh represents total assets for households and nonprofits from
flow of funds data (of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)). When differenced,
8For example, the commercial real estate crisis spans from 1989–1991 as a large financial crisis, however
it is not considered a systemic crisis. On the other hand, the saving and loan crisis in 1984 is considered
systemic, but is not classified as a large crisis since there was no substantive stock market crash. Other times
dates disagree. The global financial crisis is indicated as a large financial crisis in 2007 and a systemic crisis
in 2008. Comparing nineteenth century events, 1873 is considered a systemic crisis, but not a large financial
crisis as no stock market crash occurred (only a sovereign debt emergency).
9The Schularick & Taylor crisis dates include 1884 as a systemic crisis, as do the Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) data, but a more recent update (Jorda et al. (2017)) excludes it. The latter data are available at
http://www.macrohistory.net/data/.
10This paper was later published in its final form as Philippon (2015).
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there is a significant gap between the HSUS and flow of funds data, although they move
in parallel for the sample of overlapping observations. The historic data are thus a linear
prediction based on the model between overlapping observations.11
Personal consumption data pceg come from Craig (2006) between 1900 and 1929. After
that period, the national income and product accounts data are used (BEA (2017)). The
entire series is measured as a ratio to GDP.
Data on long-term, 10-year interest rates gs10 come from Robert Shiller’s stock mar-
ket data, available online.12 The series closely tracks the effective interest rate of Mason
and Jayadev (2014), which is calculated as the actual proportion of debt payments made
by households to their stock of debt and is a more accurate measure of the interest rate
burden faced by consumers. Measurements of broad money come from Anderson (2006a)
and Anderson (2006b) between 1867 and 1958 and later from the OECD’s main economic
indicators (OECD (2017)).
3.4.2 Cointegrated VAR model
The main empirical model is represented as an unrestricted VAR(k) in error correction form,
given by
∆xt = Πxt−1 +
k−1∑
i=1
Γi∆xt−i + Φdt + εt, (3.5)
where xt is a p× 1 vector of endogenous macroeconomic variables, k represents the number
of lags, dt is a vector of dummy variables and other deterministic terms such as linear trends
or intercepts, and εt ∼ N(0,Ω) is the unobservable or error term. The model is estimated
using full-information maximum likelihood methods.
11For years in which both the flow of funds version DaghhFoF and HSUS version DaghhHSUS exist, we
estimate the model DaghhFoF,t = α1DaghhHSUS,t+ εt. With R
2 = 0.91 and α̂1 = 2.78 (with p-value=0.01)
we then extrapolate backwards with the linear prediction D̂aghh.
12See stock market data section: http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm
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The CVAR model is a useful technique to analyze long-run comovement between endoge-
nous, stochastically trending variables. The coefficient matrix Π reveals the cointegrating
properties of the data, or lack thereof, through its rank, where rank(Π) = r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p}.
If a reduced rank r < p is found, there exist r cointegrating relationships and p− r common
stochastic trends in the model. (The common stochastic trends are best represented in the
equivalent moving average (MA) form of the VAR model, discussed in Section 3.4.5, below.)
This is analogous to the data exhibiting r stationary processes and p− r different unit root
processes. Furthermore, Π can be written as a matrix product αβ′, both with dimension
p × r and of full rank. The resulting β′xt−1 is stationary and summarizes the system’s
cointegrating relationships while α represents its adjustments back to the theoretical steady
state.
A likelihood ratio (LR) test (Johansen (1995)), sometimes called the trace test or rank
test, is used to determine cointegration rank.13 A sequence of hypothesis tests is carried out,
beginning with the null of reduced rank r = 0, or p unit roots in the data. Rejecting it leads
to the next incremental test, a null of p−1 unit roots (reduced rank of r = 1) and so on and so
forth. Failing to reject the null typically identifies the cointegration rank. However there are
borderline cases where further analysis of the eigenvalue roots of the underlying maximum
likelihood function is necessary to make a determination. An intuitive interpretation of the
cointegration rank r is to think of it as dividing the data into p−r pushing forces, moving the
model along across time, and r pulling forces that draw the relationship back from periods
of disequilibrium.
Assuming that a nonzero reduced rank is found, various linear restrictions on the α
and β vectors can be tested against the unrestricted model estimates. This is especially
important when the reduced rank is greater than one. When more than one cointegrating
13As detailed in Johansen (1995) and Juselius (2006), the trace test statistic follows a nonstandard dis-
tribution and therefore must be simulated. It is particularly necessary when the model includes dummy
variables or a linear trend.
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vector exists, α and β are not unique. Rather, they are contained within the cointegrating
space spanned by all of the cointegrating vectors. Identification of the statistical model is
therefore crucial for interpreting any economic relationships. In order to uniquely identify
cointegrating vectors at least r(r−1) restrictions must be imposed on β. The null hypothesis
is formatted as H0 : βc = (H1ϕ1, . . . , Hrϕr), such that the p × (p −m) matrix Hi imposes
0 6 mi < p restrictions on the cointegrating vector βi, for i = 1, . . . , p. The (p − mi)
dimensional vector ϕi contains free parameters. Because the LR test statistic for hypothesis
testing is asymptotically chi-square distributed, the normality of the residuals from the model
specification in (3.5) is important for any valid inference. The appendix, therefore, presents
substantial specification testing results to support the validity of hypothesis tests on β and
α parameter restrictions.
To maneuver from a statistical cointegrating relationship to an economic relationship
that is primarily associated with one variable, the cointegrating vector β′ is normalized by
setting that one variable to unity. This is somewhat analogous to choosing a dependent
variable in a standard regression model. But whereas changing the dependent variable
changes the coefficients in a regression model, in the cointegrating relation the ratios between
the variables are fixed, independent of the chosen normalizing variable. For this reason
Juselius (2006) describes the cointegration coefficients as “canonical.” Of course selecting
the normalizing variable must make economic and statistical sense in that the coefficient
should be statistically significant. In the proposed restrictions on the cointegrating processes
that follow, specific normalizations are assumed in order to isolate the economic relationship
being investigated.
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3.4.3 Models of long-run relationships
Wealth inequality and financial instability
To test for the possibility of long-run relationships between inequality, credit, and financial
instability in the US, variables defining financial instability (lfail), the interaction of wealth
concentration and national wealth (top1nwXbeta), the gap in real average income growth
between the top 10% and bottom 90% of households (rgy1090pt), household debt (dghh),

































where k = 3 according to lag selection criteria detailed in the appendix (along with resid-
ual test results, Tables 3.B.1–3.B.3). The unrestricted constant µ0 is included to allow for
individual linear trends in the variables because the time series data used span nearly a
century of US economic data and debt displays a strong linear trend, as does wealth inequal-
ity (and aggregate wealth) in the post-war period. At the same time, it is assumed that
the trends within the variables cancel each other out in the cointegrating space such that
E[β′xt] = 0. Irregular economic events necessitate including 10 impulse dummy variables
in dt.
14 All correspond to unusually large standardized residuals (i.e. greater than three
14An impulse dummy capturing possible shifts from major marginal tax rates changes in the year 1985,
for example, is coded as a 1 in 1985 and a 0 for all other years, so dum85p′ = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0). A
transitory dummy is used to mollify extreme residuals of opposite sign in adjacent, or near-adjacent, years.
For example in 1924 and 1925, then dum24t = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−1, 0, . . . , 0).
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standard deviations). Though the dummy variables do not have a large effect on the CVAR
α and β estimates, they are are necessary to meet the error term’s normality assumption,
which ensures valid trace test statistics that can otherwise have low power under model
misspecification.
Three possible long-run relationships were established above between inequality, credit,
and financial crises or instability: The Piketty hypothesis and both steps of the two-step
mechanism. The model in (3.6) nests each of them to varying degrees—though each step
of the two-step mechanism will also be tested more completely. The following long-run
restrictions on the cointegrating relationships in (3.6) are proposed for identification.
If a direct effect of wealth inequality on financial instability exists, two long-run comove-
ments are considered. One, financial instability is expected to be stationary with the wealth
inequality and national wealth interaction variable. Two, the interaction of wealth inequality
and national wealth is theorized to be stationary with private debt and/or interest rates. If
these two relationships are indeed cointegrating, we should expect to find a reduced rank
r = 2, where Πxt can be decomposed into αβ
′xt such that
β̂cxt−1 =
 1 δ1 0 δ2 δ3











Because the theoretical relationship between wealth inequality and instability is positive,
the parameter δ1 is expected to be negative within the cointegrating relation. Similarly, δ2
is expected to be negative since the cointegrating relationship between debt and financial
instability should be positive. If household debt positively contributes to wealth inequality,
then γ2 is also expected to be negative. If Piketty’s “law” is indeed true, and expanding
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wealth inequality is driven by rates of return on capital exceeding economic growth in the
long-run, then it should be the case that γ3 is negative while γ1 is positive.
An alternative to the stationarity of the Piketty hypothesis is the two-step mechanism.
In the first step, income inequality, as manifested through unequal average-income growth
rates between top and bottom households, is stationary with the level of debt. This is so
because stagnant bottom incomes are thought to be accommodated with more borrowing. In
the second step, it is debt that is stationary with financial instability in the long-run. This
mechanism between inequality and crisis, if it exists over time, can be tested with the fol-
lowing identifying restrictions (where step one is tested in the second assumed cointegrating
vector).
β̂cxt−1 =
 1 0 0 θ1 θ2











If household debt is positively related with instability in the long run, θ1 should be negative.
And if income growth inequality is determining the level of household debt, it is expected
that ζ1 is negative.
In the next two sections, each step of the proposed two-step mechanism is modeled in
greater detail.
Income inequality and credit
The theorized steady-state relationship between debt and income inequality in (3.2) is posited
as a household sector phenomenon. From the vector in (3.6) we use household debt (dghh)
and add to it consumer expenditures (pceg) along with changes in household assets (Daghh).
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No longer included is financial instability or the long-run interest rate as the average income




























+ Φdt+ εt (3.9)
where k=2. The cointegrating vector now includes a restricted constant term µ1 as several
variables drift significantly over the time period and these movements may not cancel out
with a mean of zero in a cointegrating relation. The implication is that E[β′xt] 6= 0. There
are also nine impulse dummy variables in the deterministic term dt. (As before, lag length
determination and residual testing is detailed in the appendix, Tables 3.C.1–3.C.4.)
Identification requires unique or additional restrictions between cointegrating vector pa-
rameters. First, the long-run association between income inequality, consumption, and
household debt is tested, thus restricting the changes in asset holdings and trend parame-
ters to zero. Second, the relative contributions between asset changes and consumption to
long-run inequality in income growth are considered. This leaves the following restrictions,
assuming a reduced rank of r = 2.
β̂cxt−1 =
 1 0 ζ1 ζ2 0
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According to the steady-state relationship outlined in Cynamon and Fazzari (2014) above,
consumption should have a positive effect on debt, and thus ζ1 is expected to be negative if
the restrictions are accepted. Real income-growth inequality, or lower average income growth
overall as originally formulated by the authors, should positively impact debt (ζ2 < 0). The
signs of the second row of parameter restrictions are less concrete, as economic arguments
for both could be made.
A restriction only on the linear trend is formulated as
β̂ci5xt−1 = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , r, (3.11)
where β̂ci 5 represents a restriction on the fifth coefficient of the i
th cointegrating relationship.
This is equivalent to testing for the long-run exclusion of the linear trend, a process that
may be extended to testing whether any endogenous variable in the cointegrating space can
be excluded. Note, however, that testing the same restriction on each cointegration relation
does not identify any parameters, as each cointegrating vector is a linear transformation of
the other.
Credit and instability
The final system of variables is also the first relationship discussed, that between credit and
financial instability (or step two of the two-step mechanism). From (3.6), both the mea-
sures of financial instability (lfail) and household debt (dghh) are retained. The proposed
economic relationship also emphasizes the role of existing assets, or deposits (depoghh), and
broad money (lmoney), so the CVAR model estimated is































where k = 2. In this model specification, an unrestricted constant µ0 is included for linear
trends in the individual variables, and a linear trend t is also restricted to the cointegrating
space.15 This permits trend-stationary cointegrating relationships and is included given the
strong trend, in levels, of household deposits and money supply. Also in the specification are
12 pulse and transitory dummy variables included in dt to account for large residual errors
and to ensure valid trace test statistics. (See the appendix, Tables 3.C.5–3.C.6, for testing.)
This model also includes a shift dummy variable in the cointegrating space dumS1934 that
equals a vector of ones after the year 1934 when the FDIC was created. In this specification,
we test whether or not the formation of the FDIC has a systemically important enough effect
to shift all of the parameters.
Should we find a single cointegrating relationship between debt and instability, one ex-
pected relationship between instability, debt, deposits, and money can be tested with the
following restrictions
15If the linear trend were not restricted to only the cointegrating space and included in the full model,
quadratic trends in the variables would be modeled.
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β̂cxt−1 =
(












Should the shift dummy and linear trend be unnecessary, the restrictions should be accepted.
And if debt positively contributes to instability in the long-run, then θ1 should be negative in
the cointegrating vector. Increasing assets, in the form of household deposits, are expected
to decrease instability since borrowers are theoretically better capitalized, and so θ2 should
be positive. The sign of θ3 will give some insight into how the money supply has behaved
in the long-run concerning financial instability—perhaps shedding some resolution on the
prisoner’s dilemma-type uncertainty once described by Kindleberger.16
3.4.4 Additional parameter restriction tests
In addition to testing the specific hypotheses on the entire cointegrating space, as in (3.7),
(3.8), and (3.10), general hypotheses may be tested on individual parameters in each β or α
vector.
For example, we may test whether or not the variable should be excluded from a long-
run relationship altogether. This is usually signaled by an insignificant p-value in the Π
matrix. The hypothesis tests whether or not a constrained vector βci may equal zero for a
corresponding variable, exactly as in (3.11), above.
A test for weak exogeneity in a variable asks if the variable contributes little to the α
16Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) write that, the “paradox is equivalent to the prisoner’s dilemma. Central
banks should lend freely to halt the panic, but leave the market to its own devices to reduce the likelihood
of future panics. . . actuality inevitably dominates contingency, today wins over tomorrow.” (p.228).
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adjustment vector. Does it contribute so little as to be statistically indistinguishable from
zero? That is, is xit not adjusting to β
′xt−1 at all such that its adjustment coefficient α
c
i
could be zero? If the answer is yes, then the variable is actually one of the common stochastic
trends pushing the model forward. Its shocks propel the process and play no role in pulling
it back towards the long-run stationary value.
Lastly, it can be tested whether or not a variable has the opposite effect of weak exogeneity
and is only pulling back the system to equilibrium. That is, a variable is purely adjusting
and endogenous. In this case, if the variable xjt is only adjusting to β
′
1xt−1—and only one
cointegrating relationship is assumed—then αcj,1 = 1. Collectively, these tests point to new
restrictions and help illuminate or reject proposed hypotheses.
3.4.5 Moving average representation
Just as an AR(1) model can be inverted and written as an MA(∞) process, so too can
the error-correction model (ECM) representation of the VAR in (3.5). In other words, it is
possible to describe the same statistical process either as a stationary process (the ECM) or
as a cointegrated I(1) process. So long as the p × 1 vector xt is a unit root process, then
the Π matrix must have a rank of r, with r cointegrating long-run relationships and p − r
common stochastic trends.
The MA representation of a simple VAR, with no deterministic components (Φdt) or
short run effects (Γi∆xt−i), is defined as





where the first term captures initial values, the second represents the common stochastic
trends, and the last term a converging stochastic process. The C matrix is defined by
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β′β⊥ = 0 and α
′α⊥ = 0. Importantly, the C matrix captures the permanent effects of shocks
to the system. For this reason, Juselius (2006) refers to C as the “long-run impact matrix.”
Examining it by columns, one can interpret each column as the long-run effects of that
column variable’s shocks. A row-by-row inspection describes the sources of empirical shocks
on each row variable.
Given the orthogonality of α and α⊥, when the test for weak exogeneity finds αi = 0, it
directly corresponds to a unit vector in αi,⊥, which is multiplied by the stochastic error term
in (3.14).17 Thus the p− r common stochastic trends are equal to α′⊥
∑t
i=1 εi.
3.5 Estimation Results of Long-Run Relationships
In this section, the proposed long-run relationships between instability, inequality, and credit
are tested for statistical validity. The results summarizing the Piketty hypothesis, that
wealth inequality and aggregate wealth contribute to financial instability in the long-run,
are provided in Table 3.2. Results for the theoretical two-step mechanism, whereby income
inequality first increases debt and then increasing debt leads to financial instability, are
summarized in Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
3.5.1 Piketty hypothesis: from wealth inequality to instability
A critical component of any CVAR analysis is determining the number of cointegrating
relationships r, or the reduced rank of Π = αβ′. The asymptotic distributions of the trace test




















where α2 = 0 is a test of weak exogeneity of the variable x2. Then this corresponds to α
′
⊥ = (0 1) such that
α′⊥α = 0.
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statistics may vary significantly, however, depending on actual model specification. Choosing
the rank of the model also relies on the asymptotic distribution of test statistics, just as
testing hypotheses on the cointegrating vector vectors does. Therefore test statistics must
be simulated for each model specification. Simulated test statistic results for model (3.6)
are presented in the appendix (Table 3.B.4). The rank test results are interpreted from
left-to-right in Table 3.2 (or top-to-bottom in the appendix), where r is determined by the
first value with a hypothesis that cannot be rejected (p > 0.05). Therefore, a rank of r = 2
cannot be rejected, and the analysis assumes two cointegrating vectors and three common
stochastic trends exist in model (3.6).
The estimation results in Table 3.2 present several interesting findings, namely that we
fail to reject the Piketty hypothesis in (3.7). As conjectured, a significant long-run relation-
ship emerges between financial instability and top wealth shares interacted with aggregate
wealth. By normalizing parameter estimates in β̂′1 by bank failures, the cointegrating rela-
tionship with instability can be easily interpreted as a linear function of wealth inequality,
household debt, and interest rates. Wealth inequality—and aggregate wealth—positively
comoves with instability in the long-run in this setting. Long-term interest rates are also
positively comoving with instability. But while the relationship with household debt is sig-
nificant, it is of the incorrect sign, suggesting high household debt moves in the opposite
direction of the number of bank failures—or the level of financial instability.
In addition to the restrictions on the cointegrating vectors from (3.7), the adjustment
vectors in the lower panel of Table 3.2 also include one restriction on α.18 It assumes
that household debt is weakly exogenous in the system or that it is not adjusting to the
cointegrating relationships when they are in disequilibrium. The reciprocal of the weak
exogeneity result is that household debt must be one of the three shocks driving the model’s
18The decision to include this α = 0 restriction on household debt is motivated by the weak exogeneity
tests on the model, presented in the appendix (Section 3.B.2).
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Table 3.2: Wealth inequality and financial instability, cointegration results
Rank test statistic
r = 0 r 6 1 r 6 2 r 6 3 r 6 4
Trace test 80.954 42.396 13.721 1.817 .NA
p-value 0 0.007 0.317 0.734 .NA
Identified cointegration vectors (β’)
lfailt top1nwXbetat rgy1090ptt dghht gs10t
β′1 1 −3.636 − 6.177 −64.462
(−6.604) (4.748) (−5.675)
β′2 − 1 153.601 −6.188 −50.585
(6.697) (−2.340) (−2.392)
Adjustment coefficients (α)
∆lfailt ∆top1nwXbetat ∆rgy1090ptt ∆dghht ∆gs10t
β′1xt −0.206 0.023 0.001 − −0.001
(−3.711) (4.987) (0.806) (−2.488)
β′2xt 0.06 −0.003 −0.002 − 0.000
(2.285) (−1.413) (−5.861) (−1.462)
Notes: Reported trace test statistics in the top panel represent Bartlett
corrected finite sample approximations. See the appendix for non-finite
sample corrected values. Parentheses on coefficient estimates display t-
ratios and boldface values indicate rejection of the null at 5% significance.
The imposed restrictions cannot be rejected, with a p-value of 0.134. The
full model’s estimation results are given in the appendix, Table 3.B.5.
common stochastic trends (discussed in greater detail below). The restrictions on the model
are accepted with a p-value of 0.134.
Coefficients in β̂′1 imply the following long-run equilibrium relationship between bank
failures, wealth inequality, and aggregate wealth. Consider a 10 percent increase in the
share of wealth to the top 1% (roughly the increase experienced between 1991 and the global
financial crisis in 2007–2008) from its long-run value of 34 percent. Ignore for the moment,
however, any accompanying change in aggregate wealth-income ratio and assume its long-
run average (since 1912) remains 4.3. Then the coefficient on top1nwXbeta in β̂′1 implies
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an increase in roughly five failed banks.19 Though this appears an insignificant number,
the average number of banks failing annually between 1994 and the global financial crisis
was only five banks, with a maximum of 15 in 1994. If changes to aggregate wealth are
considered, the cointegrating relationship implies a substantial effect. A similar experiment
with a one percent change in the long-term interest rate would increase annual bank failures
by two.
One possible reason why the β̂′1 coefficient on household debt is negatively cointegrated
with instability is that when household debt is contractionary it reflects poor overall economic
health. Borrowers may be engaged in reducing stocks of debt but their behavior has not yet
influenced the financial economy more broadly. Of course, this ignores the broader buildup
in credit in the economy in the period before a crisis, and so the positive sign in the β̂′1 vector
on debt remains a puzzle.
The signs of the significant adjustment factors in α̂1 (the bottom panel in Table 3.2)
suggest that when the first cointegrating relationship deviates from its long-run average, the
system is mean-reverting—albeit very slowly. Comparing magnitudes alone, changes in bank
failures account for ten times as much of the adjustment as do changes in wealth inequality
(and aggregate wealth). And changes in wealth inequality account for over twenty times more
of the adjustments back towards long-run values than do changes in interest rates. These
dynamics are conditional on the decision to normalize the first cointegrating relation along
lfail, which is done in order to consider financial instability as the “dependent” variable in
long-run dynamics of the system.
Deviations from long-run averages in the first cointegrating relationship β̂′1xt—and the
slow mean-reverting adjustment—are depicted graphically in Figure 3.2. Vertical gray bars
indicate large financial crisis years. The concentrated model series nets out the short-run
19If the long-run average of the W/Y ratio is assumed to remain at 4.3, then a 10 percent increase in top
1% shares leads to exp(.43× 3.636) = 4.78 more failed banks.
CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 129
effects of the model whereas the full model includes them.20 Of particular note is the fact that
instability appears above its long-run “equilibrium” level before, or during, each large crisis.
This movement above long-term values is particularly pronounced in the concentrated form.
The figure suggests that since the global financial crisis, the stationary relationship between
instability and wealth inequality is above its long-run average. In order to decrease and
adjust back to its long-run value, wealth inequality and aggregate wealth must decrease, or
instability must increase. The slow rate at which the cointegrating process adjusts, according
to α̂1, leads little expectation of prevailing financial stability in the near future.
Studying Figure 3.2, it seems valid to believe a nonzero equilibrium in the first cointe-
grating process might exist. This consideration requires changing the model specification in
(3.6) to include a restricted constant in the cointegrating space µ1 rather than the existing
unrestricted constant µ0 outside of it. Estimation of such a model yields a new reduced
rank of r = 1, with coefficients on lfail and top1nwXbeta still indicating positive comove-
ment. However, the significance of the restricted constant µ1 in the cointegration vector is
rejected (t-ratio −0.561) and a test of its long-run exclusion from the cointegration vector
itself cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.657). For these reasons, the model specification and
the restrictions imposed in Table 3.2 are accepted.
What about the second cointegrating relation found in the restricted model estimates
20 The concentrated model removes short-run dynamics with a Frisch-Waugh-Lovell series of regressions.
If a simplified CVAR model, with k = 2 and no intercept, is written as
∆xt = αβ
′xt−1 + Γ∆xt−1 + Φdt + εt,
with reduced rank r < p and εt ∼ N(0,Ω), let
Z0t = αβ
′Z1t + ΨZ2t + εt




t) and Ψ = (Γ,Φ). If we let R0t represent the residual from
regressing Z0t on Z2t and R1t represent the residuals from regressing Z1t on Z2t, then the concentrated
model is defined as
R0t = αβ
′R1t + ε̂t.
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Concentrated model
Figure 3.2: Cointegrating relationship between instability and
wealth inequality
Notes: Vertical gray bars indicate large financial crises. The full
model includes short-term dynamics, however the concentrated model
nets them out. See text for details.
in Table 3.2? It describes the stationary relationship between wealth inequality, income-
growth inequality, household debt, and the interest rate. Normalizing around the wealth
inequality (and aggregate wealth) variable top1nwXbeta invites a linear interpretation of its
stationary relationship with the other variables. Interestingly, the signs reflect the long-run
r > g relationship proposed in Piketty (2014). While it is not so unexpected that long-term
interest rates are positively comoving with wealth inequality, since they largely determine r
in our modern financial capitalist economy, nor is it unexpected that household debt moves
in the same direction as wealth inequality, since in a closed economy one household’s debt is
another’s asset, it is somewhat surprising that the difference in average real income growth
rates between top and bottom households negatively moves with wealth inequality. This may
occur for several reasons. First, the real growth rate for average top 10% incomes (pre-tax)
was consistently large and significant in both the 1910s and since the 1990s—both eras of
rising income and wealth inequality. Second, it is known that the US is a special case in that
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labor income inequality, rather than capital income, has become an increasingly important
contributor to wealth inequality.21 Despite these reasons, it appears the theorized long-run
r > g relation empirically dominates in the long run.
Some of the coefficients in β̂′2 are strikingly large, due to the chosen normalization. It
implies that small changes in either interest rates or real income growth rates can influence
the long-run relationship with wealth inequality and aggregate wealth. The α̂2 vector’s
coefficients of opposite sign in income growth inequality also reflect a stationary process
that is very slowly equilibrium correcting. For example, suppose a half percent increase in
interest rates initiates a divergence from long-run wealth inequality values. The adjustment
due to differences in growth rates alone suggests the return to stationary values occurs at a
glacial pace and takes over a century. Furthermore, the positive sign on the α̂2 coefficient
on instability implies it does not error correct and instead deviates from the long-run wealth
inequality level.
In essence, the estimates describe the long 20th century swing in wealth inequality—from
the interwar peak to the post-war trough and back to the contemporary peak—as one large,
slow, mean-reverting process. This is very much the argument of Piketty and, more recently,
Walter Scheidel.22 It is their contention that wealth inequality has historically been very
large, either because capital returns dominate average growth or because, since pre-history,
a stratified society has biologically and politically allocated surpluses unevenly. The 20th
century’s long deviation from this historically stationary relationship is the exception that
proves the rule, they argue.
Presented graphically in Figure 3.3, however, the slow adjustment in β̂′2xt isn’t apparent—
at least not when examining the concentrated model, which reverts in only five years after
the shock of the start of the Second World War and remains relatively stationary thereafter.
21See, for example, Figures 8.9 and 8.10 in Piketty (2014).
22See Scheidel (2017).
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Full model
Concentrated model
Figure 3.3: Cointegrating relationship between wealth inequality,
debt, growth, and interest rates
Notes: The full model includes short-term dynamics, however the
concentrated model nets them out. See note 20 in the text for details.
However, the average behavior of the full model is decidedly below the equilibrium level
from after the wars until about the 1980s. The full model’s cointegration also has a slower
average response. One way to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between the α̂2 vector’s
small but significant magnitudes, the β̂′2 vector’s very large magnitudes, and the seemingly
faster than expected mean-reversion displayed in the concentrated model’s graph is to test
if any variables may be only adjusting—that is, α2 = 1 for a given coefficient. The test
for a unit vector in α fails to reject the null for the income growth variable rgy1090pt at a
p-value of 0.128 (see the appendix, Section 3.B.2, for formal test results). The possibility of
income growth as purely adjusting could be the strong adjustment pulling the cointegrating
relation back towards equilibrium, faster than anticipated, that we see in Figure 3.3 in the
concentrated model.
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Common stochastic trends: Piketty hypothesis
We briefly consider the moving average representation model to study the three common
stochastic trends pushing the long-run relationships forward. (Full estimates are presented
in the appendix, Section 3.B.2.) Already determined is that household debt dghh is weakly
exogenous and thus contributes the shock in one of the common trends. The other two
shocks driving the common trends, chosen because they are the largest coefficients in the
remaining rows of α′⊥ when estimated, are the income-growth gap rgy1090pt and long-term
interest rate gs10. None of these three shocks have significant effects on the other identified
variables. In other words, each of the stochastic shocks driving each common trend is coming
solely from one of these three variables.
Table 3.3: Long-run impact matrix (C) from MA estimation of
restricted model in Table 3.2



















































Notes: Full estimates of restricted MA model are in the appendix,
Section 3.B.2. Boldface indicates t-ratios (in brackets) greater than
2 and rejection of the null at 5%.
Table 3.3 shows the long-run impact matrix C from the MA estimation of the restricted
model. It coheres to the above description of the common trends–except for the income
growth gap, whose shocks are all insignificant. This notable exception reinforces the earlier
suspicion that rgy1090pt has a unit vector in the adjustment vector α and is thus purely
adjusting back to the stationary cointegrating relationship in the short-run. (An alternative
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normalization of the first trend with respect to top1nwXbeta, the second largest coefficient,
creates congruency with the C matrix results.)
Examining C by its columns, which indicate how a particular variable’s stochastic shocks
impact and load into the rest of the system in the long run, the only significant shocks come
from wealth inequality, household debt, and interest rates. Over time, each of the five
variables in the VAR system is influenced by cumulative shocks in the following ways.
1. Financial instability is permanently and positively influenced by both interest rate
shocks (which may initiate cash flow shortfalls in the Minsky framework and trigger
a panic) and wealth inequality shocks. It suggests that the cointegrating relation
can in fact be interpreted as long-run pushing forces from wealth inequality towards
instability.
2. Wealth inequality is positively influenced over time by shocks in household debt-to-
GDP ratios and also by its own shocks, but it may also have been positively influenced
by financial instability shocks (the contention of Scheidel (2017), p. 364)—the t-ratio
is borderline. This supports the interpretation of the second cointegrating relationship
in favor of household debt positively contributing to wealth inequality.
3. The gap in average real income growth between top and bottom households is only
impacted in the long run by shocks to the interest rate.
4. Household debt is only influenced in the long run by its own shocks. Shocks from
income-growth inequality are notably insignificant.
5. Interest rates are only impacted by their own shocks in the long run.
To briefly summarize the statistical findings in support of the Piketty hypothesis, wealth
inequality (as interacted with aggregate wealth) is found to have a positive long-run co-
movement with financial instability, as is the long-term interest rate. Additionally, wealth
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inequality and interest rate shocks both very strongly and positively impact financial insta-
bility in the long run; however, the reverse is not true. This suggests that wealth inequality
and interest rates are indeed pushing the long-run relationship to instability, while bank fail-
ures pull the system back towards equilibrium after long deviations. Household debt is found
to be negatively related in the long term to financial instability. Furthermore, its cumulative
shocks have no significant long-term impact on instability. This gives pause to the two-step
mechanism hypothesis and warrants further investigation below. The long-run relationships
between financial instability and wealth inequality appear to be slowly mean-reverting, but
the adjustment is almost entirely driven by bank failures.
Second, household debt and interest rates are positively cointegrated with wealth inequal-
ity, while income growth inequality is related negatively. Over the long run, it is primarily
household debt shocks, though, that contribute to wealth inequality. That said, there exists
no significant cumulative impact from debt shocks, however, on income growth inequality—
another demotion of the two-step mechanism hypothesis. Together, these results, along with
a battery of specification tests, provide some statistical credibility to the Piketty hypoth-
esis as interpreted here: wealth inequality—and aggregate wealth—contribute to financial
instability in the long run.
3.5.2 Two-step mechanism, step one: from income inequality to
debt
The two-step mechanism hypothesis linking income inequality to debt—and debt to instability—
as described in (3.8) is tested and rejected (p-value = 0.01) for the two cointegrating rela-
tions found in Table 3.2. Therefore two additional models in (3.9) and (3.12), with two
unique systems of variables, are considered to investigate the mechanism piecewise. As de-
termined above in Table 3.2, there does appear to be cointegration between inequality and
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debt—however the direction of the pushing force seems to flow from accumulated shocks in
household debt to increases in wealth inequality, not from income inequality to household
debt.
Table 3.4: Debt and income growth inequality, cointegration results
Rank test statistic
r = 0 r 6 1 r 6 2 r 6 3
Trace test 124.849 49.010 5.354 1.016
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.959 0.927
Identified cointegration vectors (β’)
dghht Daghht pcegt rgy1090ptt µ1
β′1 1 − −3.246 −7.113 1.566
(−3.846) (−3.579) (2.842)
β′2 − −0.940 −0.903 1 0.860
(−10.009) (−3.740) (5.180)
Adjustment coefficients (α)
∆dghht ∆Daghht ∆pcegt ∆rgy1090ptt
β′1xt − −0.048 0.029 0.017
(−1.376) (6.836) (6.090)
β′2xt − 0.884 0.014 0.006
(9.248) (1.238) (0.770)
Notes: Reported trace test statistics in the top panel represent Bartlett
corrected finite sample approximations. See the appendix for non-finite
sample corrected values. Parentheses on coefficient estimates display t-
ratios and boldface values indicate rejection of the null at 5% significance.
The above imposed restrictions cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.12.
The full model’s estimation results are given in the appendix, Table 3.C.8.
Estimation results of the identified cointegration vectors α̂ and β̂′ are presented in Table
3.4. The top panel indicates a reduced rank of r = 2 for model (3.9), and thus p − r = 2
common stochastic trends. We fail to reject the exclusion of the trend term in (3.10) from
the cointegrating vectors (p-value of 0.73). However, the cointegrating relationships both
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show nonzero means, and so a constant term is included in the β′ vectors. The restrictions
in Table 3.4 cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.12. Note that the accepted restrictions
again include an additional α = 0 restriction on the household debt variable.23
How should these cointegration results be interpreted, and what do they mean for the
relationship between income inequality and debt? The first cointegrating relationship β̂′1xt, in
the middle panel of Table 3.4, is normalized on household debt dghh in order to facilitate the
economic interpretation of the cointegrating relationship between income-growth inequality,
consumption, and household debt. That they comove over the long run supports the first step
of the hypothesized mechanism. Estimated magnitudes are also economically meaningful.
One percent increases in both the average real income-growth gap between top and bottom
households, as well as the personal consumption expenditure-to-GDP ratio, would imply an
increase in the household debt-to-GDP ratio of over 10 percent—an increase observed several
times over in the advancement of the housing boom before the global financial crisis of 2007
and 2008.
The adjustment factors to the first cointegrating relationship, α̂1, reveal that consumption
and the gap between income growth rates are both pulling the system back to its stationary
level. Their opposite signs indicate mean-reversion, and at a fairly moderate rate under
normalization choice. The hypothetical 10 percent increase in household debt, above its
stationary level, would take 3–5 years to return to long-run averages, according to the bottom
panel of Table 3.4. Figure 3.4 makes these adjustments explicit, around the actual household
debt-to-GDP ratio. Though outlying observations undermine the usefulness of the model
prior to the Second World War, the post-war period nicely illustrates the mean-reverting
dynamics of the model. In the 1980s and 1990s, actual household debt was below the
cointegrating relation’s implied stationary value and was pulled up by increasing consumption
23The decision to include the weak exogeneity restriction comes form system test results in Table 3.C.2 of
the appendix.
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−1.57 + 3.24pceg + 7.11rgy1090pt
Figure 3.4: Cointegrating relationship between household debt, con-
sumption, and income growth inequality
Notes: Actual household debt-to-GDP data is plotted with the full
model of the cointegrating vector β̂′1xt (which includes short-run ef-
fects). The concentrated model, with netted out short-term effects,
behave almost identically. See Figure 3.C.2 in the appendix.
and income-growth inequality between top and bottom households until 2000. Then, in
the late 2000s, the housing bubble pushed household debt significantly above its long-run
cointegrating value, before falling back down after the crisis.
The second cointegrating vector β̂′2xt is normalized according to the income-growth in-
equality variable. This produces an economic interpretation that suggests both changes in
household assets and consumption positively and significantly move with the long-run level
of income-growth inequality. All adjustments back to the long-run level, however, are en-
tirely driven by changes to household assets, as confirmed by an additional test on a unit
vector in Daghh (p-value = 0.71). The second cointegrating vector’s plots are presented in
the appendix (Figure 3.C.3).
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Common stochastic trends: step one
Examination of the common stochastic trends to the model of the first step in the two-step
mechanism supports the conclusion that household debt appears weakly exogenous and only
contributes to the model as a shock. The full MA estimates in the appendix (Section 3.C.2)
also imply consumption shocks contribute to the second common trend, along with income-
growth inequality shocks. Table 3.5 shows the long-run impact matrix C of the cumulative
shocks in the MA form of the model estimated above in Table 3.4.
Table 3.5: Long-Run Impact Matrix (C) from MA estimation
of restricted model in Table 3.4

































Notes: Full estimates of restricted MA model are in the appendix,
Section 3.C.2. Boldface indicates t-ratios (in brackets) greater than
2 and rejection of the null at 5%.
Revealingly, household debt shocks (column 1) significantly impact all the variables in the
system except income growth inequality. This gives no indication of the comovement between
debt and income inequality is pushed from debt to inequality since there is no evidence that
shocks to household debt are contributing to increasing income-growth inequality. Instead,
income-growth inequality shocks significantly contribute to debt in the long-run (column 4).
Personal consumption expenditure shocks, as the cointegrating model suggests, negatively
contribute to household debt in the long run—though the significance is borderline with
a t-ratio of 1.988. Income inequality shocks significantly contribute to the entire system.
Shocks to changes in household assets, which we found evidence of being purely adjusting,
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predictably have no significant lasting impact on any variable and those shocks are purely
transitory.
Overall there exists convincing statistical evidence that increasing inequality of real in-
come growth made important contributions to increasing household debt over the 20th cen-
tury in the US. There is little evidence that the direction of the impact flows in the reverse
order, or that other contributing factors in the model are more important. That shocks
to consumption have a long-term negative effect on debt suggests that it is indeed income
growth inequality that is the main long-run contributor, rather than a keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses consumption story over the long run. In support of this fact, short-run dynamics
of consumption have positive and significant impacts on debt that income inequality lacks
(Table 3.C.8, appendix).
3.5.3 Two-step mechanism, step two: from debt to instability
Estimation results for the system of variables considering the second step in the proposed
two-step mechanism (from debt to financial instability, as modeled in (3.12)) are presented
in Table 3.6. The analysis is simplified because of a reduced rank of r = 1. As a consequence
there exist no identification concerns for β̂ coefficients in the cointegrating space.
The restrictions in (3.13) cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.61), and the additional restric-
tion of weak exogeneity for household deposits is also accepted (p-value = 0.68). Normalizing
the cointegrating vector β along financial instability, coefficient estimates can be interpreted
as household debt positively comoving with financial instability in the long run and broad
money negatively comoving with financial instability. In this scheme, money functions as
a stabilizing source to the economy. This suggests that the loose money effect post-crisis,
whereby lender of last-resort responsibilities are demanded and deployed, dominates the loose
money effect pre-crisis that facilitates the growth in debt overall. The cointegrating relation
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Table 3.6: Financial instability and debt, cointegration results
Rank test statistic
r = 0 r 6 1 r 6 2 r 6 3
Trace test 83.552 42.014 13.338 3.027
p-value 0.003 0.188 0.891 0.952
Identified cointegration vector (β’)
lfailt dghht depoghht lmoneyt dumS1934,t t
β′1 1 −44.110 −54.970 6.486 − −
(−6.572) (−5.406) (7.871)
β′1 alt. −0.023 1 1.246 −0.147 − −
(−2.924) (5.658) (−13.395)
Adjustment coefficients (α)
∆lfailt ∆dghht ∆depoghht ∆dlmoneyt
β′1xt −0.038 0.001 − 0.001
(−2.171) (3.587) (2.722)
β′1xt alt. 1.684 −0.055 − −0.060
(−2.171) (3.587) (2.722)
Notes: Reported trace test statistics in the top panel represent Bartlett
corrected finite sample approximations. See the appendix for non-finite
sample corrected values. Cointegrating vectors include an alternative nor-
malization. Parentheses on coefficient estimates display t-ratios and bold-
face values indicate rejection of the null at 5% significance. The above
imposed restrictions cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.68. The full
model’s estimation results are given in the appendix, Table 3.C.10
is reported twice in the middle panel of Table 3.6, the second time normalizing on the dghh
coefficient. This helps illuminate the strong stationary relationship between household debt,
deposits, and money and suggests the main forces in the cointegrating relationship are not
debt and instability, but rather debt, deposits, and the money supply.
The bottom panel of Table 3.6 shows significant and meaningful α̂ estimates for bank
failures as an adjusting force back to long-run values. The adjustment factors for household
debt and money are very small, but this is relative to the decision to normalize the β̂′1
vector with respect to lfail. That their signs are the opposite of the β̂′1 coefficients implies
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Figure 3.5: Cointegrating relationship between household debt, de-
posits, and financial instability
Notes: The concentrated model has short-term effects netted out.
Vertical gray bars indicate years with a large financial crisis.
equilibrium-correcting in the model. Household deposits are weakly exogenous and are thus
restricted to zero. They only appear as a common stochastic trend, pushing the system
along. The alternative normalization, along dghh, also suggests that bank failures are a
stronger adjustment mechanism rather than a component of the long-run stationary process.
It therefore seems plausible that lfail could be purely adjusting, however a test for a unit
vector in α for bank failures is rejected at 5% (p-value = 0.036).
Figure 3.5 plots the cointegrating relation as normalized with respect to lfail. Of par-
ticular interest is the concentrated model, which excludes short-run dynamics and isolates
the long-run movements. Whenever there exists disequilibrium below the long-run average,
it appears a large financial crisis (indicative of many bank failures) pulls it back up. This
interaction is notably absent in the 1960s, which could signal the effectiveness of existing
financial regulations that in 1980 began to be pared back.24
24The Deposit Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 enabled mergers of large banks
and removed interest rate ceilings.
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One problem with the second step of the two-step mechanism, i.e. going from household
debt to financial instability, is that the key variable in the cointegrating relationship lfail is
likely excludable from the model—hence its weak contribution to the cointegration process.
In other words, financial instability is insignificant enough to the stationary linear relation-
ship between the variables that it could be removed (Section 3.C.3 of the appendix). For
economic reasons the variable remains included, but the strong failure to reject the null in
the test for long-run exclusion makes the validity of the overall relationship between house-
hold debt and instability questionable in the system testing the second step of the two-step
mechanism.
Common stochastic trends: step two
If the long-run relationship between debt and instability is largely self-adjusting, what are the
stochastic forces pushing on the system? For one, shocks to household deposits. The other
two common stochastic trends are propelled by shocks to the money supply and household
debt (Section 3.C.3 of the appendix.) Table 3.7, which presents estimates of the long-run
impact matrix C from the MA estimation, indicates household deposit shocks significantly
impact the entire system in the long run. This is anticipated since the restriction of weak
exogeneity in the previous section has a direct corollary in contributing a common stochastic
shock to the model. However, the direction of the impact on financial instability is counter
to what economic theory would imply—namely that increased assets for households in the
form of deposits should make instability less prominent, not more, because of the better
capitalization of borrowers.
Each of the system variables contributes some significant long-term shock, so it’s most
helpful to describe which shocks influence what. First, bank failures are mostly impacted
by their own shocks and shocks from household deposits. Shocks from household debt
CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 144
Table 3.7: Long-Run Impact Matrix (C) from MA estimation
of restricted model in Table 3.6

































Notes: Full estimates of restricted MA model are in the appendix,
Section 3.C.3. Boldface indicates t-ratios (in brackets) greater than
2 and rejection of the null at 5%.
are notably insignificant, but positive, in their total effect, complicating any support of
the second step in the two-step hypothesis. Next, household debt is pushed by shocks from
financial instability, negative shocks to household deposits, and positive shocks to the money
supply. This supports the interpretation that financial instability contributes, if at all, to
household debt rather than debt leading to instability—as the alternative normalization of
the cointegration vector in Table 3.6 also suggested. Household deposits are only significantly
effected by their own shocks. The money supply is impacted negatively over time by shocks
from household debt, positively by shocks from household deposits, and positively impacted
by its own shocks.
To summarize the results of the theoretical two-step mechanism linking income inequality
to financial instability, we documented strong statistical evidence of step one. That is,
income-growth inequality positively and significantly contributes to household debt in the
long run as determined by the long-run impact matrix of the system’s stochastic shocks,
and also by the existence of a cointegrating relationship between debt and income-growth
inequality in the first place. The stationary relationship between debt and instability—
step two of the hypothesis—is opaque given the likely long-run excludability of instability
from the relationship. It becomes murkier still when long-term shocks from household debt
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are revealed to have no significant cumulative effect on financial instability. The statistical
model instead indicates that the main forces in the cointegrating relation are actually debt,
deposits, and money, with the pushing forces coming from shocks to deposits and the money
supply.
3.6 System dynamics
Given the above estimates for each of the models, and the implied long-term impacts from
cumulative shocks on each other, it is important to consider how the variables might behave
dynamically. For example, how long might it take before significant positive or negative
impacts are noticeable in bank failures or wealth inequality from a shock to household debt,
if at all? These and other questions are the focus of this section in which the impulse response
dynamics of the VAR models are considered. The methodology is first outlined before the
results of each of the three systems of variables are discussed. One general concern is that any
interpretation of structural shocks requires an assumption of orthogonality of the disturbance
term, which cannot be met since it would be naive to presume the model is complete and
contains all relevant variables. Therefore the validity of the shocks below, and their effect
on the system, can only be suggestive at best and help to interpret the system dynamics
proposed in the cointegration and moving average analysis.
3.6.1 Impulse response methodology
Recall that the moving average (MA) representation of the CVAR model can be written
down as
xt = Cx0 + C
t∑
i=1
(εi + Φdi) + C
∗(L)(εt + Φdt), (3.15)
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where xt is the p × 1 vector of system variables, the first term represents initial values,
the second the stochastic components, and the last term the convergent process C∗(L)—
an infinite polynomial in the lag operator. In (3.15), which includes both deterministic
and short-run elements, the C matrix is represented as C = β⊥(α
′
⊥Γβ⊥)
−1α′⊥, where Γ =
I−
∑k−1
i=1 Γi and each Γi is the lagged short-term effect parameter in (3.5). The corresponding













C̃∗i (ut−1i +BΦdt−i) + A, (3.16)
where C̃ = CB−1, C̃∗i = C
∗
i B
−1, A represents the initial values, and B is the system matrix





Γ̃i∆xt−1 + Φ̃dt + ut, (3.17)
where α̃ = Bα, Γ̃i = BΓi, Φ̃ = BΦ, and ut = Bεt. Orthogonal shocks are determined by
decomposing B into its Cholesky factorization
B = GG′, (3.18)
such that the variance of ut is a diagonal identity matrix of dimension p. Juselius (2006)
proposes a method of decomposing B such that ut is comprised of r transitory and p − r
permanent “structural” shocks. The analysis below, however, only considers the permanent
shocks to each system variable and therefore nonzero long-term impacts are possible.25
Shocks of one standard deviation of each system variable are imposed, with responses
evaluated over twenty periods. Error bands, or confidence intervals, of 95% are bootstrapped
25The transitory and permanent “structural” shocks proposed in chapter 15 of Juselius (2006) can be
implemented on the restricted MA form of the model in the CATS software program—itself a component of
RATS—however the lack of confidence intervals clouds any inference.
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with 1,000 random draws of simulated estimates of the corresponding unrestricted VAR
model. Finally, impulse responses for the cointegrating relationships in Tables 3.2, 3.4, and
3.6 are calculated based on the responses to each of the variables in the cointegrating vector,
their bootstrapped confidence intervals, and the coefficient estimates from their equivalent
unrestricted VAR models. The unrestricted VAR estimations, rather than the restricted
error-correcting models, are used because their impulse responses are consistent and more
straightforward to calculate. They may not be as efficient either—something to keep in
mind when interpreting the results below. Also, because the unrestricted models are used,
variables that are otherwise excluded in the restricted models appear as both shock and
response variables in the response graphs.
3.6.2 Piketty hypothesis impulse responses
The ordering of the variables in G is typically meaningful for the interpretation of the impulse
responses as the Cholesky factorization is unique. Here, the ordering of the variables is
consistent with (3.6) as the covariance matrix from the estimated unrestricted model Ω̂ shows






0.166 0.447 0.508 1
0.808 −0.578 0.956 0.249 1

(3.19)
Figure 3.6 reports the impulse responses from the orthogonal one standard deviation
shocks to each system variable. The shocked variable is organized by column and the response
variable by row so that the top right graph, for example, reports the response of bank failures
lfail to a one standard deviation shock in long-term interest rates gs10. Shocks to rgy1090pt
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses from orthogonal one standard deviation shocks: Piketty
hypothesis system of variables
are included because the unrestricted model is estimated and simulated, not the restricted
model from Table 3.2. Therefore the restriction on the rgy1090pt coefficient in β̂1 seen in
Table 3.2 is not applied, and the same goes for the restricted models in Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Financial instability shocks have a positive and significant impact on top wealth shares
(interacted with national wealth) over the 5–15 periods or years after the initial shock.
The impact of the positive shock on bank failures fades after five periods. Shocks to top
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wealth shares—interacted with national wealth—also increase financial instability, and also
within 5–15 periods. This is in accordance with the proposed Piketty hypothesis. They
also initially increase income-growth inequality a small amount, which subsides and looks
more like a transitory rather than a permanent shock. Household debt is also positively
and significantly responding to a wealth inequality shock in the first three to seven periods.
Shocks to income-growth inequality (the middle column) naturally increase income-growth
inequality, but otherwise only have a slight positive and significant increase on household
debt in the first seven periods. Household debt shocks have brief yet positive and significant
impacts on financial instability and wealth inequality. The effect of the shock on household
debt itself also takes at least 10 periods to dissipate. Finally, interest rate shocks have positive
and permanent impacts to themselves. They also increase bank failures permanently and
significantly as well as income-growth inequality after five to ten periods. These responses,
in particular the permanent impacts from interest rate shocks, are consistent with the long-
run impact matrix C from the estimate of the restricted model’s moving average form,
presented in Table 3.3. The only notable deviations are the more transitory effects of a
wealth inequality shock on bank failures (or financial instability), and household debt shocks
on wealth inequality and debt itself. In the restricted model the effects are permanent and
significant.
Next, impulse responses for the first unrestricted cointegrating relationship (correspond-
ing to the restricted vector in Table 3.2) are presented in Figure 3.7. Names along the
top indicate the shock variable. The cointegrating process as normalized around financial
instability related positively to wealth inequality, positively to income-growth inequality,
negatively to debt, and positively to interest rates. Recall that its graph (Figure 3.2) ap-
peared to be mostly in negative disequilibrium—and that was after having ruled out a
nonzero mean for the cointegrating process—and financial instability episodes pushed the
relationship above its long-run value, which was particularly clear in the concentrated model
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Figure 3.7: First cointegrating relation under impulse responses: Piketty hypothesis system
of variables
form.
Studying the responses in Figure 3.7, the cointegrating process becomes significantly
positive in the near term in response to wealth inequality shocks. Income-growth inequality
shocks have a similarly positive but even briefer impact, although the magnitude is initially
greater than from the wealth inequality shock. Shocks to long-term interest rates also have
a positive and significant impact on the cointegrating relationship. Significance begins after
three periods and is sustained for about ten more, though the effect appears permanent since
most of the underlying system variables experienced permanent nonzero responses from an
interest rate shock. Unlike in the restricted model, which found that household debt was
weakly exogenous to this process and thus strictly one of the common stochastic trends
pushing the cointegrating relation, shocks to household debt have no significant impact on
the relation.
Collectively, the above results broadly support the long-run dynamics from the restricted
model in Tables 3.2 and 3.3: Wealth inequality shocks positively and significantly impact
financial instability, shocks to household debt increase wealth inequality, and interest rate
shocks increase financial instability and income-growth inequality.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse responses from orthogonal one standard deviation shocks: step one of
two-step mechanism system of variables
3.6.3 Step one of two-step mechanism impulse responses
Next, the unrestricted model corresponding to Table 3.4 is estimated and its impulse re-
sponses are calculated and simulated. Like the above system of variables examining the
Piketty hypothesis, there is no clear ordering of the variables based on the estimated covari-
ance matrix. The variables are ordered as in Table 3.4.
The responses are plotted in Figure 3.8. As in the first system’s impulse responses, it
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Figure 3.9: First cointegrating relation under impulse responses: step one of two-step
mechanism system of variables
is expected that plots along the diagonal show positive and significant responses. That is,
variables should respond to their own shocks and hence off-diagonal graphs are of greater
interest. Household debt shocks significantly increase consumption expenditures, with the
increases to both variables declining within about 10 periods. Initially there is no signifi-
cant effect on changes in household assets, however after five periods there emerges a small
negative impact that endures for about 5–10 periods. Shocks to changes in household as-
sets Daghh have a positive and significant impact on household debt. The impact takes a
few periods to become significant and fades after 10 periods. Consumer expenditure shocks
strangely decrease household debt in the near term, but are insignificant thereafter. The ex-
pected result would be a positive increase in debt, since the presumption is that consumption
increases without any increase in assets (which remains insignificant) and income-growth in-
equality increases a significant amount over the same time horizon. Finally, income-growth
inequality shocks (the main variable in question for the initial step of the hypothesized two-
step mechanism) have no significant effects on the other variables at the 5% level. However,
error bands at the 16 and 84 percentiles, as originally recommended in Sims and Zha (1999),
would reveal a positive and significant response in household debt from the income-growth
inequality shock. It would also persist over the entire response period.
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Next, the first cointegrating relationship in Table 3.4, positively relating consumption
expenditures and income-growth inequality to household debt under the assumed normal-
ization, is examined under the same set of impulse responses above. Recall that this cointe-
grating relationship included a nonzero mean and thus the impulses responses are centered
around a nonzero, but negative, value. The results are reported in Figure 3.9. Overall, none
of the shocks have a strong significant impact on the cointegration process. Only shocks to
changes in household assets have a strongly positive and significant impact, however it is
transitory as it only lasts one or two periods before returning to its long-run value.
Depending on the significance level, it may be inferred that the impulse responses of
household debt from income-growth inequality shocks support the first step in the two-step
mechanism hypothesis. This would align with the estimates of the long-term impact matrix
C of the restricted model in Table 3.5 discussed above.
3.6.4 Step two of two-step mechanism impulse responses
The final set of impulse responses test the dynamics of the second step of the two-step
mechanism—from household debt to financial instability. The responses reflect the unre-
stricted model that precedes the restricted model estimated in Table 3.6. Again, the same
ordering of the variables is followed as no distinct rankings of exogeneity emerge amongst
the variables from the covariance matrix.
Figure 3.10 displays the impulse responses, with particular interest given to the off-
diagonal plots. Shocks to financial instability lfail significantly impact only the money
supply, and negatively so. The impact is permanent over the visible time horizon, reflecting
possible lender-of-last-resort facilities accommodating increased bank failures that continue
10 periods after their initial shock. Household debt shocks also cause a negative and signifi-
cant response in the money supply, and also a brief positive response in household deposits.
The money supply response lasts over 10 periods. However the expected positive response
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period
Figure 3.10: Impulse responses from orthogonal one standard deviation shocks: step two
of two-step mechanism system of variables
in financial instability from increasing household debt never manifests. Even if the 16 and
84 percentile error bands were examined instead, any significant and positive effect would
be at most one period long and very small.
Shocks to the deposits of households have a negative impact on household debt, though
the response is slow—only appearing after five periods. They also positively impact the
money supply and the effect is nearly permanent, lasting just after the deposits shock wears
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Figure 3.11: Cointegrating relation under impulse responses: step two of two-step mecha-
nism system of variables
off. The money supply shocks have a permanent effect on themselves, reflecting that the
money supply changes are permanent in the model and the economy. The shocks also have a
permanent effect on the level of household debt, but again no significant impact on financial
instability results from changing household debt.
Each of the outlined responses is generally consistent with the estimates of the restricted
model in the MA form and its long-term impact matrix in Table 3.7. The only interesting
deviation between the two analyses is the permanent and significant negative response of
the money supply to a bank failure shock, which was not close to significance in the earlier
MA estimates. Each of the other shocks, however, predicted permanent effects on the money
supply as echoed by the impulse responses.
Looking at the single cointegrating relationship in the model, which relates financial
instability positively to household debt and deposits but negatively to the money supply—
according to the first normalization—it is now examined in response to each of the above
shocks (Figure 3.11). Financial instability shocks, not surprisingly, increase the cointegrating
relationship to a nonzero and positive value. Interestingly, shocks to household debt push
the cointegrating relationship into a positive disequilibrium, before eventually returning to a
stationary state after 10 periods. In other words, household debt shocks positively and sig-
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nificantly increase the level of financial instability based on this long-run stationary process.
Household deposit shocks also positively and significantly increase the relationship, though
only for a few periods, and money supply shocks solicit no significant response.
Overall, there is ambiguous evidence in the response functions of a strong statistical
relationship in these data between household debt and bank failures, or financial instability.
While the system’s impulse responses do not support it, the response of the cointegrating
process implies that household debt shocks contribute to instability.
3.7 Robustness
In this section, some robustness checks on the above cointegrating relationships are presented.
By definition, cointegration introduces a stationary process to a VAR that still has non
stationary components and is itself I(1). Ensuring that the estimated cointegration spaces
and their parameters are constant over time is the focus of the robustness check process
that follows. Forward (and sometimes backward) recursive estimates are used on the above
models to test for parameter constancy.
Figure 3.12 shows the constancy of the LR test statistic used to accept or reject the
null hypothesis of the imposed restrictions on the cointegration vectors β′ and α in Table
3.2. For forward recursive tests on the Piketty hypothesis model (3.6), the sample 1919–
1959 forms the base sample, with forward estimates beginning in 1960. This graph, and
all subsequent graphs presenting recursive test results, is scaled such that the 5% critical
value is equal to one, allowing for a convenient and intuitive rejection area for parameter
constancy. Whenever the recursive series goes above one, constancy is rejected. Another
feature of the recursive tests is that, when applicable, they estimate both the full model β′xt
and the concentrated model β′R1t, thus removing the short-run effects. Because the focus of
this paper has been entirely on long-run relationships, the recursive tests of the concentrated
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LR-test of Restrictions








5% C.V. (5.99 = Index)
Figure 3.12: LR test statistic constancy for restrictions on Piketty
hypothesis model in Table 3.2
model are typically deferred to if there is disagreement. Based on the the LR test statistic’s
stability, and that its recursive test graph never crosses the 5% critical value threshold—for
both the full and concentrated models—it is safe to assume the restricted model is safely
accepted across the entire sample.
Results for recursive tests on the restricted models investigating the two-step hypothesis
in Tables 3.4 and 3.6 are given in the appendix, Section 3.D. Figure 3.D.2 indicates that the
constancy of the restrictions test on step two (the household debt to instability relationship)
are rejected for the majority of test dates, for both model forms. This creates more reluctance
to find the narrative around household debt leading to financial instability convincing. The
restrictions on the step one relationship (between income-growth inequality and household
debt) are found to be constant throughout, however.
Next, we test whether the cointegrating parameter estimates are also constant using two
tests. The first, referred to as the Max Test in Juselius (2006), tests the following hypothesis
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Test of Beta Constancy








5% C.V. (3.71 = Index)
Q(t)
Figure 3.13: “Max Test” for β constancy of
Piketty hypothesis model in Table 3.2
Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’












5% C.V. (12.6 = Index)
Figure 3.14: “Known Beta” constancy test
for Piketty hypothesis model in Table 3.2
Hβ : β̂t1 = β0 for t1 = T1, . . . , T. (3.20)
where β0 is set to β̂T . The test is more conservative, and rejection signals a large deviation
from the null. Its test statistic follows a simulated asymptotic distribution.
The second test, called the Known Beta test, begins by first obtaining an estimate β̃
from a chosen subsample of the data. Then the “known” value β̃ is tested for inclusion in
the space spanned by β̂T1 , where β̂T1 is the β estimate on the sample 1, . . . , T1. Thus the
hypothesis, formally, is
Hβt : β̃ ∈ sp(βt1), t1 = T1, . . . , T. (3.21)
As a default, the entire sample is used as the reference for the “known” β, a more conservative
choice.
Figures 3.13–3.14 provide graphs of both recursive tests for the restricted model in Table
3.2—that is, the model testing the Piketty hypothesis. Though there is some fluctuation in
the Known Beta test result in the 1980s—because both forms of the model are otherwise
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safely in the non-rejection zone—they support the constancy of the earlier findings. Those
findings were that wealth inequality positively contributes to the long-term level of financial
instability and that household debt and long-term interest rates positively and significantly
contribute to wealth inequality.
Test of Beta Constancy








5% C.V. (3.33 = Index)
Q(t)
Figure 3.15: “Max Test” for β constancy of
restricted step-one model in Table 3.4
Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’












5% C.V. (12.6 = Index)
Figure 3.16: “Known Beta” constancy test
of restricted step-one model in Table 3.4
Next, the constancy of the cointegration estimates from the first step (income inequality
to debt) in the two-step mechanism are tested. The cointegrating relation demonstrated
that income-growth inequality between the top 10% and bottom 90% of households signifi-
cantly and positively contributed to the level of household debt, as did increasing consumer
expenditures. Figures 3.15–3.16 indicate that the parameter estimates on the cointegrating
relations are constant over the sample period.
Finally, the constancy of the cointegrating vector in the final restricted model in Table
3.6 is tested. Figures 3.17–3.18 indicate that if the concentrated model is considered, as
was preferred in the analysis above since the full model was in fact borderline stationary,
then constancy cannot be rejected. The estimated cointegrating relationship showing finan-
cial instability being influenced by household debt and negatively influenced by the money
supply remains credible. However, the negative sign of the cointegrating coefficient on house-
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Test of Beta Constancy












5% C.V. (2.96 = Index)
Q(t)
Figure 3.17: “Max Test” for β constancy of
restricted step-two model in Table 3.6
Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’













5% C.V. (11.1 = Index)
Figure 3.18: “Known Beta” constancy test
of restricted step-two model in Table 3.6
hold deposits leaves the overall relationship unsettled, as does the likely long-run exclusion
of instability—the key variable—from the cointegrating relation. Of course rejecting the
constancy of the model’s restrictions (see Figure 3.D.2) poses another large problem. Fur-
ther research should investigate if the model is misspecified by using household sector debt
rather than a broader measure of total private sector debt, or financial sector debt more
specifically.26
3.8 Conclusion
As a respected economist once advised—and gesticulated—a majority of macroeconomic
time series are either U-shaped or positively sloped. So what can this analysis possibly
illuminate concerning the nexus between the macroeconomic time series of inequality, credit,
and financial instability?
First, we find strong statistical evidence in the US for what is termed the Piketty hypoth-
esis. Over the last century, wealth inequality, acting in concert with the large accumulation
26It should be noted that data collected on total private sector debt, inclusive or exclusive of financials,
moves closely in tandem with household sector debt.
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of aggregate financial wealth, contributes significantly and positively to financial instabil-
ity in the long run. The direction of this stationary relationship is decidedly from wealth
inequality, as well as interest rates, to instability, as determined by studying the stochas-
tic elements of the cointegrated VAR model that are revealed through the moving average
(MA) form estimates and also the impulse responses in Figures 3.6–3.7. Furthermore, a sec-
ond long-run relationship exists between household debt and wealth inequality, with interest
rates also contributing. In this long-run relationship, the direction is from household debt
to increasing wealth inequality. The accumulation of cumulative stochastic shocks leads to
long-run deviations in financial instability and wealth inequality from their long-run station-
ary levels, with increasing bank failures the only significant adjusting force. Adjustments
from decreasing wealth inequality or interest rates are too small in magnitude to have any
impact leading up to a larger financial crisis, the data show.
The second important finding is that the theoretical two-step mechanism relating income
inequality to financial instability via household debt is statistically nebulous. While there
is strong evidence of income-growth inequality’s positive long-run contribution to household
debt (with the direction, again, evidenced by the stochastic shocks of the MA form of the
CVAR model), the next step—from debt to actual bank failures—is less robust. Household
debt shocks, however, do significantly increase financial instability in the impulse response
of the cointegrating process from the step two system of variables. Hence the ambiguity of
any strong relationship. Another reason is that cumulative shocks to household debt have no
significant long-term impact on instability. Yet another is the likely exclusion of instability
from the cointegrating relationship altogether. (The inclusion of the potentially excludable
instability variable in the CVAR model may be one reason for the strong and unexpectedly
positive role of household deposit shocks on bank failures.)
The lack of statistical evidence supporting a relationship between household debt and
financial instability does not necessarily challenge Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis.
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That relationship, as expounded by Kindleberger, was a decidedly firm-level or banking
sector phenomenon. It appears household sector debt is alone incapable of generating such
large deviations in credit. However, it can apparently contribute to the already large stocks
of financial assets help by top wealth holders. In this sense, the changes in household debt
may be large enough to shift wealth inequality to levels that threaten financial stability.
These results bolster the general findings of the first two essays: The accumulation and
the distribution of wealth and financial assets plays a significant role in the overall stability
of the macroeconomy. Wealth, as a stock, behaves differently in the economy than the flow
of income. Therefore, it should perhaps be unsurprising that the apparent contribution
of its distribution to macroeconomic stability is different than the distribution of income.
Its accelerated amassment is also distinguishing. The continuing expansion of the financial-
capitalist economy will only amplify the consequences of the next great crisis, a fear expressed




Table 3.A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Start End N
lfail 3.283 1.897 0 8.295 1864 2016 153
top1nwXbeta 1.479 0.509 0.898 2.923 1913 2012 100
rgy1090pt 0.008 0.027 -0.085 0.076 1916 2015 100
dghh 0.418 0.204 0.124 0.955 1890 2012 123
depoghh 0.398 0.15 0.079 0.657 1867 2012 146
Daghh 0.281 0.174 -0.726 0.673 1897 2012 116
pceg 0.697 0.098 0.484 0.967 1900 2012 113
gs10 0.046 0.022 0.017 0.137 1870 2015 146
lmoney 4.693 2.641 0.457 9.277 1867 2013 147
163
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Figure 3.A.1: Systemic financial crises and bank failures
Notes: Gray bars indicate a systemic crisis event as determined by
Schularick and Taylor (2012). Variable lfail is the log of total bank















































1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Differences













1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Differences













1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Differences













1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Differences















































1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Differences













1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Differences















1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Differences













1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Differences















































1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Differences
Figure 3.A.10: Variable lmoney, in levels and differences
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3.B Piketty Hypothesis Appendix
3.B.1 Model specification testing
Table 3.B.1: Lag selection for model in equation (3.6)
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k)
VAR(5) 5 92 26 1512.263 −26.486 −28.611 0.000 0.003
VAR(4) 4 92 21 1475.723 −26.920 −28.637 0.007 0.012
VAR(3) 3 92 16 1462.976 −27.872 −29.180 0.460 0.468
VAR(2) 2 92 11 1434.498 −28.482 −29.381 0.009 0.166
VAR(1) 1 92 6 1392.956 −28.807 −29.298 0.000 0.000
Note: SC = Schwarz information criteria; H-Q = Hannan-Quinn informa-
tion criteria. Lagrange multiplier tests for autocorrelation of order 1 or
k.
Table 3.B.2: Multivariate residual testing for model in equation (3.6)
LOG(—Sigma—) = −34.443
Information Criteria: SC = −28.160
H-Q = −30.257
Trace Correlation = 0.590
Tests for Autocorrelation
Ljung-Box(23): ChiSqr(500) = 609.081 [0.001]
LM(1): ChiSqr(25) = 22.519 [0.606]
LM(2): ChiSqr(25) = 36.357 [0.066]
Test for Normality: ChiSqr(10) = 19.371 [0.036]
Test for ARCH:
LM(1): ChiSqr(225) = 249.420 [0.126]
LM(2): ChiSqr(450) = 507.341 [0.032]
Note: p-values are reported in brackets.
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Table 3.B.3: Univariate residual testing for model in equation (3.6)
Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
∆lfail 0.000 0.697 −0.129 3.225 1.665 −1.722
∆top1nwXbeta −0.000 0.060 0.379 3.828 0.192 −0.135
∆rgy1090pt −0.000 0.010 −0.089 3.216 0.023 −0.026
∆dghh 0.000 0.014 −0.323 3.878 0.035 −0.041
∆gs10 0.000 0.006 0.297 4.178 0.020 −0.018
ARCH(3) Normality R-Squared
∆lfail 3.668 [0.300] 1.233 [0.540] 0.546
∆top1nwXbeta 7.775 [0.051] 4.793 [0.091] 0.780
∆rgy1090pt 9.303 [0.026] 1.134 [0.567] 0.501
∆dghh 4.265 [0.234] 5.123 [0.077] 0.743
∆gs10 7.592 [0.055] 7.487 [0.024] 0.504
Note: p-values are reported in brackets.
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3.B.2 Model estimation
Cointegration rank
Below are the simulated quantiles of the asymptotic distribution of the rank test statistic
for the model in (3.6).
Number of Replications (N): 2500
Length of Random Walks (T): 400
Table 3.B.4: Simulating the rank test distribution for model (3.6)
Quantiles of the Simulated Rank Test Distribution
p-r r 50% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 97.5% 99%
5 0 39.714 8.282 39.120 45.240 46.756 48.530 50.724 54.222
4 1 23.883 6.366 23.225 27.793 28.909 30.327 32.184 35.425
3 2 11.991 4.786 11.349 14.839 15.746 16.861 18.482 20.792
2 3 3.970 3.060 3.269 5.494 6.218 7.038 8.067 9.997
1 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-r r Eig.Value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value*
5 0 0.385 94.164 80.954 54.222 0.000 0.000
4 1 0.275 48.405 42.396 35.425 0.001 0.007
3 2 0.144 18.186 13.721 20.792 0.106 0.317
2 3 0.026 3.624 1.817 9.997 0.442 0.734
1 4 0.012 1.125 NA 0.000 NA NA
Note: Starred columns indicate Bartlett correction values for finite sample
sizes. Boldface indicate rejected reduced ranks. The table in the lower
panel should be read top-to-bottom, selecting reduced rank at the first
null that cannot be rejected.
The rank test, or trace test, derives its name from a test of the trace of a matrix from
an eigenvalue problem. In the problem, the eigenvalue roots that are nearest to the unit
circle suggest the rank of the cointegrating VAR. Examining those eigenvalue roots, both
numerically and visually, below, can help validate the choice of rank. For each CVAR model,
there exist pk roots to examine.
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Roots of the Companion Matrix























Figure 3.B.1: The pk = 15 roots of the VAR(3) model in (3.6)
Alternative restrictions on model (3.6)
LR-test is Chi-Square(r) distributed with p-values in brackets.
Test for weak exogeneity
r DGF 5% C.V. lfail top1nwXbeta rgy1090pt dghh gs10








































CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 172
Test for unit vector in alpha
r DGF 5% C.V. lfail top1nwXbeta rgy1090pt dghh gs10
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Table 3.B.5: Estimates of the full CVAR model, from Table 3.2
Adjustment coefficients (α)
∆lfailt ∆top1nwXbetat ∆rgy1090ptt ∆dghht ∆gs10t
β′1xt −0.206 0.023 0.001 − −0.001
(−3.711) (4.987) (0.806) (−2.488)
β′2xt 0.06 −0.003 −0.002 − 0.000
(2.285) (−1.413) (−5.861) (−1.462)
Short-run dynamics (Γ)
∆lfailt−1 0.050 −0.016 0.000 −0.001 0.001
(0.630) (−2.449) (0.435) (−0.551) (1.339)
∆lfailt−2 0.018 −0.015 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(0.237) (−2.238) (0.575) (−0.196) (−0.010)
∆top1nwxt−1 −0.842 0.311 0.029 −0.003 0.000
(−1.093) (4.826) (2.751) (−0.212) (0.023)
∆top1nwxt−2 0.639 −0.007 0.001 0.039 −0.006
(0.888) (−0.118) (0.085) (2.527) (−0.878)
∆rgy1090t−1 −7.696 −2.384 0.141 0.130 −0.031
(−1.225) (−4.536) (1.648) (0.973) (−0.536)
∆rgy1090t−2 −0.798 3.135 −0.009 0.134 0.064
(−0.120) (5.611) (−0.097) (0.942) (1.046)
∆dghht−1 −0.860 1.737 0.073 0.616 −0.012
(−0.189) (4.552) (1.174) (6.331) (−0.296)
∆dghht−2 2.578 −0.719 −0.065 −0.043 0.044
(0.551) (−1.835) (−1.019) (−0.430) (1.036)
∆gs10t−1 −5.904 2.317 −0.149 −0.271 −0.399
(−0.591) (2.772) (−1.101) (−1.271) (−4.399)
∆gs10t−2 5.484 2.538 −0.048 0.168 −0.156
(0.573) (3.171) (−0.373) (0.825) (−1.793)
Deterministic terms (Φ) and constant (µ0)
µ0 −0.278 0.054 −0.005 0.004 −0.004
(−1.579) (3.666) (−2.051) (1.044) (−2.701)
dum19p −0.537 0.374 0.061 0.023 0.006
(−0.619) (5.148) (5.165) (1.235) (0.790)
dum23p 0.427 −0.226 0.011 −0.023 0.002
(0.544) (−3.445) (1.072) (−1.382) (0.249)
dum27p −0.458 0.364 −0.023 0.004 0.005
(−0.587) (5.562) (−2.143) (0.270) (0.639)
dum32t −0.779 −0.073 0.012 0.071 −0.002
(−1.456) (−1.642) (1.695) (6.232) (−0.506)
dum34p −6.199 −0.285 0.015 −0.074 −0.007
(−6.804) (−3.742) (1.226) (−3.833) (−0.876)
dum40p −0.657 −0.396 −0.021 −0.002 −0.006
(−0.876) (−6.305) (−2.070) (−0.147) (−0.918)
dum41p −1.204 −0.305 −0.019 −0.046 0.004
(−1.507) (−4.554) (−1.767) (−2.705) (0.592)
dum80t 0.027 −0.025 −0.009 −0.006 0.029
(0.053) (−0.586) (−1.360) (−0.572) (6.251)
dum85p 0.224 −0.014 0.015 0.039 −0.024
(0.310) (−0.230) (1.548) (2.506) (−3.650)
dum86p 0.267 0.045 −0.004 −0.007 −0.028
(0.350) (0.698) (−0.343) (−0.425) (−4.058)
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MA representation estimation of restricted model in Table 3.2
Coefficients of the Common Trends (α′⊥)
lfail top1nwXbeta rgy1090pt dghh gs10
CT(1) −0.054 −0.460 −0.876 0.135 0.000
CT(2) 0.011 0.151 −0.080 0.000 0.985
CT(3) 0.007 0.063 0.120 0.991 0.000
Normalized α′⊥
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Long-Run Impact Matrix (C)



















































Linear Trends in the Levels (Cµ)
lfail top1nwXbeta rgy1090pt dghh gs10
0.019 0.033 0.000 0.012 −0.000
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3.C Two-Step Mechanism Appendix
3.C.1 Model specification testing, both steps
Table 3.C.1: Lag selection for model in equation (3.9)
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k)
VAR(5) 5 92 21 1403.703 −26.387 −27.760 0.042 0.401
VAR(4) 4 92 17 1366.477 −26.364 −27.475 0.009 0.103
VAR(3) 3 92 13 1351.827 −26.832 −27.682 0.069 0.144
VAR(2) 2 92 9 1339.628 −27.353 −27.941 0.553 0.023
VAR(1) 1 92 5 1298.045 −27.235 −27.562 0.000 0.000
Notes: SC = Schwarz information criteria; H-Q = Hannan-Quinn infor-
mation criteria. Lagrange multiplier tests for autocorrelation of order 1
or k.
Table 3.C.2: Lag selection for model in equation (3.12)
Model k T Regr Log-Lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k)
VAR(5) 5 118 22 1423.610 −20.571 −21.798 0.658 0.175
VAR(4) 4 118 18 1418.817 −21.137 −22.141 0.882 0.888
VAR(3) 3 118 14 1412.787 −21.681 −22.463 0.854 0.719
VAR(2) 2 118 10 1396.745 −22.056 −22.614 0.056 0.104
VAR(1) 1 118 6 1334.995 −21.657 −21.991 0.000 0.000
Notes: SC = Schwarz information criteria; H-Q = Hannan-Quinn infor-
mation criteria. Lagrange multiplier tests for autocorrelation of order 1
or k.
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Table 3.C.3: Multivariate residual testing for model in equation (3.9)
LOG(—Sigma—) = −31.190
Information Criteria: SC = −27.739
H-Q = −28.892
Trace Correlation = 0.601
Tests for Autocorrelation
Ljung-Box(23): ChiSqr(336) = 430.054 [0.000]
LM(1): ChiSqr(16) = 15.265 [0.505]
LM(2): ChiSqr(16) = 34.338 [0.005]
Test for Normality: ChiSqr(8) = 26.931 [0.001]
Test for ARCH:
LM(1): ChiSqr(100) = 117.796 [0.108]
LM(2): ChiSqr(200) = 260.112 [0.003]
Note: p-values reported in brackets.
Table 3.C.4: Univariate residual testing for model in equation (3.9)
Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
∆dghh 0.000 0.013 0.019 4.901 0.044 −0.047
∆Daghh −0.000 0.116 −0.041 2.673 0.295 −0.260
∆pceg −0.000 0.015 0.130 5.876 0.050 −0.048
∆rgy1090pt −0.000 0.010 −0.025 3.373 0.029 −0.024
ARCH(3) Normality R-Squared
∆dghh 0.053 [0.974] 16.020 [0.000] 0.769
∆Daghh 14.304 [0.001] 0.092 [0.955] 0.638
∆pceg 12.334 [0.002] 28.047 [0.000] 0.644
∆rgy1090pt 9.334 [0.009] 1.871 [0.392] 0.498
Note: p-values reported in brackets.
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Table 3.C.5: Multivariate residual testing for model in equation (3.12)
LOG(—Sigma—) = −26.073
Information Criteria: SC = −22.268
H-Q = −23.585
Trace Correlation = 0.640
Tests for Autocorrelation
Ljung-Box(30): ChiSqr(448) = 567.979 [0.000]
LM(1): ChiSqr(16) = 30.657 [0.015]
LM(2): ChiSqr(16) = 12.205 [0.730]
Test for Normality: ChiSqr(8) = 12.359 [0.136]
Test for ARCH:
LM(1): ChiSqr(100) = 77.940 [0.950]
LM(2): ChiSqr(200) = 157.386 [0.988]
Note: p-values reported in brackets.
Table 3.C.6: Univariate residual testing for model in equation (3.12)
Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum
∆lfail 0.000 0.626 −0.290 3.135 1.518 −1.655
∆dghh 0.000 0.013 0.180 4.171 0.042 −0.039
∆depoghh 0.000 0.018 −0.145 2.912 0.042 −0.048
∆lmoney 0.000 0.019 −0.402 4.404 0.049 −0.067
ARCH(2) Normality R-Squared
∆lfail 0.187 [0.911] 1.910 [0.385] 0.577
∆dghh 1.632 [0.442] 8.779 [0.012] 0.736
∆depoghh 1.004 [0.605] 0.487 [0.784] 0.438
∆lmoney 4.955 [0.084] 10.088 [0.006] 0.820
Note: p-values reported in brackets.
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3.C.2 Model estimation, step one: from income inequality to debt
Cointegration rank of step one model (3.9)
Below is reported the simulated quantiles of the asymptotic distribution of the rank test
statistic for the model in (3.9).
Number of Replications (N): 2500
Length of Random Walks (T): 400
Table 3.C.7: Simulating the rank test distribution
Quantiles of the Simulated Rank Test Distribution
p-r r 50% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 97.5% 99%
4 0 38.839 7.897 38.155 43.540 45.083 46.812 49.547 53.216
3 1 23.111 5.904 22.326 26.641 27.942 29.329 31.120 33.586
2 2 11.753 4.341 11.208 14.161 14.988 16.063 17.605 19.729
1 3 3.971 2.651 3.381 5.154 5.715 6.374 7.306 9.129
p-r r Eig.Value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value*
4 0 0.602 142.736 124.849 53.216 0.000 0.000
3 1 0.405 55.199 49.010 33.586 0.000 0.000
2 2 0.046 5.907 5.354 19.729 0.938 0.960
1 3 0.015 1.448 1.016 9.129 0.855 0.923
Note: Starred columns indicate Bartlett correction values for finite sample
sizes. Boldface indicate rejected reduced ranks. The table in the lower
panel should be read top-to-bottom, selecting reduced rank at the first
null that cannot be rejected.
Alternative restrictions on step one model, (3.9)
LR-tests are Chi-Square(4-r) distributed, with p-values in brackets.
CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 180
Roots of the Companion Matrix















Figure 3.C.1: The pk = 8 roots of VAR(2) model in (3.9)
Test for weak exogeneity
r DGF 5% C.V. dghh Daghh pceg rgy1090pt
























Test of unit vector in alpha
r DGF 5% C.V. dghh Daghh pceg rgy1090pt
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Table 3.C.8: Estimates of the full CVAR model, from Table 3.4
Adjustment coefficients (α)
∆dghht ∆Daghht ∆pcegt ∆rgy1090ptt
β′1xt − −0.048 0.029 0.017
(−1.376) (6.836) (6.090)
β′2xt − 0.884 0.014 0.006
(9.248) (1.238) (0.770)
Short-run dynamics (Γ)
∆dghht−1 0.830 0.405 0.228 −0.020
(11.967) (0.693) (3.233) (−0.420)
∆daghht−1 −0.031 0.126 −0.008 0.008
(−3.339) (1.630) (−0.882) (1.320)
∆pcegt−1 −0.393 0.879 −0.031 0.162
(−4.910) (1.305) (−0.378) (2.971)
∆rgy1090t−1 0.289 −1.790 0.386 −0.065
(2.406) (−1.768) (3.167) (−0.789)
Deterministic terms (Φ)
dum19p −0.019 0.229 0.020 0.070
(−1.173) (1.649) (1.166) (6.197)
dum22p −0.014 −0.015 0.082 0.031
(−0.956) (−0.119) (5.338) (2.999)
dum26p 0.006 0.037 0.007 0.034
(0.452) (0.309) (0.509) (3.500)
dum32p 0.055 −0.392 0.039 0.025
(3.798) (−3.212) (2.649) (2.554)
dum33p −0.099 −0.320 −0.032 0.011
(−6.438) (−2.460) (−2.056) (1.008)
dum34p −0.069 −0.124 −0.015 0.020
(−4.688) (−1.000) (−1.007) (1.986)
dum42p −0.055 0.105 −0.077 −0.013
(−3.745) (0.850) (−5.148) (−1.303)
dum46p 0.051 0.048 0.091 0.030
(3.476) (0.389) (6.045) (3.010)
dum08p −0.038 −0.948 −0.006 0.001
(−2.673) (−7.848) (−0.430) (0.069)
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Full model
Concentrated model
Figure 3.C.2: Cointegrating relationship between household debt,
consumption, and income growth inequality in Table 3.4
Note: The full model includes the concentrated model, with netted





1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Full model
Concentrated model
Figure 3.C.3: Cointegrating relationship between changes in house-
hold assets, consumption, and income growth inequality in Table 3.4
Note: The full model includes the concentrated model, with netted
out short-term effects, behave almost identically.
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MA representation estimation of restricted model in Table 3.4
Coefficients of the Common Trends (α′⊥)
dghh Daghh pceg rgy1090pt
CT(1) 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CT(2) 0.000 0.002 −0.511 0.860
Normalized α′⊥



































Long-Run Impact Matrix (C)

































CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 184
3.C.3 Model estimation, step two: from debt to instability
Cointegration rank of step two model, Table 3.12
Below is reported the simulated quantiles of the asymptotic distribution of the rank test
statistic for the model in (3.12).
Number of Replications (N): 2500
Length of Random Walks (T): 400
Table 3.C.9: Simulating the rank test distribution for model (3.12)
Quantiles of the Simulated Rank Test Distribution
p-r r 50% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 97.5% 99%
4 0 54.379 9.332 53.854 60.246 61.837 63.605 66.591 70.685
3 1 35.449 7.602 35.040 40.111 41.384 43.309 45.598 48.624
2 2 20.023 5.720 19.380 23.495 24.690 26.014 27.781 30.127
1 3 8.070 3.714 7.548 10.136 10.825 11.700 12.843 14.930
p-r r Eig.Value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value*
4 0 0.288 90.185 83.552 70.685 0.001 0.003
3 1 0.236 49.033 42.014 48.624 0.048 0.188
2 2 0.102 16.477 13.338 30.127 0.714 0.891
1 3 0.028 3.486 3.027 14.930 0.925 0.952
Note: Starred columns indicate Bartlett correction values for finite sample
sizes. Boldface indicate rejected reduced ranks. The table in the lower
panel should be read top-to-bottom, selecting reduced rank at the first
null that cannot be rejected.
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Roots of the Companion Matrix















Figure 3.C.4: The pk = 8 roots of VAR(2) model in (3.12)
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Alternative restrictions on step two model, (3.12)
LR-tests that are Chi-Square(r) distributed. p-values are in brackets.
Test for weak exogeneity
r DGF 5% C.V. lfail dghh depoghh lmoney
























Test of Long-run exclusion
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Table 3.C.10: Estimates of the full CVAR model in Table 3.6
Adjustment coefficients (α)
∆lfailt ∆dghht ∆depoghht ∆dlmoneyt
β′1xt −0.038 0.001 − 0.001
(−2.171) (3.587) (2.722)
Short-run dynamics (Γ)
∆lfailt−1 −0.103 −0.001 0.002 −0.003
(−1.439) (−0.560) (1.163) (−1.603)
∆dghht−1 2.171 0.553 −0.220 −0.537
(0.578) (7.385) (−2.121) (−5.009)
∆depoghht−1 5.244 −0.125 0.186 0.712
(1.302) (−1.552) (1.671) (6.196)
∆lmoneyt−1 2.220 0.084 −0.015 0.448
(1.080) (2.039) (−0.269) (7.636)
Deterministic terms (Φ) and constant (µ0)
µ0 −0.311 0.004 0.005 0.042
(−1.588) (1.093) (0.872) (7.561)
∆dumS1934 −5.810 −0.049 −0.034 0.108
(−7.134) (−3.036) (−1.534) (4.632)
dum16p −1.359 −0.052 −0.023 0.084
(−1.925) (−3.679) (−1.196) (4.193)
dum18p −0.351 −0.037 −0.071 −0.018
(−0.488) (−2.615) (−3.594) (−0.880)
dum19p 0.792 −0.008 −0.004 0.095
(1.069) (−0.542) (−0.173) (4.483)
dum21p 1.381 0.027 0.038 −0.130
(1.933) (1.900) (1.903) (−6.396)
dum30p 0.985 0.052 0.047 −0.029
(1.370) (3.634) (2.359) (−1.426)
dum32p −0.874 0.082 0.022 −0.134
(−1.185) (5.603) (1.087) (−6.375)
dum42p 0.468 −0.068 −0.062 0.038
(0.638) (−4.621) (−3.050) (1.819)
dum43p −0.691 −0.024 −0.008 0.117
(−0.902) (−1.580) (−0.372) (5.363)
dum45p −0.736 −0.030 0.075 0.020
(−0.988) (−1.998) (3.647) (0.962)
dum46p −0.479 0.03 0.032 −0.096
(−0.597) (−1.878) (−1.466) (−4.202)
dum93p 1.539 0.006 −0.014 −0.093
(2.185) (0.452) (−0.720) (−4.622)
dum10p −0.025 −0.057 −0.031 −0.039
(−0.035) (−4.001) (−1.560) (−1.911)
CHAPTER 3. INSTABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND DEBT 188
MA representation estimation of restricted model in Table 3.6
Coefficients of the Common Trends (α′⊥)
lfail dghh depoghh lmoney
CT(1) −0.023 −0.700 0.714 0.000
CT(2) 0.036 −0.001 0.000 0.999
CT(3) −0.024 −0.713 −0.700 0.000
Normalized (α′⊥)
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Long-Run Impact Matrix (C)

































Linear Trends in Levels (Cµ)
lfail dghh depoghh lmoney
0.041 0.006 0.003 0.062
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3.D Model Constancy Appendix
LR-test of Restrictions








5% C.V. (5.99 = Index)
Figure 3.D.1: LR test statistic constancy for restrictions on esti-
mated model in Table 3.4
LR-test of Restrictions










5% C.V. (7.81 = Index)
Figure 3.D.2: LR test statistic constancy for restrictions on esti-
mated model in Table 3.6
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